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The purpose of this study has been to understand the experience of imaginary 
companionship through the memory narratives of adults. Following a mid-
century lull in research on imaginary companions, contemporary studies have 
focused primarily on childhood populations. Using correlational methods to draw 
inference between imaginary companionship status and other developmental 
facets of childhood these large sample studies have sought links for instance to 
theory of mind, narrative ability, perspective-taking and creativity. However, as 
less is known about the personal meanings attached to and the lived 
experiencing of these early relationships, the study has taken a 
phenomenological approach.   
For the nine university students who remembered having had an imaginary 
companion and who volunteered to share their stories, the aim was to 
understand the meanings attached to these companionships through 
idiosyncratic, personal accounts. The delineated phenomenon, ‘the 
remembered as told’, permitted an understanding of both the experience and its 
interpretation within a context of intentionality and temporality. The individual 
narrative interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed for Interpretive 
Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). From the narrative data emerged the 
following key themes: The relationship experience, social comparison, self-
evaluation, the impact of the imaginary companion relationship on identity 
formation, the influence of mother as a key figure, the influence of others in 
memory and, the experience of temporality and loss.   
What is apparent from a collective examination of the narratives is how the 
imaginary companionship is experienced ecologically in terms of other co-
occurring experiences and connections to relationships within the family. 
Interpretation shows further that the connections include past and present 
representations of self and that, as a potentially self-defining memory, this 
special companionship has, for some individuals, facilitated coherence in their 
evolving life stories.     
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INTRODUCTION
The idea for this study grew essentially from an interest in the workings of the 
imagination, initially from observing children at work and play. Employed in 
psychological and educational settings, clinics and schools, in Southern Africa 
and the USA, I consider myself fortunate to have been an observer of children. 
And so I have for a number of years been intrigued by this thing we term 
‘imagination’. All kinds of children in all kinds of settings moving beyond the 
actual into a place of projected alternatives.  
The decision to research imaginary companions came about as a result of a 
graduate childhood studies module, ‘Imaginary Worlds’, and an essay I wrote on 
young children’s imaginary friends. This would be my first exposure to academic 
literature on the topic. And as I myself had not had an imaginary companion nor 
knew of any other family member with one, my first sense of the phenomenon 
was reliant on my own imaginative faculty and of course the second-hand 
source material of research articles and text books.  
The first step towards this current project was the completion of a literature-
based dissertation on imaginary companions in 2013, (Way, 2013). Theoretical 
findings pointed to a most normative and in fact developmentally significant role 
of the imaginary companion. The paper highlighted the findings of several 
contemporary studies most notably, the link to theory of mind (Taylor, Cartwright 
& Carlson, 1993; Taylor & Carlson,1997; Taylor,1999; Taylor, Carlson &  
Shawber 2007), to ‘cognitive flexibility’ and mental displacement, (Hoff and  
Carlson, 2002), creativity (Somers & Yawkey 1984;Hoff, 2000; Hoff, 2005; 
Bouldin,2006), to levels of self-knowledge (Davis, Meins & Fernyhough 2011), 
richer narrative ability (Trionfi & Reece 2009), and, to ‘referential 
communication’ skills (Roby & Kidd 2008).The emergent picture was one of 
children benefitting personally and socially from these relationships and as 
already highlighted, a fairly common part of early childhood.  
 One of the motivating factors for this current study was a timely reading of 
Klausen and Passman’s ‘Pretend Companions: The Emergence of a Field’ 
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(2006). Herein the authors have pooled archival material, historical antecedents 
that have both informed and shaped our current knowledge on this topic. The 
article, on a personal level, did well to highlight an ontological readiness 
following what the authors describe as a ‘mid-century lull’. With the emergence 
of an enthused empiricism came new questions and methods and it appeared, 
according to the authors, that imaginary companionship had begun taking its 
place within the broader ambit of developmental psychology alongside other 
forms of pretend play.  
As mentioned earlier, the theoretical dissertation was a step towards this current 
research. However, it was not a step in the same direction. As a theoretical 
endeavour it permitted cognitive, academic access to the phenomenon. The 
experiential essence, the ‘felt’ dimension of the relationship, was still some 
distance away. The opportunity for further research meant I was given a second 
chance, to get closer to the phenomenon, to add to Klausen’s ‘emergent field’ of 
research.  
Initial consideration was given to the perspective of adults as a novel extension 
of the phenomenon. The imaginary companion has developmental relevance to 
early childhood, its temporal parameters evidently set in place between the ages 
four to six or seven, (Taylor 1997; Taylor 1999; Gleason, Sebanc & Hartup 
2000; Taylor & Carlson 2004; Hoff 2004). Studies examining imaginary 
companionship from other points along the developmental continuum are limited 
and there are few with adult participants other than those wherein parental 
testimony for the child is sought. The feasibility of understanding the experience 
retrospectively, from an adult perspective, made phenomenological sense. In 
the end, students from the university campus were voluntarily recruited, sharing 
with me their stories of imaginary companionships.  
A decision was made at this stage not to de-limit the concept of an imaginary 
companion. By allowing participants to decide for themselves the nature of their 
own experiences I felt firstly, it more likely that the emergent narratives would be 
personally embedded. Secondly, I considered the landscape of memory to be 
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ambiguous and so too the concept of imaginary companions. By leaving these 
two things in their natural state I hoped for a greater catchment area; an 
increased likelihood that participants would be able to access their past with a 
sense of ownership and confidence, speaking freely about even the ambiguous 
experiences. Thirdly, an understanding of imaginary companions would already 
no doubt be de-limited, framed by existent perceptions and beliefs. By leaving 
the definition open there was a chance for conceptual reflection and perhaps 
reconsideration. Fourthly, with the purposeful collapsing of this conceptual 
boundary there was hope that whole ecologies may emerge from the stories, 
naturally apparent links to other remembered things, to self, childhood, family 
relations, life events etc. This decision was therefore an auspicious one and 
marked the beginning of this research as an interpretive journey.  
Nine Oxford Brookes University students from an array of academic pursuits 
have shared their memories of imaginary companions with me. I, in turn, am to 
share them with you the reader.  
The introductory chapter begins with a taxonomic interpretation of imagination 
and imaginative play. The imagination is put forward for the reader as a 
particular flexibility, a capacity which appears to ‘invigorate’ other mental 
functions and seems to enable the imaginative person to conceive of a wider 
than normal range of actions or ways of being. A general discussion on 
imaginary play suggests that it serves both normative and adaptive purposes for 
the child. Suggestive of a personal interest in the value of play I have included in 
the discussion concerns over the threat of its extinction due in part to the 
shrinking of imaginative space, time, place, and encouragement to pretend. 
Marjorie Taylor, an imaginary companion researcher whom readers will be 
familiar with by the end of this study, has questioned the vulnerability of 
children’s imagination due to the ever increasing consumption of fantasy in the 
media.  
Following on from this, the next section begins a more in depth look at the 
imaginary companion. Imaginary friendships are not characteristic of any 
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particular homogenous group and the literature has suggested that this 
particular form of symbolic relationship is a valuable tool in the facilitation of 
social competencies (Bouldin & Pratt 2002; Gleason, Sebanc & Hartup 2000; 
Taylor 1999; Taylor and Carlson 1997). This chapter summarises for the reader 
the current status of imaginary companion research and gives some attention to 
the correlates and developmental attributes which have been postulated as 
related to early imaginary companionship. What becomes clear from an 
understanding of this section is that imaginary companions are no longer 
conceived of exclusively as markers for children’s poor reality- testing, ego 
defensiveness or as the result of acute early trauma. Included in the discussion 
of research outcomes are findings on theory of mind, creativity, fantasy 
predisposition, narrative ability, self-knowledge and cognitive flexibility. 
Following this, I have included a description of Taylor’s much used ‘Imaginary 
Companion Interview’, (1997), a screening instrument employed to determine 
imaginary companionship status in childhood. The final section covers what I 
have termed ‘definitional discrepancy’, a conceptual debate concerning the 
inclusionary/exclusionary criteria for an imaginary companion relationship. 
Although I remind readers of the non-definitional and interpretive stance 
adopted in this current study, it is worth noting Svendsen’s (1934) definition, a 
most frequently cited one: “An invisible character named and referred to in 
conversations with other persons or played with directly for a period of time, at 
least several months, having an air of reality for the child but no apparent 
objective basis” (Hart & Zellars 2006 p.6).  
The methodology chapter begins by positioning the research within an 
interpretive epistemology. Concerned with the meanings of imaginary 
companionship for individuals rather than the quantification or frequency of this 
phenomenon, the act of interpretation relies on social processes such as 
language, consciousness and intersubjectivity. The reader is reminded that 
generalisations from this small sample of participants to any larger population is 
not something that is aimed for.  
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In line with the interpretive stance, the methodology section encourages the 
reader to enter into a negotiated discussion around child and adult and this is 
done from the perspective of human geography. Concepts drawn from the 
landscape of childhood and adulthood, referencing the work of human 
geographers Chris Philo and Owain Jones, (Philo & Jones 2003; Jones 2011), 
are explained as non-reified and temporal experiences viewed against the 
background of the child-adult binary so often witnessed in developmental 
literature. Much of the work referred to in this section is rooted in Bachelard’s  
(1969a), ‘Poetics of Reverie’, a phenomenological interpretation of childhood as 
a place that is revisited, imaginatively returned to by adults.  
Continuing along this line, there is a reflection on the service of autobiographical 
memory. Through the collapsing of space and time memory retains its potency 
in the personal construction of self. This leads us to consider too the potential 
for de-stabilisation through attempting to reconstruct our memories and 
therefore ourselves. A childhood experience such as the relationship with an 
imaginary companion must therefore take account of many factors in its 
recollection. What follows the more philosophical discussion is the provision for 
the reader of five research examples. These are examples of studies by other 
researchers that have attempted a similar sojourn to childhood via adult memory 
encounters.  
Before the phenomenon under investigation is reached, the reader is given an 
overview of phenomenology and researcher preparation. Thereafter the study 
moves towards delineation of what it is that will be investigated, identifying and 
describing three closely related imaginary companionship phenomena : The 
adult who remembers; The imaginary companion as remembered and; The 
remembered as told. Despite the fact that it may be a fairly common 
methodological goal in phenomenological research to describe phenomena it is 
difficult if not impossible to separate out the experiential component, how it 
exists in mind. This has much to do with the idea of ‘essences’, (Husserl 1977), 
and is what makes a phenomenon what it is, its way of being. The phenomenon 
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of the remembered as told, for instance, has to do with telling someone else a 
story about something particular one remembers, something that happened and 
that one was a part of. This has a special kind of temporal value, as much about 
what happened as about where it happened, when, who was there, what else 
was going on at the time etc. It is the reflective understanding not of experience 
only but of the memory of that experience.  
There is a section devoted to describing the ‘narrative interview’. The current 
study’s data comprises memory narratives of imaginary companion 
relationships. This form of unstructured interview aims to expose themes and 
patterns between individuals as well as assist in a more lucrative understanding 
of each participant’s idiosyncratic experience. For smaller sample sizes such as 
in the case of this study (N=9), narrative interviews are able to capture in a 
rather unique way the active manner in which experiences are interpreted 
including the contextual factors which help to shape that interpretation. As the 
method selected for data collection there are certain qualities that have 
positioned narrative as favourable over others. Qualities described for the 
reader include co-production and collaboration, context and temporality.  
The interview transcripts have been interpreted using Interpretive  
Phenomenological Analysis, (IPA), (Smith1996, 2007; Smith & Osborne 2003; 
Reid, Flowers & Larkin 2005). Rather than being an analysis in its truest sense, 
the narrative data is described for the reader. Excerpts are provided throughout 
this section as experiential examples of the phenomenon as-lived. There are 
conjectured links to the literature and to my interpretation although this is 
traditionally reserved in phenomenological studies to the discussion section.  
The discussion section is a consolidation of participant testimony, existing 
literature and theory, and interpretation. Discussion of the data moves from 
childhood memory, to imaginative play and how this particular form of play may 
assist in personality extension, the negotiation of multiple selves and self-other 
boundaries. This is once again linked to notions of the inherited adult self/selves 
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and informs part of an overall understanding of the adult participant 
experiences. From pretend play to imaginary companionships the discussion 
moves towards the provision of an experiential interpretation of the 
phenomenon, the remembered story and the telling.   
Imaginative Play: Framing the Context 
Imagination is the capacity to think of things as possibly being so; it is an 
intentional act of mind; it is the source of invention, novelty, and generativity; it is 
not implicated in all perception and in the construction of all meaning; it is not 
distinct from rationality but is rather a capacity that greatly enriches rational 
thinking  
Imaginativeness is a particular flexibility which appears to invigorate all mental 
functions. The flexibility that is central to imaginativeness seems to enable the 
imaginative person to conceive of a wider than normal range of actions or ways 
of being that do not follow conventional representations. What we observe in 
highly imaginative people is variability in ways of thinking, a peculiar richness of 
detail, unusualness.  
The Child’s Work: Understanding Imaginary Play 
Imaginary play generally begins from 11 months to 18 months (in typically 
developing children), and it is the child’s work, preparing him/her for adulthood. 
Imaginative play is a thinking skill; children have to understand the meaning of 
what is happening. According to Harris (2000), there are three types of play 
involving imaginary characters relative to the medium of the role play:  
i. When the child invents a creature or person and interacts with it, but
does not rely on any prop from the environment (in this case, the child
interacts with an invisible imaginary companion).
ii. When a child invents a creature or person and then projects it onto a
toy.
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iii. When children act out or impersonate an imaginary character, (Harris
describes the child as using the self as the vehicle for the role play). In
this case, the child pretends to be something or someone.
The first ‘make believe’ games will re-create familiar activities such as going 
shopping or feeding a doll, acting out ritualised family activities. Through testing 
out roles in play they are slowly beginning to think about what it would be like to 
be someone else, an understanding and awareness that later develops into 
empathy. The imitation of social practices, the exercising of choice, the 
opportunity to switch roles and act according to the reasons of another, these 
are said to contribute to the development of judgement.  
Ossorio (1977 p.234; 2006) has described the range of choice a child has during 
play as corresponding to a loosening of constraints – a maximisation of freedom 
during which time children can switch from one role to another, swop one set of 
rules for another, abandon one game for another. When they engage in 
imaginative play, children have the opportunity to expand the possibilities of how 
a social practice occurs and to expand their behavioural repertoire within that 
practice. They can invent new versions of social practices by imitating, 
deconstructing, and reconstructing those practices, and they get used to living in 
society where change is necessary and adaptive. The loosening of constraints 
that accompanies a child’s play gives opportunities to learn these patterns and 
to operate within a greater range of ritual and relationship.  
Play theorists have concluded that free imaginative play is a significant 
contributor to children’s ability to self- regulate,(Kantor 2008).Some have 
described the emergence of “private talk” (Berk, 2008) in play, as distinct from 
that which may occur during other non-play social practices. However, with the 
parent or teacher for example, not being a participant, the child in their 
imaginative world has license to regulate the action taking place. Accordingly, it 
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is this rather unique ‘observer-critic’ role in early imaginative play that 
contributes to the development of the competence to self- regulate.  
In short, children’s imaginary play affords them the competencies to participate 
in human life. “Imaginative play demonstrates directly the earliest instances of 
creating scenarios, assigning statuses, and living out the drama.” (Ossorio 
2006, p.294)  
Social Status of Imaginary Play 
The preceding discussion, having described what is meant by imaginary play, 
would be incomplete without at least some reference to the current status of 
imaginary play.  
The preeminent issue concerns anxieties over the threat of extinction. 
Researchers, social scientists, and practitioners alike have developed a range 
of ideas about the value of children’s imaginative play and expressed concern 
about the impact of over-regulating it. Contemporary writers such as Chudacoff 
(2008, cited in Kantor,2008, p.259), have argued that 21st century children play 
differently from their ancestral predecessors, due in part to the shrinking of 
imaginative space, time, place, and encouragement to pretend. It is claimed that 
today children play approximately eight hours less each week than their 
counterparts did two decades ago (Elkind 2008). With the pressure of ‘making 
the grade’, free play, and in fact free time, is being replaced by test preparation, 
school readiness, all manner of developmentally enhancing activities. Our 
society may well have created a false dichotomy between play and learning.  
In Santer and Griffiths’ comprehensive literature review on ‘Free Play in Early  
Childhood’, (2007) published by the National Children’s Bureau, it is shown that 
there are some dichotomies within early years practice. They claim a tension 
between the language of play and the extent to which (some) adults understand 
its true potential. Children may receive the message that some activities are 
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more important than others, and that what adults do, and how they do it, is of 
more value than what children choose to do. The conclusion drawn from the 
report is that in some situations there is a lack of confidence in free play as a 
primary means of learning.  
Chudacoff,(2008), views techno-friendly society as reducing opportunities to 
stimulate the imagination of children. Cognitive development,self regulation, self 
esteem, and socialization are increasingly seen as outcomes of imaginative 
play. On the flipside, play is seen simply as fun, as the opposite of work. Bruner  
(1986 p. 109) has stated, “All mankind shares the ability to be imaginatively 
creative but the education and environments in which children find themselves 
can increasingly cut them off from their creative selves. These quickly make 
them adjust to a factual, material world.”  
Imaginary companion researcher Marjorie Taylor, in her paper entitled, 
Children’s Fantasies and Television (2003), has posed the following questions 
regarding the potential vulnerability of children’s imagination: What effect is 
increased fantasy consumption, (in our media frenzied society), having on the 
natural development of children's imagination? And, are the personal, private 
fantasies of children the result of what they have consumed from television 
characters, ie. the product of someone else's imagination? Taylor’s own 
research is testimony are things which children with imaginary companions 
(IC’s). However, to the diversity of characters held in young minds, to the 
spectrum of creations that come to life most often bearing no resemblance to 
anything witnessed on TV or film.  
The Imaginary Companion 
This form of symbolic play is a valuable tool in the facilitation of social 
competencies (Bouldin & Pratt 2002; Gleason, Sebanc & Hartup 2000; Taylor 
1999; Taylor and Carlson 1997). Aligned with contemporary findings, imaginary 
companions are no longer conceived of as markers for children’s poor reality- 
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testing or as signs of acute ego-defensiveness, nor relegated to the socially or 
cognitively impoverished. Pearson et al. (2001) in a study of 1,800 children in 
the UK aged between 5 and 12 years found that 46% reported current (or 
previous) imaginary companions. 43% of children were aged 5 to 9 years. 19% 
of children aged 10 years reported current imaginary companions, as did 9% of 
12 year olds. Estimates by Singer & Singer, (1981), Taylor, Carlson, Maring,  
Gerow and Charley, (2004) have suggested 65% of young children to have, or 
have had, an imaginary companion.  
Imaginary friendships are not characteristic of any particular homogenous group 
– gender, age, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and may include children with
special needs and those who have been traumatised (Spender et al, 2011). For 
example, children with Aspergers Syndrome are also recognised as creators of 
imaginary friends (Calver 2009; Attwood 2006).  
The imaginary companion, as a self-constructed other, permits the child to 
privately work through the conundrum of what it means to be ‘self’ and ‘other’. 
From a developmental perspective, individual differences in social 
understanding for example has shown support for the role of “internal-state talk” 
as a “consistent” factor in the development of this faculty (Nichols, Svetlova & 
Brownell, 2009, p.472). Fragments of reality which do not make sense, episodes 
from daily life, the expression on a face, these can re-experience and re-work. 
The mental simulations undertaken by the child, although internal, are able to be 
readily reflected to the IC, and filtered back again to the child. Carlson & Moses, 
(2001; and Eisenberg 2010 cited in Eggum et al. 2011) refer to the potential 
influence of children’s “effortful control” as a moderator variable which 
influences Emotional Understanding, Prosocial Orientation, and Theory of Mind.  
New findings in theory of mind research have shown that some abilities, such as 
perspective-taking, may not be solely reliant on cognitively sophisticated skill 




Imagination allows for a natural type of philosophical enquiry. Children who 
utilise this faculty are able to consider alternatives and make sense of their lived 
experiences through frequent hypothesis-testing. Imaginary friendships, as 
interpersonal simulators, provide the opportunity for preschool children to 
organise their self-other scripts through recital and reconstruction.  
  
 Early psychological discourse centred on the imaginary companion's role in ego 
fragmentation, in disabling effective coping mechanisms and in the pathologies 
emanating from an ‘escape’ into fantasy.  
More recent research has sought to illuminate the functionality and ‘purpose’ of 
the imaginary companion:  
i. Fantasy Predisposition,  
ii. Personality correlates such as Intersubjectivity, Creativity and Social   
Sensitivity, iii.  
 Theory of Mind,  
iv. Self-knowledge and Knowing Other Minds (Davis, Meins & Fernyhough,  
2011),  
v. Narrative ability, (Trionfi & Reece, 2009).  
  
I will review Theory of Mind (ToM) literature in order to get a better 
understanding of children’s developmental currency, reflected on the 
psychoeducational discourse of fantasy play, examined self-other narratives 
within early relational frames and described how imaginary friendships may 
inform aspects of the adult self.  
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Fantasy Predisposition and Imaginary Companions 
The debate surrounding young children’s ability to discern false-belief is not far 
removed theoretically from that which surrounds their reality testing 
competency. It has been suggested that relations between children and their 
imagined constructions be taken as a “vivid merging point” between fantasy and 
reality (Klausen 2007 p.356).  
In a study conducted with 3- and 4- year olds, Wellman, (Estes et al., 1989; 
Wellman and Estes,1986), the children were asked to imagine a pair of scissors, 
shown a real pair, then asked to differentiate the properties of both. The children 
verbalized that the actual pair of scissors were able to be seen by others and 
realised that the imaginary pair could not. They also understood that it was only 
the imagined pair which could be “transformed by thought alone” (cited in Braten 
(Ed) 1998 p.339). Paul Harris, in his 1991 study on fictional absorption, tested 
whether this ability of children to differentiate was contingent on the nature of 
the imagined object by including not just an imagined pair of scissors but 
something ‘extraordinary’, such as a monster or witch. His results confirmed that 
of Wellman’s. The children were able to construe the ontological status of the 
extraordinary objects and therefore showed no evidence of confusion between 
real and imagined, irrespective of the nature of the imagined (Harris et al.1991).  
The reality testing ability of young children was further explored by Goy (1990), 
a study in which she looked specifically at children’s judgements about 
imaginary friends. The sample of 4-year olds were given imaginary 
companionship status via parent testimony and were asked to differentiate 
between the IC and a school friend. One child out of sixteen, after being asked 
which friend they could ‘really hear’ and ‘which friend they could only pretend to 
hear’, answered incorrectly. Taylor (1999) reported that 4-year-olds had shown 
concern that a researcher was taking their imaginary companions too seriously, 
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“It’s only pretend, you know. ” Taylor presents a cogent argument reconciling 
children’s sophisticated understanding of fantasy and imagination with their 
apparent confusion. Pivotal to this is the degree of control children have over 
the fantasy, for instance, whether children’s fantasies are culturally created (like 
Santa Claus or the Easter Rabbit) or, whether child controlled and mediated.  
The fantasy predisposition of children with IC’s was examined by Bouldin 
(2006), revealing a significantly higher frequency in daydreaming activity, 
together with a higher sensorial acuity of dream content (p.22) than their peers. 
These same children engaged more frequently in games with a mythical theme 
– centred, for example, around “non-existent beings” such as fairies and
monsters (p.24). The results support previous research findings that children 
with IC’s are able to readily and easily process the content of their fantasies 
(Bouldin & Pratt 2001; Taylor et al. 1993; Taylor 1999). Supportive evidence is 
found in Acredolo’s 1995 study wherein the play behaviour of a sample from 
infancy through to preschool years was analysed and found that children who 
would later create IC’s had shown significantly more indications of interest in 
fantasy even in their infancy then their non-IC peers, (cited in Taylor 1999).  
An early study by Singer & Singer,(1981), found that children with IC’s engage 
in less television viewing than their peers. A similar study confirming these 
results was conducted by Taylor & Carlson,(1993). They suggested that the 
fantasy realm generated by television is displaced by children’s own imaginative 
play, and that children who are in the company of their ‘other’ may have less 
time or motivation to engage in TV viewing.  




If we take intersubjectivity to imply shared understanding and co-creation of 
meaning then it is hardly surprising that this should be expected of children with 
rich imaginations. And, that it would extend to the knowledge exchange between 
person and fantasy character.  
Papastathopoulos (2007), in researching the intersubjectivity of pre-schooler’s 
imagination, arrived at a similar conclusion to Bouldin. His sample of children 
with IC’s showed significantly more engagement not only in pretend and 
sociodramatic play but in the negotiations surrounding the pretense as well. In 
this instance, intersubjectivity could well be facilitated by meta-communication, 
discourse, and joint attentional focus or what Becker-Weidman has identified as 
“shared emotion (attunement), shared attention and shared intention”.  
The dialogic units that make up intersubjective episodes can be verbal or 
nonverbal as long as there is an expression of thought or idea. With regard to 
imaginary play, we see what Goncu, (1993), has termed “expansion” – the  
“introduction, extension, acceptance, revision and conciliation” of thoughts and 
ideas.  
Creativity 
The ease at which children creatively step into the shoes of their virtual other is 
a unique and meaningful process. As if in an extended theatrical role play, these 
real to life relationships seem to demand huge amounts of imaginal 
resourcefulness. Hoff (2005) conducted a bi-focal study in which she tested the 
hypotheses that i) imaginary companions could be conceived of as products of a 
creative disposition and, ii) that children with IC’s have what she terms “negative 
self-images” (p.170). As stated earlier, Hoff’s sample comprised middle school 




and perceptive skill, more so than is deemed the case with younger preschool 
children. Using her own instrument, she empirically assessed ‘involvement in 
creative activities and hobbies’ (p.170) through the AQ (Activity Questionnaire), 
and included such items as ‘inventing their own games’, ‘built their own toys’. 
The instrument was shown to be statistically related to the Creative Functioning  
Test (Smith & Carlsson1990, 2001) and the Unusual Uses Test (Hoff 2000, Hoff 
& Carlson 2002). The Creative Functioning Test (CFT) has been validated as a 
measure of “cognitive flexibility”, which Hoff has defined as “the ability to shift 
flexibly between imaginative and rational thought” (p.171). The test, a simple 
black-and-white picture stimulus, presented to the child in different time 
increments, relies much on subjective interpretation and some might say, akin to 
other similar instruments, the child’s own projections. As the picture is shown 
with rapidly decreasing exposure time, the child is left to imagine what they see 
after they know they have viewed the same image during longer exposure 
series. According to Hoff, (p.171) a child high in creativity will “abandon rational 
thought” and allow the “subjective representational world” to shape their visual 
perception. Hoff fails to account for children’s self-efficacy in sharing their 
perceptions with the researcher, nor does she factor in levels of verbal ability.  
Hoff states that the children are told to “describe what they see on the screen, 
even if they are not certain” (p.171). This does seemingly afford children an 
unsolicited opportunity for imaginative projection but necessitates both self-
confidence and verbal skill. Although there is research which suggests children 
with IC’s have a rich and sophisticated linguistic repertoire, this is evidenced in 
discourse with familiar people such as parents and peers. One of Hoff’s 
questions in this study was whether children with IC’s had potentially lower self-
images than their counterparts, yet the CFT no doubt demands at least some 
measure of self-efficacy and social confidence on the part of the participant. To 
evaluate children’s perceptions of themselves, Hoff used a Swedish self-image 
inventory, ‘How I Think I Am’ (p.171). Subscale items include among others, a 
mental wellbeing and relationship component (with parents and peers). In terms 
of construct inclusion, there seems to be considerable overlap with the Self-
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Knowledge Inventory used by Davis et al (2011) in their study on children with 
IC’s levels of self-knowledge.  
 Interestingly, Hoff went beyond the now standard interview format for assessing 
the presence of an IC, (Taylor and Carlson 1997), supplementing her evidence 
richly with a series of IC ‘character depth’ questions, and has rationalized her 
use of this interview by reaffirming the link between IC’s and creativity in terms 
of these children’s ability to “cognitively elaborate” (p.172).  
 The results of Hoff’s study were supportive of her hypothesis that having an IC 
was related to creative potential in middle school children. This finding is in line 
with Theory of Mind (ToM) research and in particular, with ToM’s assertion that 
‘cognitive flexibility’ is a component of executive functioning. Also worth noting is 
the fact that the CFT used by Hoff would have necessitated children’s fixed 
attention to picture stimulus. As Hinnant & O’ Brian (2007) have suggested, 
children’s executive functioning is dependent on both cognitive adaptability/ rule 
switching and attentional control. The findings on creative disposition also 
concur with Bouldin’s (2006) findings supporting the idea that children with  
Imaginary companions (IC’s) are able to imaginatively produce vivid mental 
constructions. However, as noted by Taylor (1999), the methods of assessing 
children’s creativity and the manifestation thereof, is a difficult task and 
variances across sample populations should be interpreted with caution. Taylor 
has stated that when differences in creativity between children with and without 
imaginary companions have been observed, they do favour the former.  
 Hoff’s findings with regard to children’s self-image (p.176) are particularly 
interesting in light of Davis et al.’s (2011) study. The children described 
themselves as being “different from others”, having “lower psychological 
wellbeing”, and rated low on measures of self-image, which would be in line with 
Davis et al’s finding that these children have higher levels of self-knowledge and 
are more aware of their authority on self-states. However, her findings are 
inconsistent with Singer & Singer’s (1990) study of 111 observed pre-schoolers.  
They found the children with IC’s to be less fearful and anxious, and less shy.  
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Myers et al. (Myers, 1979; Singer & Singer, 1992) conducted longitudinal case 
studies which revealed that those who had had imaginary companions in their 
childhoods exhibited creative capacity as adults. The exercise and expansion of 
creative thought likely takes place because of the interaction with an IC. 
According to Somers and Yawkey, (1984) imaginary companions promote 
originality of ideas. Mackeith (1982) has pointed to another genre of imaginary 
play in which imaginary companions are included, namely imaginary worlds, so 
called paracosms. These invented worlds include elaborate scenes, novel 
places, new languages, strange creatures (Cohen & Mackeith, 1991; Mackeith, 
1982; Singer & Singer, 1992).  
The relationship between early IC’s and adult creativity was investigated by 
Allen, (2012), who sampled 41 female (adult) students, of which 21 were 
identified as having had an IC as a child and 20 did not. The design was 
consistent with the mixed methodology format. All of the sample participants 
were administered the quantitative portion which included the Khatena-Torrance 
Creative Perception Inventory (KTCPI) (1976). The KTCPI consists of two 
measures, What Kind of Person Are You? (WKOPAY?) and Something About  
Myself (SAM). The results from this study showed those who had IC’s as 
children are more creative in specific ways, based on the findings of the KTCPI.  
Of significance was the factor identified as ‘Disciplined Imagination’ and the  
‘Creative Perception’ index identified (PsycINFO Database)  
Edith Ackermann,(2006), re-positions the debate on creativity and imagination 
through the following hypothesis: If it be the case that developmental 
researchers suggest that inventing imaginary companions is a helpful step in 
gaining empathy and social skill, as a response to developmental transition, 
then more is needed on understanding what solutions children of different ages 
invent for themselves to cope with some of these developmental tasks. In other 
24 
words, it is worth considering that the imaginary friend is simply a creative 
solution to normal developmental conflict in childhood. The capacity to generate 
an imagined interaction with someone or something else would, in this 
hypothesis, be viewed as a positive coping mechanism.  
Social Sensitivity 
Greater other-orientation is an adaptive faculty for young children, one that was 
assumed to emerge only in later childhood. Preschool aged children that are 
able to transcend their own mental state are able to better understand the 
motivation behind character actions in a story, empathize with others, and 
distinguish appearance from reality (Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, & Cohen 
2000;Weil, Hayes & Capurro 2011 p.371).  
Goldstein and Winner (2012 p19-37), tested the hypothesis that experience in 
acting/role-playing would lead to increased empathy and theory of mind in 
middle aged children and adolescents. In their study, pupils received a year of 
acting classes, with constructs of empathy and ToM assessed before and after 
training. Results showed that those learners who had been enrolled in acting 
classes had significantly higher dispositional empathy scores, were able to  
“match the emotion of a fictional character” (p.27).The adolescent participants 
also showed increases on a naturalistic measure of theory of mind, the 
Empathic Accuracy Paradigm. The findings show what Goldstein has termed 
‘plasticity’ in empathy and ToM, occurring beyond the critical developmental 
period of 3-4 years. Other correlational studies have pointed to increased theory 
of mind ability in those who spend much time thinking about mental states, for 
instance psychologists (Dziobek et al., 2006), fiction readers (Mar, Oatley, 
Hirsh, de la Paz, & Peterson, 2006), and dysphoric adolescents (Harkness, 
Sabbagh, Jacobson, Chowdrey, & Chen 2005).  
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A previous literature-based study on the relationship between imaginary 
companion status of young children and corresponding levels of cognitive 
perspective-taking, (Way 2012), has suggested that cognitive flexibility, when 
seen in terms of relational responding, implies an ability to move more easily 
into the shoes of another. This form of dyadic interaction is de-contextualised, 
providing both a context and opportunity for perspective-taking. Children with 
imaginary friends appear to have a more developed understanding of what 
information a listener has or does not have access to, suggesting that they are 
better able to take others’ perspectives into account (Davis, Meins, & 
Fernyhough, 2011).  
The imaginary companion, as a self-constructed other, permits the child to 
privately work through the conundrum of what it means to be ‘self’ and ‘other’. 
From a developmental perspective, individual differences in social 
understanding for example has shown support for the role of “internal-state talk” 
as a “consistent” factor in the development of this faculty (Nichols, Svetlova & 
Brownell, 2009, p.472). The positive association between children with an IC 
and their tendency to focus on mental characteristics in describing a real best 
friend is consistent with the notion that having an IC entails that the child 
becomes practiced in focusing on cognitions and emotions (Taylor & Carlson, 
1997).  
The mental simulations undertaken by the child, although internal, are able to be 
readily reflected to the IC and filtered back again to the child. Carlson & Moses, 
(2001; & Eisenberg, 2010, cited in Eggum et al., 2011), refer to the potential 
influence of children’s “effortful control” as a moderator variable which 
influences Emotional Understanding, Prosocial Orientation, and Theory of Mind.  
Trionfi and Reece, (2009), have stated that, when conceptually construed, 
imaginative companion play relies on idiosyncratic mental constructions to 
create context. Roby and Kidd (2008) investigated the referential 
communication skills of preschool children with IC’s versus those without and 
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observed a significant difference in the “meta-cognitive processing skills” of the 
two groups.  
Theory of Mind and Imaginary Process 
Imagination has become a key issue in current theory of mind debate, (Davis, 
Meins & Fernyhough, 2011; Astington & Edward,2010; Bouldin & Pratt, 2001), 
giving credence to the potential role played by the imaginary companion in 
meta-representational thinking.  
Research has shown that critical developments occur both in imaginary 
play,(the emergence of the IC), and Theory of Mind around the age of four years 
(Davis, Meins & Fernyhough 2011; Diachenko 2011; Astington & Edward 2010; 
Taylor & Carlson, 1997). The overlap between imaginary process and ToM has 
warranted further consideration.  
Mental Representations are, according to Theory of Mind, a necessary and oft 
sufficient component of the young child’s ability to construe the thoughts and 
feelings of others. What is argued by theorists is that children, typically those 
aged 3 to 4 years-old, do not understand the interpretive nature of the mind, 
believing it to be a “passive recorder”, trapping sensorial images and soaking up 
the day’s takings (Taylor et al.1991, p.1334). The hypothesis of a copy theory of 
mind is that children, in particular those who have not yet developed false belief 
understanding, have limited representational diversity and are unable to 
distinguish seeing from knowing. Children would, accordingly, be unable to 
understand why two people who have the same visual perspective would 
interpret an event in different ways.  
 Simple visual perspective-taking, referred to in ToM as Level 1, is the child’s 
understanding that other people can see different things from themselves, 
measured by “what can I see and what can you see?” tasks (Heagle & Rehfeldt, 
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2006, p.2). Level 2 is considered to be ‘complex’ visual perspective-taking, (p.2) 
involving a judgement of not only the what but the how. According to ToM, 
successful mastery of this task implies the child knowing that what they see is 
indeed different to what another may see, but they are also able to verbally 
express how it is different. Incrementally, level 3 perspective-taking requires a 
greater degree of other-orientation and increased mental simulation. This is the 
point at which children come to realise that seeing equates with knowing. They 
understand that what they know, they have experienced, and that what others 
know has come to them through experience. This is the beginning of an 
awareness of situated reality, that knowledge including other peoples, is 
positioned in time and place. Level 4 perspective-taking is, according to ToM, 
rooted in children’s ability to predict that another will make a decision or hold a 
belief based on what they deem real and true (Heagle & Rehfeldt, 2006). Level 
5 is a predictive faculty wherein children are able to discern truth from fiction, 
and decide how another will act based on that other’s knowledge of falsehood. 
An abstract mental operation thought to be successfully mastered between ages 
5 or 6, this is the level at which ToM supporters argue that transcendence of 
self-perspective is possible.  
ToM to a large extent underscores the natural egocentricities of very young 
children, suggesting that a large amount of effort and energy is required to resist 
interference from their own perspective (Apperly & Samson, 2010;  
Apperly,2009) There is the question of whether a buffering process is needed to 
short circuit the apparent egocentric bias in children’s thought. Some ToM 
supporters suggest the re-routing from self-perspective to other-perspective 
requires executive level functioning, although no tidy definition of executive 
functioning has been offered or accepted. Processes defined as important to 
higher order functioning in terms of ToM involve “inhibitory control”, “attentional 
control”, “cognitive flexibility”, “error detection” among others (Hinnant & 
O’Brien,2007, p.303).  
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Theory of Mind proponents have asserted that it is the advancement of mental 
skill which permits children to cognitively decentrate – that is, to “free 
themselves from the grip of their own perspective…” (Hoffman, 2000, cited in 
Maxwell & DesRoches, 2010,p.36). However, with new research showing ToM 
abilities such as social reasoning in children younger than was previously held, 
the argument supporting a ‘conceptual change hypothesis’ (Perner,1991, cited 
in Samson & Apperly, 2010) is less credulous. In a similar vein, there is 
evidence now showing that these fractures in cognitive processes which are 
required to resist interference from the self-perspective occur in adults with ToM 
difficulty.  
Considering Simulation Theory (Harris, 1992,1996), a plausible route to the 
understanding of Theory of Mind is the role of, i) language and, ii) children’s 
conversational experiences in their imagined projections. The crucial exchange 
of information that takes place with increased frequency in the lives of young 
children is, according to simulationists, important because it reveals immediate 
and concrete differences in knowledge and belief. ToM studies have revealed a 
link between language ability and false-belief understanding, suggesting that 
early linguistic competence facilitates false-belief understanding, and by default, 
perspective-taking. (Bigelow & Dugas 2008). According to a simulation theory 
account of ToM, the pluralistic understandings gained from self-and-other talk in 
the formative years may advance the ability to shift from an egocentric 
processing modality.  
A signifier for ToM advancement is the preschool child’s ability to reflect on their 
own and others’ thoughts. Flavell, in early ToM trials conducted at Stanford 
University (cited in Bower 1993p.93) suggested that 4-year-olds seldom engage 
in thought reflection or cognitive reflexivity and that only around age seven does 
this ability manifest fully. However, there is other evidence to suggest that 
children with imaginary companions have a high degree of referential thought 
and reflexive consciousness, (Taylor 1997; Taylor 1997; Roby & Kidd 2008). 
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These children mediate the lived experiences of their virtual other, engaging in 
storytelling exchanges with peers and adults, interpreting for themselves and 
others the episodes of this relationship.  
Self-knowledge and Knowing Other Minds 
Examining the relationship between imaginary companion status, self-
knowledge and Understanding of Mind, Davis, Meins and Fernyhough, (2011) 
undertook a correlational study (N=80) knowledge and mental state 
understanding in children aged 4 to 7- years of age. Concerned with 
extrapolating the type and amount of interior knowledge children feel privy to 
and comparing this with IC status, the researchers hypothesised that those with 
established imaginary companions would show a greater sense of authority 
concerning aspects of their interior knowledge states and a refined awareness 
of the privacy of their thoughts. The reasons put forward as to why the 
relationship with a virtual other was presumed to index children’s self-knowledge 
were based largely on Taylor’s work (Taylor,1999; Taylor & Carlson 1997). 
According to Taylor, even the very young child is aware that others cannot see 
their IC, and that knowledge regarding this friendship is mediated via the child. 
Through non-verbal behaviours and narrative engagement with parents and 
significant others, the child functions as gatekeeper, actively selecting what (of 
their IC relationship) to reveal and when. For this reason, the researchers 
postulated that 4-7 year olds would know that their knowledge was private.  
Restricting evidence to internal-state understanding, the rationale behind Davis 
et. Al.’s hypothesis could well have been supported by, and indeed seems to 
parallel, Theory of Mind’s levels 1- 3 understanding of perspective-taking 
(Barnes-Holmes et al., in press). According to ToM, “simple visual perspective 
taking” (p.16) would imply the child knowing that people see different things, ie. 
that their IC is not seen by others and belongs to themselves. The next level,  
“complex visual perspective- taking” (p.16) during which time the child realises 
people can see the same things differently. Relative to Davis et al.’s hypothesis, 




and that others may have a different idea because of what the child shares or 
does not share with them. The child at level 3 is aware that “seeing leads to 
knowing” (p.17), and by this token, the hypothetical support for Davis  et al.’s 
study would be evidenced by children knowing that because others could not 
see their IC’s, they did not have knowledge of their existence, other than what 
they came to know indirectly through the child. The pervasiveness and strength 
of the child-IC relationship – the fact that the child spends a large part of the day 
with a friend that nobody else can see – means that there is continued reflection 
on knowledge states. The child is sharing stories, keeping secrets, explaining 
antics, all with a very concrete understanding of who knows what.  
  
Davis et al. cite & Carlson’s (1997) study that self-knowledge measures are a 
valid and predictive assessment for ToM and particularly for false-belief 
understanding. While Taylor & Carlson used higher order executive process, 
(appearance/reality and false-belief), in examining ToM with relation to IC 
status, the mental representations in Davis et al.’s study are seemingly more 
superficial. Lower-level constructs such as ‘feeling ill’, ‘having fun’, ‘feeling 
hungry’’ dreaming’ (p.685) are used in relation to children’s and adults self-
knowledge. With non-significant correlational measures obtained on ToM and 
interior knowledge, Davis et al.’s study did not replicate Taylor and Carlson’s 
(1997) positive findings but did seem, according to item variance across sample 
groups, to indicate a belief by children with IC’s that they are the keepers of their 
interior selves and that adults, for example, are privy to some external, manifest 
states (p.685). A limitation of this study was the failure by researchers to specify 
a definition of an imaginary companion, although stated in the preliminary 
analyses that some sampled IC’s included personified objects. This may have 
had a confounding effect on measures of self-knowledge as studies (Harris 
2000; Gleason, Sebanc & Hartup, 2000) have found significant differences in 
the way children relate to these two forms of imaginary construction. The 
relationship with personified objects, for example, is one of hierarchy,(Gleason 
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et al.,2000) such that the child may feel more empowered and have a greater 
sense of authority over their internal states. Invisible companions on the other 
hand are held equitably, as friends.  
Davis et al. chose not to control for socioeconomic status or ethnicity, and stated 
in their findings that gender had no statistical significance (p.685). A large study 
conducted by Carlson and Taylor (2005) showed no statistical sex differences in 
verbal ability, fantasy predisposition, or competence ratings with regard to 
children’s IC status, but did show differences in the form and function that the IC 
took.  
An exploratory study conducted by Vierkant, (2012), using Theory of Mind as an 
exemplar, has tried to make sense of the current flux of literature on early false 
belief assessments and children’s ability to truly know the minds of others.  
Testing the assumption that having sophisticated constructions of explicit 
knowledge is a necessary pre-condition for ascribing awareness, Vierkant has 
cited recent literature (Buttlemann, Carpenter, Tomasello, 2009) highlighting the 
dislocation between children’s demonstration of false-belief understanding 
under test conditions versus their behavioural implementation of acts, such as 
helping behaviours, as signifiers of this understanding. What Vierkant’s paper 
does astutely is question the now established protocol for assessing false-belief 
in young children by suggesting that report, (and therefore explicit knowledge), 
is perhaps not such an “exclusive criterion” (p.142).  
Vierkant argues that in false-belief testing there is a presupposition that the child 
knows their own mind. In order to verbally share the belief states of others 
entails children having an explicit representation of the nature of this belief, 
otherwise they wouldn’t be able to report it. There is the crucial element of 
knowing – the child being able to cognitively reflect on what it is they believe 
another believes. According to Vierkant, a plausible explanation is that both 
children and adults understand their internal self-states “in a way that does not 
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require [us] to have the theoretical concept of belief“(p.143). This hinges on the 
ToM debate between simulation theory and theory/theory (Vierkant, 2012; 
Apperly & Samson, 2010; Apperly, 2009). Simulation theorists suggest that 
children do not require a theoretical set of concepts in order to understand 
another. They hold that self-knowledge is a developmental precursor to 
otherorientation, and that the manner in which the child knows themselves is 
really a case of less effortful introspection. Theory theorists on the other hand, 
hold a rule-based view, asserting the need for perceptual access to an 
established set of concepts. Vierkant suggests that there may be another 
process involved when it comes to making internal thought explicit. Not requiring 
the “drawn out weighing of evidence”, (p.145) “deliberation” (p.145) through 
language is one such means. Reflecting on “consciousness and agency” 
(p.148), Vierkant suggests that it is language which fosters the child’s ability to 
negotiate their own mental content and simultaneously allows these internal 
beliefs to be communicated to others.  
Narrative Ability, and Imaginary Companionship Status 
What follows is an examination of the use of narrative in play. My analysis of  
Trionfi and Reese’s (2009) study includes references to Theory of Mind (ToM). 
 Assessing the extent to which imaginary companions facilitate narrative 
competence in 5-year-olds, the researchers used previous studies to confirm 
linguistic correlates with IC status. Their hypothesis was premised on the belief 
that this correlation may reflect a more established connection to fantasy play 
and language development. Developmental researchers have long asserted the 
importance of language in children’s play, and in particular, the need to use 
“explicit language to negotiate meaning” in their role play and fantasy 
organisation (p.1302). Trionfi and Reese attempt to make a conceptual 
comparison between imaginary companion play specifically and narrative,  
(p.1303), suggesting they both depend on “mental and linguistic constructions to 
create context”. Although they do not elucidate the nature of this “mental 
construction”, there seems to be no implied higher order executive process. The 
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inference then is that the mental element refers to the act of imagination and 
creative faculty. The researchers assert that it is the de-contextualisation 
required for both IC engagement and complex narrative that marks the 
correlation.  
The sample (N= 48, mother-child dyads), with children 1.5 to 5.5 years of age, 
of middle-class socioeconomic status, primarily of New Zealand ethnicity. The 
researchers used Taylor’s standardised ‘Imaginary Companion Interview’ (1993, 
Taylor & Carlson, 1997). Vocabulary skills were assessed using the ‘Peabody  
Picture Vocabulary Test- IIIB’ and the ‘Expressive Vocabulary Test’ (Trionfi & 
Reese, 2009, p.1304). The story comprehension assessment involved children 
hearing a story with which they were unfamiliar, and asked a series of questions 
covering their knowledge of ‘plot’, inferential connections, and real world 
knowledge which could assist in contextual understanding of the story. The 
researchers also included a ‘Story Retelling’ task, assessing the ability to recall 
contents and share verbally with a puppet (p.1305).  
The findings of the study showed that the older aged children in the sample had 
benefitted from their IC in terms of the “richness” of their narrative, and the 
awareness of context and listener. This, suggested the researchers, is because 
of the frequent practice they get in having de-contextualised conversations with 
their IC’s but also in their sharing of IC-related stories to others (p.1310). Trionfi 
and Reese’s suggestion that these children are aware of the privacy of their 
relationships and thus feel the need to share knowledge with others may be 
supported, for example, by the findings of Davis et al.’s (2011) study on children 
with IC’s having greater awareness of this self-knowledge. Accordingly, children 
may have an increased sense of ‘their voice’ when it comes to their IC and are 




In a final caveat I want to bring to attention to the fact that Trionfi and Reese 
made a choice to exclude children’s verbal IQ and verbal repertoire from their 
study on narrative richness. However, they do suggest (p.1311), that children 
with IC’s may have such high levels of language and narrative skill that they 
create their IC’s “as an outlet for their verbal expression”. In the discussion of 
their findings, Trionfi and Reese posit a “third variable” to account for the 
correlation between imaginary companions and increased narrative ability, 
suggesting “personality variables” such as perspective-taking (p.1311).  
Davis, Meins, and Fernyhough, (2014 pp.622-633) researched young children 
with imaginary friends looking at their tendency to verbally describe their other 
real friends with reference to mental characteristics rather than physical 
appearance or behavioural traits. Although this aligns clearly with what has 
already been explored in the Theory of Mind section, it is also interesting to look 
at this spontaneous tendency as a form of narrative acuity.  
Roby and Kidd (2008) investigated the referential communication skills of 
preschool children with IC’s versus those without and observed a significant 
difference in the “meta-cognitive processing skills” of the two groups. The 
researchers found that IC children were better able than their peers without ICs 
to name a specific referent and to avoid describing redundant features.  
  
Historical Context  
The following section raises some important issues in imaginary companionship 
research. The examination of past studies affords some clarity of the larger 
picture and an understanding of where the current study may be positioned. 
Issues to be highlighted include i) defining the imaginary companion, ii) 
methodological devices iii) Child reports and parental testimony iv)making sense 
of data.  
Definitional Discrepancy  
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As a construct in an emergent field of study, the imaginary companion has 
proved difficult to operationally define. It is not rooted within any particular 
theoretical discourse, and this makes the objectification of an already elusive 
construct all the more difficult. Whatever definition researchers choose to guide 
their efforts, consensus is held on the natural development and privacy of this 
experience for the young child.  
In terms of operationalized conceptions, Svendsen’s (1934) definition is, by way 
of historical literature review, the most frequently cited : “An invisible character 
named and referred to in conversations with other persons or played with 
directly for a period of time, at least several months, having an air of reality for 
the child but no apparent objective basis” (Hart & Zellars 2006, p.6).  
Personified objects in the domain of imagination research refer to children’s 
attachments to specific toys such as stuffed animals or dolls. Svendsen’s 
definition excluded props on the basis of their imaginal independence, asserting 
that their objective, here-and-now presence did not draw on the child’s 
embellishment. The definition also excluded all other forms of symbolic play 
involving companionship on a temporary or transient basis, for instance, the 
case of a teddy bear’s picnic, or tea party.  
Singer and Singer (1990) chose to include stuffed animals in their extensive 
research for The House of Make-Believe, based on the criteria that the toys 
were richly imbued with human and friend-like qualities by the young child. They 
stipulated the young child project an autonomous identity on the part of the toy 
for the relationship to be considered significant.  
As a long-time researcher in the area of children’s imagination and author of 
much foundational work on Imaginary companions, Taylor has set what she 
defines as stringent identifying and inclusionary criteria for IC sampling. The 
triangulation of parental corroboration, child testimony and semi-structured 
interviewing inform what she holds as an accurately representative sample of 




naming of an imaginary companion over time-delayed sessions, the verbal 
agreement by parent or caregiver of these descriptions and that the described 
other was not based on any known real friend and, in instances where she had 
chosen to include personified objects in her study, the corroboration by parents 
that the play object was engaged with frequently and was treated as real by the 
child (Taylor & Carlson, 2005).  
In their investigation of Individual and Family Correlates of Imaginary 
Companions in Preschool Children, Manosevitz, Prentice & Wilson (1973, p.74) 
defined the IC to children’s parents as a “very vivid imaginary character with 
which their child interacts during their play and daily activities”. This definition 
could be interpreted then as including imaginative play with stuffed animals but 
there is no alluding to permanency or repetition of engagement with the 
imagined other. We find a similar definitional take on IC’s in Bouldin’s (2006) 
study of Fantasy Predisposition and Fantasy Style, in which it is similarly 
explained as a “ very vivid imaginary character”, non-existent in reality, but 
something that the child “treats as though it does” (p.19). In this instance, by 
virtue of her stipulation that this imaginary other does not exist, there is an 
assumption she has chosen to exclude personified objects and there is no 
reference made to permanency or quality of the child-other relationship.  
Implications of operational inconsistency are evidenced in Gleason and  
Hohmann’s (2006) study wherein it is suggested that there exists a variance, 
potentially significant, in the type and strength of relationships between 
preschool children and imaginary friends on the one hand, and children and 
personified objects on the other. Gleason, Sebanc and Hartup (2000) make a 
case for the separate categorisation of Invisible and Personified imaginary 
companions, citing differences in the typology of the child-other relationship.  
They suggest that ‘friendship’, approximating the qualities of real peer relations, 
is found more frequently with the invisible companion dyad, whereas the 




Latterly, Klausen and Passman (2007b p.359) have arrived at a threefold 
typology of children’s fantasy attachments. They discern between the imaginary 
companion as a friend with no physical basis, the personified object as a 
physical object afforded a pretend personality, and pretend companions as a 
term which refers to both. Given this, most research reviewed would be said to 
reference the pretend companion as a chosen definition.  
In a similar vein, Harris (2000) has classified pretend play according to what he 
deemed was the mode of pretense : Personified Objects directed outward 
towards some external thing, Pretend Identities concerning the child’s own self, 
and Imaginary Companions toward an entirely fantasized construction. 
Reflection on imagination research invariably includes reference to the works of 
Paul Harris and in this case it is the merging together of imaginary phenomena 
that is of particular interest. Defined ontologically, Harris asserts that “they serve 
similar developmental purposes” for the child. The imaginary companion is 
situated as one- of- three forms (types) of role play. Impersonation,(child takes 
on a character of person or animal),and personification (where the child 
personifies an object) are noted as the other two forms.  
Despite Gleason's assertion that we are dealing with two separate phenomena 
operating according to different social processes, (2004) and the citing of 
reasons to examine invisible companions and personified objects separately 
(2000),I have opted for an interpretive approach within this study. My 
inclusionary criteria for participants purposely did not set forth any parameters in 
the definition of an imaginary companion and every effort was made to suspend 
my expectation of what I was wanting to hear from storytellers in the narrative 
sessions. Gleason has suggested that the two concepts may be only “subtly 
distinct” (2000), which I feel is further validation for a lucid de-construction of 
individual notions of what it means to have an imaginary companion.  
Allowing for multiple constructions of this concept is, I feel, in line with Klausen 
and Passman’s suggestion that researchers should pay careful attention to both 
definitional forms (2007).  
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Conceptualising Friendship 
Disagreement concerning the qualities of the imaginary companion IC and the 
nature of the child-other dyad has lessened, in part due to renewed empirical 
vigour, increased use of qualitative enquiry, the plausible relationship with ToM, 
and the rise of children’s agency and voice.  
Taylor (1997, 1999) was forthright in her assertion that young children, 
progressing normally through development, do not believe these companions to 
be real (see later discussion on The Imaginary Companion and Pretense). The 
objectification of the IC is made apparent through children’s conscious 
awareness of the constructed nature of, and internal investment in, the 
friendship. The IC’s of preschool aged children are afforded independent 
agency by their creators, having personalities of their own.  
In terms of friendship attribution, as with other dispositional traits, this population 
of children are not homogenous however. The level of investment in their 
friendships as well as the degrees of elaboration of character, and character 
depth, have shown to vary considerably.  
Papastathopoulos (2007), in his writings on the Intersubjectivity of the 
Imagination and imaginary companions, reported that preschool girls with 
imaginary companions, observed in dyadic play, attributed an interlocutor role to 
their imagined friends, giving them relational qualities but acknowledging their 
non-physical existence.  
These friendships initially begin to emerge during times of quiet 
contemplativeness or when children are engaged in free play, absorbed in the 
act of imagination. Almost as a raising of consciousness, akin to adult 
meditative practice, Hart & Zellars (2006, corroborated by Taylor, 1997) suggest 
the very act of creating the imaginary other is an essential ingredient in the 
deepening of perception and “quieting (of) the mind” (p.12)  
The nature of the relationship between child and peer versus child and fictitious 
other was the focus of Gleason and Hohmann’s (2006) study. Although based 
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on a small, predominantly female sample, the study showed the latter as 
providing much of the same social value for preschool children as do real 
friends. This was evidenced in correlations with the following relationship 
variables: “conflict”, ”power”, ”instrumental help” and “nurturance” (p.141). 
Gleason & Hohmann went so far as to assert that, when examined within the 
context of significant peer relations, there was no statistical difference between 
real and imagined friends. Taylor (1999) argued against the hypothesised 
uniformity of friendship concepts, stating that the IC most certainly had a set of  
“special qualities”(p.130) not found in real-life peers, and that the two forms of 
friendships were inherently different. She premised this on the fact that children 
do not necessarily give up their IC’s when real ones come along. When, 
according to Taylor, these companions do outlive their usefulness, they are 
relinquished.  
Studies have been non- supportive of the hypothesis that children with IC’s have 
limited authentic peer engagement and are not as socially competent as their 
peers (see Bouldin & Pratt,1999; Harter & Chao,1992). Presumed social 
incompetence and the potential hindrance caused by the presence of an IC led 
to initial speculation that imaginary relations were all that fed the social needs of 
this group of children. These children in fact show a high degree of sociability 
and normative levels of peer acceptance in their real-life play (Singer & Singer, 
1990; Gleason, 2004; Carlson & Taylor, 2005).  
The Imaginary Companion Interview 
Assessment of children’s imaginary companionship status has been reliant on, 
and benefitted from,Taylor’s (1997) Imaginary Companion Interview. Although 
not a psychometric or standardised instrument, the interview has been used to 
verify the presence of imaginary friendships. Although Taylor acknowledged 
children as “the best sources of information”,(1999, p.23), she makes clear the 
fact that elaboration, over-imaginings, inconsistencies and misinterpretation of 
adult’s questioning contribute to a significant amount of variability in responses. 
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Construct validity of course rests largely on the accuracy and containment of the 
construct under investigation. Although an expected outcome of conversing with 
children, it has left researchers pondering as to the significance of what remains 
uncovered about the fantasy lives of children. Taylor (1999) has interestingly 
noted that parents of older children may not be as aware of their children's 
imaginary friendships, with one study revealing only 20% of parents of 6- and 
7year-olds knew about the playmates.  
The protocol devised by Marjorie Taylor has typically taken the following form: 
i) The researcher will spend a few minutes engaging with the child ii)  The
researcher invites the child to answer a few questions (beginning the 
process of the semi-structured interview): “ May I ask you some 
questions about friends? …Some friends are real, like the ones that live 
on your street, the ones you play with at the park. And some friends are 
pretend friends. Pretend friends are ones that are make believe that you 
pretend are real. Do you understand?” (Taylor & Carlson, 1997). iii) The 
child is then asked whether they have or have had a pretend friend. If 
they answer yes, they are asked further prototypical questions, gathering 
information on the imaginary companion’s “name”, whether it is a “toy” or 
not, its “gender”, “age”, “physical appearance”, what qualities the child 
“likes” or “does not like” about the IC, and where the friend  
“lives, sleeps, eats” (Taylor 1999). 
iv) Children’s reports are then corroborated by a parent’s completion
of a questionnaire or telephone interview. 
v) Only children whose imaginary friends are corroborated by a
parent are deemed as having an imaginary friend. 
Taylor and Carlson, (1997), wanting to know whether children would remain 
consistent in their descriptions of the imaginary friends, devised a repeated 
interview strategy with a sample of 4-year olds. Both parents and children were 
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interviewed twice, each interview a week apart. Information obtained in the first 
interview, for example, what the friend may have looked like, was used to clarify 
the responses in the follow-up session.  
Accordingly, children were “categorised” (Taylor, 1999, p.29) as having an 
imaginary friend if they met the following criteria:  
• Child provided a description of the IC in first session.
• Named the same IC in second session.
• The parent said that it was not a real friend, and if a toy, that the child
played with the toy “a lot” and “treated it as if it were real”(p.29).
• The child said yes to having an IC at either session, named the friend,
and this was described “independently by the parent”. Or
• The child described different imaginary friends at two sessions and the
parent attested to the fact the child had “lots of imaginary companions”
(p.29).
The exclusionary criteria were as follows: 
• Child said “no” to having a make believe friend at both sessions, even if
the parent said yes.
• The parent stated that the child did not play for a long period of time with
a particular toy/stuffed animal that the child had said was their imaginary
friend.
• The child said that they did have a special make believe friend but could
not provide any details of this friend.
 This interview format is meritorious in its utility. This is especially true for 
correlational- type studies wherein research questions are concerned with 
relationships between delineated variables. For instance, should I have wanted 
to quantify my MA literature study on the possible relationship between cognitive 
perspective-taking and children’s imaginary friendships, I would have employed  
Taylor’s IC interview. The types of research questions I may have been able to 
address include:  
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• Is there a relationship between Imaginary companions and perspective
taking in young children?
• What is the nature of this relationship?
• Does the presence of an imaginary companion facilitate an increase in
manifest levels of perspective-taking towards peers?
• If there does exist a positive correlation between these two variables,
what other factors may be at play? … And so forth.
As long time researchers on the topic of imaginary friendships, Davis, Meins and 
Fernyhough, (2014, p.631), have remarked that research has focused on asking 
children various questions about their IC’s appearance and behaviour but “no 
study has yet assessed the characteristics that children spontaneously focus on 
when given an open-ended invitation to describe the IC… studies exploring 
heterogeneity within IC-group”.  
The Framing of Child and Adult 
In order to make the case for continuity, in what is often a discontinuous life 
story, the following sections will explore ontological and epistemological issues 
surrounding the notion of ‘child’ and ‘adult’. I did not wish for the study to reflect 
what has been considered an ‘artificial’, and certainly enlarged, gap between 
child and adult and so an attempt is made to locate a ‘new intermediate space’ 
(Waller, 2010). The space is experiential belonging neither exclusively to 
childhood nor to adulthood. The dominant discourse of ‘otherness’, 
documentation of the differences between the experiential worlds of children 
and adults, (as well as between children with and without imaginary friends), 
has made it difficult for researchers attempting to ‘understand things from a 
child’s perspective’. A brief unpacking of the debate surrounding notions of 
childhood and adulthood as well as the case made for continuity may together 
provide some understanding of methodological choice. Consideration is given 
firstly to the framing of ‘child’ and ‘adult’.  
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It has already been pointed out that ‘children’ and ‘adults’ are framed in such a 
way as to impose a bi-polar and hierarchical model, one which is reproduced 
and enforced further in social scientific discourse. The dominant discourse of  
‘otherness’, documentation of the differences between the experiential worlds of 
children and adults, (as well as between children with and without imaginary 
friends), has made it difficult for researchers attempting to ‘understand things 
from a child’s perspective’. James et al. (1998) suggest there has been a 
tendency in the social sciences to focus on difference. By concentrating, for 
example, on play as an exclusive part of childhood but not of adult culture, 
(p.181), the idea of childhood tends to be reinforced as a very different time.  
There is the heightened concern too with being ‘child-centred’, suggesting the 
exclusive benefit of researching children in the playground, to the exclusion of 
the family and other social variables (James et al. 1998). The prevalence of 
developmental discourse which presents children as ‘other to’ adults does not 
take into account the non-homogeneity of children as a category. Intra-category 
variables such as gender, class, age, ethnicity etc. yield as much variation in 
research response as they do for adults.  
In this study, the child and the adult speak to one another. As the adult self 
connects with child self, remembering an earlier time imaginary friendship, the 
experience comes to be understood in a way other than that of intellectual 
detachment.  
Consideration of the debate around child and adult conceptualisations must at 
some point take account of memory. The epistemological question concerns 
how one assesses the ‘truth’, viability or value of early childhood memory. The 
fragmentary and porous nature of early memory, notarised by the likes of 
Sigmund Freud, is a distinctive feature of modernist representations of 
childhood. Haughton, who penned an introductory piece in Freud’s ‘The 
Uncanny’, (2003), has spoken of the co-construction of childhood memory, how 
what is remembered is not a solitary process but instead mediated via family 




   
Kuhn, in Family Secrets: Acts of Memory and Imagination (1995, p.158) has 
argued that it is near impossible to separate the past from that which it is 
situated in - the culture, the connectedness, of childhood. Kuhn is interested in 
what people do with memory content. How, as time passes, we use ‘the stuff’ of 
memory to make more memories, how these memories turn into stories, how 
the stories change our selves. Through her own autobiographical work Kuhn 
sees memory as a producer, of account and meaning.  
Human Geography: Bachelard, Philo and Jones  
Memory marks our membership to developmental categories. An argument for 
the loosening of constraints around ‘adult’ and ‘child’ in research praxis may find 
support in an examination of memory, in particular, the recognition of memory 
as a “stream of consciousness” as opposed to a “self-enclosed consciousness” 
(Halbwach cited in Meusburger,ed. 2011).  
The following section explores the work of human geographers Philo (2003, 
2008) and Jones (1999, 2001, 2003, 2008), offering a critical response to the 
question of how the ‘worlds’ of children may be accessed and represented. The 
section begins with a brief outline of Bachelard’s position, In ‘Poetics of Reverie’ 
(1969a),Bachelard sets out the basis for a ‘phenomenology of childhood’ 
whereby adults are able to imaginatively revisit the joy and wonder of their 
youth. The quest for adult researchers to recapture early years is, according to 
Bachelard, made possible through projecting imaginatively back to an 
experience all adults have once had. This then is about some form of natural 
connectivity between the ‘two worlds’. More recent engagement with this issue 
can be seen in Chris Philo’s writings (2003), as he addresses whether 
researchers can re-enter childhood through the faculties of what he terms 
‘reverie’ (a term borrowed from Bachelard) and imagination. With particular 
reference to childhood geographies, he points to the importance of memory, 
imagination and emotion in researching childhood, establishing a meaningful 
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connection between the realms of child and adult. For Philo, (p.7-23) this 
scholarly activity seems something that is so important and necessary arguing 
that it is “unique”, an “opportunity” that researchers “can and should take 
advantage of”; seeking “ fragments of connection” by virtue of the very fact that 
all of us have been children. Philo uses Jones and Cunningham (1999) as an 
example of those who argue that memory can be a source of recreating 
‘children’s geographies’.  
Attention is called to Jones’s (2001, 2003) response to Philo, highly salient to 
this study on imaginary companionship. In response to Philo’s argument, has 
stated concerns about the ‘reachability’ of the otherness of childhood as well as 
the ethics of such a goal (p.29). Examining Philo’s idea of ‘reverie’ for example- 
a valued part of childhood – states that are central to childhood and indicative of 
otherness, he argues for the importance of researching these moments, for 
adults getting a handle on these unique imaginative geographies because doing 
so would support their continued availability to children. However, these 
moments represent childhood at its most remote from adult perspectives. Jones 
makes the point that, as adult researchers, we should remain very alert to the 
question that as these places are almost ‘adult free zones’ by definition, how do 
we enter them without doing damage (p.33). Drawing from Jones’s response to 
Philo, the assertion most relevant to this study on imaginary friendships is that it 
is “fruitless to get caught in any fixed or binary notion of ‘possible or impossible’ 
in terms of adults meaningfully remembering childhood” (p.30)  
In examining the bringing forth of childhood into adult life, (forward as opposed 
to journeying back), Jones cites Probyn,(1996, p.103) who describes the 
chronological re-ordering of memory, a continuous back and forth. For her, 
childhood is ‘deployed’ in adult life, providing some form of illumination in the 
present, although still strongly aligned with Philo’s position of connection 
between two worlds. The influences of childhood on adulthood, the call for a 
heightened awareness of these influences, the irrecoverability of the past, 
elation and despair at what is remembered and what is lost to memory are part 
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of a larger theme of disconnections and reconnections. Jones, who has claimed 
to be wary of the dualities of such discourse, makes the suggestion that for 
adults to go back to this other time in their memories there needs to be 
suspension of logic and the adoption of a feeling state (p.34). According to both 
Philo and Jones, feeling and imagination together permit at the very least a  
“fragmentary connection” to the past although Jones does claim the 
‘unreachableness’ of childhood experiences (2001/2008).  
What of the things that make childhood separate? The experiences that ‘define’ 
this time as distinct and special, are we as researchers not to know them?  
Jones is quoted as saying, “the mysteries of childhood” (2008, p.2) yet readers 
are reminded of Bachelard’s position stating that all adults/ adult researchers 
have already been children, already known childhood. So how much of it then is 
really that mysterious? For Jones, it seems more of an ethical issue, one of 
respect and reverence, saving children from the intruding probes of adult 
researchers. And although the aim of this study was not to seek children’s first 
hand perspectives, in ontological terms it is still worth considering the debate 
about what constitutes the “colonisation” that the likes of Jones refer to (Jones, 
2008; Thomas & Hacking, 2003). By using terms such as ‘colonise’, ‘venture 
towards these other lands’, ‘childhood becomes another country’, ‘a disputed 
territory’, ‘children as a theoretical resource’, established geographical 
terminology with which Jones is familiar, does this not serve to reify the 
categories of adult and child, de-value the social capital of children, a mimicry of 
some poor third-world country? If what is understood by colonisation is the 
taking of something, an experience, a phenomenon, from childhood and ‘giving’ 
it to adults to make sense of, then this very study on imaginary friendships 
comes close.  
For the reader, two issues bear reflection: The first is that the experience, the 
phenomenon under investigation, belongs to the same self. The child and adult 
both own the experience, it is theirs - young child, old child, adolescent, young 
adult, older adult, old age-experienced and re-experienced in the natural 
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unfolding of one life. Secondly, the implication is that the colonising act of 
research robs childhood of its natural resource. The landscape that both Philo 
and Jones claim is rich in magic and otherness, is also claimed as one left 
ravaged and barren. Yet the aim of exploration into something as multi-textured 
as an imaginary companionship is to fully understand its richness.  
It was my intention to view categories of adult and child on a continuum, in 
geographical terms, one landscape. With less rigid framing around what is 
perceived as ‘a childhood experience’ or ‘an adult experience’, the 
understanding of one category requires multiple perspectives or layers of 
analysis. If memory is viewed likewise as a landscape, a living landscape, then 
the study is a movement through chronological time called into consciousness 
and redefined, re-experienced in relation to the present. Although Jones’s 
position on the ‘fixity’ of child- adult selves has already been interrogated, the 
point at which our arguments do converge is his assertion that life is “inherently 
spatial” (2005 p.206). In this he describes what may be akin to schema, 
suggesting that each moment’s laying down of experiences is coloured by the 
past, moments of “becoming-the-now” that make sense because of other 
moments. He therefore does contend that memories always have a spatial 
framework. Most significantly, his assertion of ‘fragments of connection’ 
between adulthood and the memory of childhood, an idea shared with Philo 
(2003), is difficult to grasp when in another instance he has stated that it is 
through memory and imagination that we maintain connections across space 
and time.  
Remembering: Research Examples 
The aim of this section is to provide a relevant and applicable research context 
against which the current study may be evaluated .This will be achieved through 
the provision of six examples. These are studies that despite variation in 
methodology have similarly utilised an adult perspective from which to 
understand and give meaning to the past or to an experience normatively 




I wish firstly to turn attention to Alison Waller, an English literary researcher 
whose cross-disciplinary work borrows key concepts from psychology and 
human geography, informing ideas of self, memory and contextuality all of which 
hold relevance to this current study. In ‘Revisiting Childhood Landscapes: 
Revenants of Druid’s Grove and Narnia’, (2010,303-319), Waller draws from two 
children‘s tales wherein fictional characters revisit places of the past. Waller’s 
analysis of the text follows closely the evocative process of memory in relation 
to place and for me raises the question of proximity. How differences in  
‘distance’ between past and present may be personally perceived and whether 
the possibility exists that special memories such as those of place may have a 
larger ‘homing range’, engaged with more frequently. Waller’s interpretation of 
the character’s experiences is suggestive of dissonance- that returning to the 
past may bring with it a form of discomfort she terms a ‘paradox’. However, in  
‘Swallows and Amazons’ (Waller & Maine,2011), which I turn to next, the re-
visitation of adults to their past experiences of fiction is interpreted as “nostalgic 
enjoyment” (354-371).  
      
The theme of memory, narrative and identity is further evidenced in Waller’s   
‘reality-located ‘exploration of how adult re-readers engage with the fictional tale ‘Swallows 
and Amazons’ and how adults as ‘re-readers’ experience the text in relation to their 
previous childhood selves? (Waller & Maine 2011). In the individual interviews, which were 
audio recorded and transcribed, the adult participants were asked in the first place to recall 
their knowledge and experience of the text from past and then were given the text to re-
read and reflect upon. A unique part of the participant experience in this study was the 
opportunity afforded for child and adult readers to ‘meet each other across time’, as 
discussions were video recorded and shown to each group. Waller and  
Maine searched for “recurrent ideas” in the narratives which were organised  
into common themes. The researchers do note that their study’s aims were best 
served through adopting an ‘eclectic approach’ in terms of addressing the 
meaning-making processes of both children and adults     
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The theme of ‘journeying back’ , prevalent in much of Waller’s research , 
appears as much an interpretation of belongingness – what ‘belongs’ to the 
adult – as it is an interpretation of engagement. In the ‘Swallows and Amazons’ 
study, Waller and her colleague employ terms such as “the interactive space”,  
“across time”, “meaning as temporal”, “something that is happening between” ,  
for me all interpretively descriptive of the child-adult-child traverse (354-371).   
They have stated that “…less attention has been paid to how reading over time 
might provide insights into the continuities between childhood and adult reading 
experiences…”.In terms of validating support for the current (imaginary 
companionship) study, it would be well to echo this sentiment that other located 
experiences, such as imaginary process or early relationship encounters, may 
offer insight into the continuities of what it means to be child and adult as well as 
the experiences themselves.  
David Sobel, (1990 vol.7, p.8) in his study, Adults Memories of Special Places, 
found that adult recollections captured how important these places were in 
forming self-identity. Sobel has shown how memories of place-particular 
experiences have shaped the way these individuals are as adults: “The person 
makes a literal place in the world during childhood, preparatory to making a 
figurative place in the world during adolescence and adulthood” (p.10). He has 
stated that during his interviews, adults told their stories with a “breathless, 
twinkle-in-the-eye animation”, feeling once again the excitement and thrill of 
childhood. Korpela, Kytt and Hartig, (2002) who have conducted a child-focused 
study of special places, claim that adults and children provided converging 
evidence that ‘emotion- and self-regulation’ occurs in special places of 
childhood, revealing similarities between what children relate in the present and 
what adults remember about experiences of special places.  
Similarly, Raymund (1995) conducted an interactionist study of children’s 
experiences and adult memories of childhood playscapes…“discovering the 
deeper meanings and effects of childhood on a person's overall life experiences 
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is difficult… “ (p.135). She utilised a survey method with questions seeking to 
detail what the adults remembered about how they played, where they played, 
what they played with, and how they felt as children; how their childhood 
experiences influenced their adult lives and the lives of their children; and how 
the adults viewed their childhood (p.136). Raymund has stated that the impacts 
of childhood,(in this case, special places), remained through adulthood and 
were remembered emotionally with fondness.  
Skar and Krogh, (2009), investigate children’s nature-based experiences in 
Norway through adults’ memories of their own childhood and through 
observations of children’s practices over the past decade. Utilising a 
phenomenological framework, the focus of this case study was on both 
children’s actual nature-based experiences as well the way in which nature 
experiences are shaped and influenced by the social context of everyday lives.  
Researchers engaged in novel ‘walking interviews’, conversing in natural 
outside spaces where the tone was relaxed and participants were placed at 
ease. Examples of key questions included: “How do adult informants describe 
changes in children’s usage of natural areas?”; “How does the changing 
sociocultural context contribute to explaining these changes?”; “ What 
challenges are posed in the changing patterns of children’s outdoor life?” There 
was a descriptive emphasis to the interviews with informants’ giving descriptions 
of the actual experiences throughout the life course, minimising the risk of 
childhood presentations being overshadowed by ‘nostalgic memories’. The 
significant role of emotions in memory richness and recall was highlighted in this 
study and is supportive of the current status of literature on memory.  
Camahalan’s study (2014) has shown the importance of tracing development in 
a non-linear manner. Arguing against ‘transitoriness’, she has used a grounded 
theoretical approach to investigate the childhood memories of seventy-five 
graduate students enrolled in a child development module. The aim was to 
provide an opportunity for the young adults to engage directly with their own 
childhoods as a new way of understanding child development. With regard to 
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the consequences of the early memories, the researcher claimed that all 
respondents reported themes of self-growth and emotional growth; believing 
that their early memories had taught lessons about self and belongingness as 
well as resiliencies from the ups and downs of life. With not too much critical 
analysis, an interpretation of this study would suggest that Camahalan is a 
believer in the human-ness of experience. The fact that ordinary life provides us 
- ordinary living things - with experiences that last in mind and memory. Lasting
impressions are made on the self and carried through to adulthood. 
As a last example of research that places child and adult on one experiential 
landscape, I turn to Scott’s (2004) ‘Retrospective Account of Spiritual  
Narratives. It is an interesting study to examine following Camahalan’s (above) 
and also interesting because he does something quite similar to what I have 
undertaken in this imaginary companionship study. He has sought a collection 
of stories from volunteer adult participants who make the self-judgement as to 
what constitutes ‘a spiritual experience’. The tellers identify events in their own 
lives as spiritual without any attempt on Scott’s part to define or classify whether 
these experiences conform to any accredited definition. Scott has stated, “I 
make no attempt to verify the veracity of the accounts” (p.68). Similarly, in the 
collection of narratives for this current study, I did not undertake any form of pre-
assessment concerning definitions of imaginary companionship. In the few  
times when a participant sought reassurance I gently directed them back to their 
own understanding. The focus in this kind of approach is not in gauging ‘the 
truth’ of retrospective narratives but in the power the narrative itself has. 
Potentially, this power is for (self) transformation…“The experiences remain 
potent… I see them as access pathways to self-understanding…” (Scott,p68)  
There is a further similarity between Scott’s study and this current study on 
imaginary companionships. He gives consideration to the role of social, 
emotional and familial factors in the shaping of the narrative. By not reducing the 
experience to one accepted definition the personal narrative reveals itself in a 
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living context and, as Scott suggests and with which I concur, it is only in this 
way that the stories and the assumptions implicit in them can be truly heard.  
Both Camahalan and Scott agree that early experiences are responsible in large 
part for shaping the adult mind. For Scott however, it is ‘the intensity’ of the 
experience that counts, an awareness in the child self that something ‘out of the 
ordinary’ was happening. Scott suggests that in many cases the experience 
includes the recall of specific emotions. He suggests further that these 
emotionally-laden experiences “have often remained hidden and unspoken”. 
The reason he gives for this, if considered psychologically, tends to be 
somewhat pathologising. Scott states that should a child have a realisation or 
awareness which is alarming to the adults in their life the experience may be 
denied or suppressed. For Camahalan however, as she refers to the ‘human 
factor’ common in early experiences, less emphasis is placed on the criticality or 
severity of these. For her it seems as if the persistence in memory of the 
experience is due to the fact that it has spoken to the self, that some core 
construct has been touched by the event(s) and is remembered as special by 
the adult self.  
These examples serve to highlight the fact that memory is the connective tissue 
of life, binding together past and present in a way that is significant and 
transformative. As Casey states, memories possess “a depth not easily 
penetrable by the direct light of consciousness” (Casey 2000, p.265). “Retelling 
(the) past in discourse …we come to know it from within again. We come to 
know it better, more completely and more poignantly, than if we had left it 
unremembered, un-unfolded (p.121)  
 METHODOLOGY 
The study seeks to understand the phenomenon of the imaginary companion 
and it does so through the memories of adult students at Oxford Brookes 
University. I believe an authentic understanding of the personal experiences 
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required both a practical and philosophical sensitivity to the participants, their 
rights to ownership of memory and to the manner in which this memory was 
conveyed through oral conversation. Together with a sensitised disposition, 
loyalty is arguably the cornerstone of the methodological choices made and 
described: to the nine participants, their stories (and kinsfolk included), to the 
study, the ethics committee, the School of Education and myself, (my 
interpretive voice). One might suggest the methodology chapter is a declaration 
of the conscious act of binding the study, intellectually and emotionally, to the 
phenomenon.  
The previous chapter sought to clear ground in terms of: the examination of the 
constructions of child and adult; providing a sound rationale for the loosening of 
constraints around what are considered exclusively childhood phenomenon 
(play, imagination) and lastly; explaining how crucial ideas and concepts 
borrowed from human geography may assist the study, in locating what is 
inherently spatial, temporal and experiential. A discourse of ‘otherness’, fixating 
on the differences between the experiential worlds of children and adults,(like 
that between children-with and children-without IC’s), has made it difficult to 
venture anywhere near what is considered a childhood-located phenomenon. In 
response to this, the preceding chapter argues for another way around the 
problematic untouchability of childhood, through the perspective of human 
geography. Proposing that memory and imaginative faculty work as binding 
agents, that adult and child are never really out of each other’s sight, our 
personal history looks a lot different when understood in these terms. What 
does become apparent in human geography is a theme of connection, 
disconnection, and reconnection.   
Further to this, the preceding chapter has included examples of other studies 
which have sought to examine and understand ‘childhood-located’ experiences. 
The idea was to present ontologically similar research for scaffolding: 
generically an educational scaffold may assist learning by providing ‘support’ or 




accessed and experienced by readers prior to the methodology chapter, in 
preparation and readiness for the methodology and interpretation. Readers may 
also wish to use the research examples in a comparative manner, to gauge on 
whatever criteria they wish. This is an interpretive study and the reader is of 
course called upon to interpret the work.  
 
The following is a list of research examples provided in the previous chapter: 
Alison Waller’s study, (two different projects are referenced), examining  
fictional reading experiences and historical process; Sobel’s study of adult’s 
memory of past special places; Raymund’s analysis of childhood play and play-
scapes as they are remembered/ re-storied; Skar and Krogh’s study of 
children’s nature-based experiences in Norway through adults’ memory 
narratives and through observations of children’s practices over the past 
decade; Camahalan’s grounded theoretical study examining development in a 
non-transitory manner by linking the memories of graduate students (enrolled in 
a child development module) with their own childhoods as a novel way of 
understanding child development, and lastly is Scott’s‘ retrospective account of 
spiritual narratives, wherein stories of remembered spiritual experiences are 
collected, collated and understood in reference to the self and self-
transformation.  
 
The Methodology chapter begins with an acknowledgement of the tensions that 
run through the study between cognitive science and phenomenology, and 
synchronous voice of psychotherapist and researcher. Some readers may 
identify the dynamic as a felt tension more evident when the study is regarded 
as a whole, for other readers it may just be noticed as a subtle dissonance or 
not noticed at all. The ecology of the study is important however, and the point 
of this beginning is not to de-vein the writing piece by piece but rather just to 
describe the opposing tendencies.  
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Beneath the heading of ‘Phenomenology’, the study’s aim of understanding 
participant experiences is looked at against the phenomenological attitude and 
researcher assumptions. I will explain the importance of describing/elucidating 
the actual phenomenon in the phenomenological approach and show the reader 
how I have arrived at three possible phenomena: the adult who remembers; the 
imaginary companion as remembered and, the remembered as told, each with a 
different focus, each lending itself to a particular experiential end.   
Next, a description of narrative interviewing is provided as the chosen data 
collection method, and a brief rationale for this choice. The aim is to share the 
potential utility of a narrative style interview for this particular study, examining 
narrative’s harmonious relationship with phenomenology. Narrative has 
demonstrable sensitivity to individual experience and self-authorship and as I 
hope to show, provides a shared space for intersubjective exchange.  
The second-half of the chapter is devoted to participant’s experiences of 
imaginary companionships. This is the data section where information is 
gathered and an interpretation, (analysis) of the information is offered. 
Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) is the method used for interpreting 
the participant stories. The steps involved in IPA will be explained in a practical 
fashion using examples and excerpts drawn from participant interviews.   
Tensions 
Quantitative research has an established and successful past, a long history of 
producing important findings. Some argue it has become “the language of 
research rather than the language of a particular paradigm”. Using this language 
in qualitative research may stem from a “desire for intellectual and scientific 
acceptance by the academic community” (Tobin & Begley,p.389, 2004). 
Although this section is not meant as a judicious defence of an interpretative 
position, there is need for an explanation of the project’s methodological turn 
and concurrent tension.  
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As I shifted from an original interest in imaginary friendships and their correlation 
with perspective-taking to a non-defined interest in the IC experience, it has felt 
at times like a step backward, moving away from the light. However, as this idea 
of exploring lived experiences took root, committing to an interpretive framework 
seemed necessary.  
In its formative stages the study has been influenced by cognitive- 
developmental literature on childhood, play, imagination and imaginary 
friendships. Soliciting accurate and academically verifiable findings meant that 
much of what is referenced in the literature review is quantitative and scientific. 
So it is that I have cited studies aimed at locating and measuring constructs 
related to the imaginary companion, explaining correlations to psychological 
variables, studies that situate the IC within a normative developmental 
framework, studies that are robust, coherent, replicable and objective. 
My position as a novice researcher translates into a genuine concern for ‘quality work’ and 
for being able to demonstrate subject ‘competence’, hence an initial and comforting 
tendency to stick with well-known studies, familiar literature, not wandering too far from the 
path. This is the same well-worn path I have followed as a psychotherapist, a 
psychometrically trained professional whose work is framed by medico-psycho 
formulations, diagnostics and generalizable theory. I did not want to be guilty of collapsing 
therapeutic and research interests and in some respects playing it safe has meant losing 
sight of the value of ambiguity and discordance. In the relational-centred approach,  
developed by Evans and Finlay,(2009), for example, data emerges from the researcher 
and co-researcher relationship, a shared dialogical space quite similar to a therapeutic 
encounter, where according to the authors, anything can appear. Of course, I was wary of 
moving toward this kind of intersubjective fusion because of the potential for blurring roles. 
As a doctoral researcher, the aim is to produce something new and something 
of value, with the former condition warranting an intermediate stage of literature 
re-reviewing. With the study continuing to project a particular type of 
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understanding, empirically rather de-personalised and narratively inauthentic, 
the entire process felt unstable.  
A less personalised yet equally probable explanation for the continuance of tension can 
be located in McDowell’s discernment of constitutive and enabling understanding (1994). 
Constitutive understanding is linked to the work of philosophy and phenomenology whilst 
enabling understanding is arguably the target of empirical science. The type of 
constitutive understanding sought for instance in the present study, regards the 
unpicking,(identifying and articulating) of conditions surrounding a phenomenon, an 
understanding of the essences of personal experience. However, the work covered in the 
literature review and preceding theoretical sections of this study, together with my 
professional background in psychology, is rooted in empirical science, loaded in the 
discourses of cognitive and developmental psychology. It is the type of understanding 
which, according to McDowell’s typology, works to reveal causal elements, the 
organizational structure of elements and the causal interactions between those elements.
In the forthcoming sections I make the case for selecting phenomenology as a different 
route to understanding the imaginary companion experience, one that is concerned with 
personal meaning whilst also not locked into intra-individualistic explanation. 
Developmentally-oriented literature on imaginary companionships, that which this study 
has relied on and benefitted from, by its very nature bypasses experiential phenomena in 
favour of other objective, theoretical and sub-personal functions, such as cognitive 
elements.
Following McDowell’s distinction between constitutive and enabling understanding,  
McCulloch poignantly suggests that “meanings ain’t in the head, they are in the mind, but 
the mind just ain’t in the head” (2003, pp. 11–12). Using this to support an explanation of 
the tension in the study, I would need to further add that the approach I have chosen, 
that of Phenomenology, seems to reject the kind of internalism that is espoused in 
cognitive science. That is, the fundamental idea that the mind be identified with, or held 
the same as, the brain. Furthermore, that the brain is self-contained and set apart from 
all else. McCulloch has stated too that a phenomenological approach to understanding 
would not be accepting of the kind of externalism that reduces intentionality to cause-
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and-effect. Similarly, psychoanalytic theory when translated empirically lays claim to 
unconscious processes, the mind subjected to external force as opposed to 
phenomenology’s conscious state of intentionality (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000,p149). The 
authors question the ontological status given to research participants even in cases 
where psychoanalytic ideas are used within a ‘sociological framework’ (Hollway & 
Jefferson, 2000; Clarke, 2002).  
There is a tension existent in situations with dynamic interplay, the dynamic between 
internalism-externalism for instance. McCulloch’s suggestion however, is that the 
either-or dynamic is immediately rejected on the premise that subjective does not 
equate with ‘inside the mind’, nor objective ‘outside the mind’. There are other 
philosophy writers such as Sanders (cited in Wrathall & Kelly,1996), whom suggest that 
there is only one way to reconciliation and tension reduction, which is to shift from a 
representationalist (internal) view of the mind to an ecological (external) view. It would 
seem to run counter to McCulloch’s call of just letting go, forgetting for good the 
trappings of either-or. What Sanders appears to be in favour of is actually a diluted 
version of traditional, ‘analytic’ approaches, suggesting a binary opposite for cognitive 
science in the form of eco-logical-ism. Which brings us back full circle. 
 So where does that leave this current study, with incongruence and tension? 
 The study has benefitted empirically from developmental psychologists such as 
Marjorie Taylor, neuro-behavioural researchers such Stephanie Carlson, and many 
more cognitive-scientific researchers, especially in terms of the imaginary 
companionship literature. Gallagher and Zahavi (2008), assert that “thicker” 
elaborations- thick descriptions of individual experiences- are warranted on the basis of 
the need for more detail, more complex explanation, more emotion and humanity. 
Flyvbjerg, (2001) describes this as “stick(ing) to the details” of individual cases. And 
phenomenology is not the only approach that has attempted to inform understanding 
through providing thick descriptions. Social –constructionist studies, for example tend 
to look beyond intra- individual mechanisms and patterns, to the processes of human 
engagement. The construction of narratives for instance, which provide researchers a 
‘thicker-type’ of understanding of the sense-making of individuals. Narrative identity 
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research has similarly undertaken the study of memory process and links to the 
conceptual structures of the self. In the case of narrative identity research, despite 
similar empirical questions being asked, the literature generated from ‘identity’ research 
begins to resemble something traditionally psychological and familiar, as “components” 
are “defined and ordered”, and experiences are collectively “framed” and “synthesized” 
(Singer & Conway, 2011). Phenomenology, within which this study is rooted, and 
cognitive science from which most of the framing literature has been drawn, are 
regarded as incommensurable but even if it be so, the philosophies and 
phenomenology have within themselves housed incommensurable forces. Whilst 
phenomenologists agree on the need to “study human beings in human terms”,(Finlay, 
2006a), these terms naturally translate into human tensions and human contradictions, 
surely. The current phenomenological study aims to describe what it is for someone to 
have a particular experience within a world of other experiences, but in moving toward 
the experiential unknown has rightly or wrongly walked through the known. The 
absolute non-importation of known theoretical frameworks in the hope of arriving at 
new descriptions holds for some phenomenological studies whilst for others, such as 
this current study, it appears that the work itself serves to highlight the tensions 
between lived and theoretical accounts, something Dreyfus describes as “living life 
forward” and attempting to coherently “understand it backwards” (1991) . 
Phenomenology 
Participants 
Potential participants were recruited by requesting permission from the 
university to circulate information about the research to all registered students 
via poster advertisements and leaflets distributed around campuses.( for poster 
example see Appendix 6)  
Participants who were interested in volunteering could contact me via email or 
telephone. All of the participants chose to email me. I replied in turn and 
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forwarded each an information sheet (see Appendix 2) explaining the rationale 
for the research and the procedure.   
My original proposal for the sampling of participants stated that individuals 
would be Oxford Brookes University students with good conversational English 
ability, who are willing and able to share their imaginary friendship experiences. 
They would be sourced through posters on campus noticeboards, (Harcourt Hill, 
Headington, Gypsy Lane Campuses), Facebook groups and Associations linked 
through Student Union portal , and Internal Brookes email, (“message of the 
day”).  
 I used the same campus-type poster advertisement to post on an Oxford 
Brookes open Facebook group and received no response. I received two 
potential participant email enquiries from an internal Brookes mail alert that had 
gone out but neither of these two individuals were able to commit to meeting 
with me.     
The original proposal for the sampling of participants stated that the sample 
would ideally comprise a multicultural, mixed age and gender group of students, 
not restricted by their enrolment in any one faculty.   
The table below shows the composition of the participant sample group 
Participant Gender Age Ethnicity Student in :  
1. Undergraduate Female 20 White 
British 
Education 
2. Post Graduate female 21 White 
British 
Social sciences 
3. Undergraduate female 23 White 
British 
Social Sciences 
4. Post Graduate Female 26 White 
British 
Education 




6. Undergraduate Female 19 White 
British 
Social Sciences 
7. Undergraduate Female 20 Asian 
British 
Education 
8. Undergraduate Female 23 White 
British 
Psychology and Art 
9. Post graduate Male 21 Turkish 
British 
Education 
To preserve anonymity each participant’s transcript was given a code, P1 being 
the first participant to be interviewed and P9 the last. It is not uncommon for 
participants to want to be named in this type of study, to retain their sense of 
authorship and legitimate their rightful presence. When presented with the 
request to be identified I explained to participants that they would receive an 
electronic copy of the completed study and the choice would then be theirs to 
share it and to identify themselves. However, in the interests of other individuals 
such as family members who had not been consulted and who could 
inadvertently be recognised the participants would not be named in the study.  
Method 
The main criteria for the methodology was that it be sensitive to lived 
experience, responsive to the individual and temporal nuances of the data. The 
raw data are intimate, unstructured narratives and because of this the 
investigation needed something to frame/contain the storying process while 
holding accountability to a full interpretative description. In place of following 
pattern, theme or replication in the data, the aim was to reveal the idiosyncratic 




lived experiences of individuals and their interpretation, phenomenology was 
selected as a methodological approach.  
  
Although a rather crude formulation for a complex subject matter, perhaps the 
best starting point is to discuss Merleau-Ponty’s (1962) four qualities shared in 
phenomenological thought: description, intentionality, reduction and essences.  
1. Beginning with description, the researcher is directed toward exploring a 
recognisable human experience (phenomenon) as it is lived through, rather than 
how it is to be conceptualised, theorized, or reflected upon (van Manen 1997). 
The aim is to determine what the experience means for the people who have 
had the experience, providing descriptions in place of explanation or analysis. At 
the risk of stating the obvious, experiential accounts are not identical to lived 
experience itself. Once a human experience is over what is left are the 
transformations of that experience –the recollections, reflections, and 
descriptions.  
2. Consciousness is an important concept in phenomenology. When we are 
conscious of something we are in relation to it, aware of it, and it holds meaning.  
Referred to as ‘intentionality’, it is a key focus in this approach. The researcher 
aims to make explicit this intentional relationship by describing what research 
participants are experiencing (via consciousness) and how they are 
experiencing it.  
3.Reduction will be explained further under ‘researcher preparation’, and will for 
now be described as the process whereby things are made less complex - the 
phenomena are reduced to their essential elements, seen for what they are. The 
impact of the researcher is too reduced, their strength in the interpretive act 
lessened.  
3. In section 3, The Phenomenon Under Investigation, the concept of 
essence is elaborated further. It refers to the very core of an individual’s 
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experience and it is the researcher’s task to illuminate the hidden meanings and 
essences of this experience.  
According to van Manen, (1997 p.345), phenomenological understanding is best 
described as “existential,… embodied, situational, and non-theoretic”. 
Phenomenology has much to do with our humanity, our relationship to each 
other and to the world in which we find ourselves and this would include: the 
research participant’s existing network of relationships, relationship between 
participant and researcher, the researcher’s relationship with others in the 
research team. Although they happen (are happening) at the edge of the 
phenomenological field my lesson from this study has been that these 
relationships are meaningful and therefore impactful. Drawing from, adding to, 
casting light on, the relationships that this study’s participants had with their 
mothers for example impacted the narrative about imaginary friendships. 
Mothers were mentioned often in conversation, bearing witness and consulted 
for their testimony. As this had not been suggested or recommended, it seemed 
to be a natural phenomenon.  
Reflexivity is seen at different stages of the design, with the final analysis 
involving a process of reflective writing and rewriting. Ambiguity and complexity 
of experience is carried through to the final word. It is not the researcher’s duty 
to ‘make things easier’ to understand. Because the raw data may contain 
participants’ narratives and quotations there is an opportunity for readers to 
make their own sense of things.  
Recounting memory of an imaginary friendship and the experience of this is an 
interpretive act and the aim was to retain the storyteller’s sense of authorship. 
The manner of description, language choice, perceived significances are all 
things that belong to the storyteller. What belongs to the researcher is [my] own 
ordinary everyday language in the expression of findings and this is situated 





Researcher Preparation  
Attention is drawn to the role of the researcher. This is viewed in terms of a 
relationship with the phenomenon under investigation, how another’s 
experience of the phenomenon comes to be understood, how meanings are 
made explicit and how the researcher transfers what they have understood to 
others. What follows is a description of the ‘phenomenological attitude’, and an 
explanation of the concepts of ‘bracketing’ and ‘bridling’. I feel it is important to 
explain this in personal terms as it is not something that could be understood as 
a methodological device or technique.  
 Because phenomenology has to do with the subjective act of knowing we have 
to question the taken-for-granted assumptions that we, as researchers, have in 
relation to the world when we are in our normal, unreflective mode of being, the 
natural attitude (Husserl, 1982 ). The natural attitude takes things just as they 
are in the world, at face value. However, Dahlberg’s (2006) assertion that we 
are connected by phenomena to everything else in the world, to other subjects 
and objects, reminds us that researchers too are part of this world, the one that 
is being defined, investigated or explained. Researchers such as I, working with 
lifeworld phenomena, are to sensitize ourselves, to become prepared in a 
manner that allows us to see shades of meaning while remaining vigilant to 
what we may be doing to the phenomenon in the explication of meaning.  
 It is easy for the phenomenological researcher to become tangled up. 
Enmeshment not only in the process of extraction (of data) but in the whole 
research experience. Best practice would involve some form of initial ‘risk 
assessment’ wherein a frank acknowledgement of one’s own perspective, 
assumptions and emergent hypotheses are laid down. Traditionally, a more 
acute form of reduction, termed ‘bracketing’ by Husserl (1998) and more 
recently, ‘bridling’ by Dahlberg (2006).  
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Husserl’s term describes the mental act, (used synonymously with a ‘conscious 
act’), of putting to rest knowledge gained through secondary or mediated 
sources - “All past knowledge derived from readings or secondary sources, as 
well as one’s former personal experiences with the phenomenon, are meant to 
be excluded”. Ignoring what one already ‘knows’, a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for transcendence in Husserlian philosophy. This attitude of  
“wonder… quiet inquisitive respect” (Bettis,1969, p.12 ) is traditionally adopted 
prior to any engagement with the data or study participants. On reflection, the 
process ‘feels like’ an imaginary transposition, moving across from my place to 
your place, an active and cognitive process. A critical concept for Husserl, he 
explains it thus, “I am here and I imagine going there and being at the place 
where you are right now... you are here (the ‘there’ where I imagine being) and 
you imagine you are going there, to the place where I am (my here)” (Moran &  
Embree, Eds. 2004)  
Dahlberg (2006) has introduced a more contemporary notion of ‘bridling’, (the 
author has stated she owned horses and borrowed this term very specifically). I 
see it as having much to do with restraint. Wilfully energetic beasts, the horse 
and mind are kept in check. Beliefs, theories, assumptions sit powerfully 
beneath the surface of pre-understanding. I have taken ‘bridling’ to be a 
reflective process, scrutinizing my involvement with the imaginary companion as 
phenomenon. Through this process I look for the meanings that exist in 
relationships - those between myself and phenomena, participant and 
phenomena and also intersubjectively. Dahlberg describes this as giving the 
researcher “elbow room” (p.11-19)… “[I] bridle [my] understanding so that [I] do 
not understand too quick, too careless, or slovenly,…that [I] do not make 
definite what is indefinite” (Dahlberg & Dahlberg, 2003).  
 With the rejection of bracketing, of suspending personal opinion, hermeneutic 
phenomenology focuses on getting beneath subjective experience. Researchers 
in this tradition ‘attune themselves’ towards the phenomena, a readiness to see 




interpretations are all we have, the challenge would still be to describe ‘what is 
given in immediate experience’ without intrusion from theory or pre- 
understanding (van Manen, 1990, p.184). Debunking the practice of bracketing 
as impossible and unrealistic would leave us reliant on intuition – “the 
researcher aims to create rich and deep account of a phenomenon through 
intuition” (Cohen, 2001). Even when this is so, implicit assumptions are still to 
be made explicit. A parallel with other schools of phenomenological thought.  
According to van Manen, (1997), the explication of meaning is made possible 
through language use and in particular a register which is informal and 
idiographic.  
There is a reflective section in the study which initially consisted of of journal-
type entries of the research process. However, as is called for at the 
commencement of phenomenological writing, there are certain assumptions and 
hypotheses which I would like to make explicit:  
i. Ignorance: As a child, I did not have an imaginary friend nor recall any 
friend or sibling having had one. I remember first hearing about an 
imaginary friend in my late childhood.  
ii. Unfamiliar: I did think it was a strange experience, maybe even 
something that wasn’t true. I struggled to fully understand the psychology 
behind it.  
iii. Significant: What I began to believe in was it’s significance. However 
variable the definition, this relationship in all its forms seemed important.  
It held a noticeable place in the life of the individual.  
iv. Familial: Right from my first encounter with stories of imaginary friends, 
they seemed to be involved in the life of the family. In one way or another 
bits of family history seemed to be woven into the story.  
v. Emotion: I have come to believe strongly that there is an emotional or 
feeling component to the experience of having an imaginary companion. I 
have noticed non-verbal clues such as facial expression, hand gestures, 
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use of personal space and verbally, the emotional valence becomes 
apparent through tone, pace and pitch of voice.  
vi. Common: I had little idea as to how common they are. The literature gave
me some idea but along the way this seemed to become a less important
fact for me.
vii. Imagining: I have imagined. It is fantasy. Not in the sense of travelling
back in time to my childhood, but at this present time. I am forty years of
age and have an imaginary friend, what’s it like? Is it really an important
relationship? What’s the experience like for me? The most difficult part of
that exercise was trying not to be influenced by what I had already started
hearing from participants. My mind wanted to borrow parts of other
people’s stories and I began to get frustrated. I could not un-hear what I
had already heard and as much as I tried ‘thinking outside the box’,
‘letting my mind go’, there were second-hand elements in every
imagining.
This last point is reassurance as to why I did not define or describe at the outset the 
imaginary friend for participants. I will discuss in the next section the concept of 
phenomena, but reiterate for now that the essential characteristics of a phenomenon exist 
only as they are experienced. I wanted this phenomenon to show itself. I made a decision 
to share nothing about the imaginary companion, not in the advert for volunteer 
participants, nor the participant information sheet nor in my dialogue with volunteers. When 
questioned, as I was, my scripted reply became “an imaginary companion is however you 
define it, it is whatever you consider it to be or however you have experienced it”.  
The phenomenon under investigation 
A phenomenological approach requires several layers of reflection. The first of 
these is researcher attitude, as discussed. The next reflective act is pausing to 
clarify and demarcate the exact phenomenon to be investigated, why this 
phenomenon and what it means to me the researcher.  
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This is a risky business, the business of ‘describing’ phenomena. It means 
attempting for a moment to separate the thing from the thing as-experienced. 
Despite the fact that it may be a fairly common methodological goal in 
phenomenological research to describe phenomena it is difficult if not 
impossible to separate out the experiential component, how it exists in mind. 
The idea of essences is central in Husserlian philosophy (1977) and, although a 
term borrowed gratefully, there is not the scope to delve much further than to 
say that essence or essential meaning is what makes the phenomenon what it 
is, its way of being. When the phenomenon presents itself as something, it 
presents its essence. The term ‘essence’ has been used interchangeably with  
‘structure’ in the sense of a phenomenon, that is, it houses the meaning of what 
something is.  
 Dahlberg, (2006) suggests it has much to do with intentionality stating that 
when one understands a particular phenomenon and what it is, one is dealing 
with essence. As intentional subjects we form meaningful relationships with the 
world of objects and the world of people, existing in these relationships are the 
essences. They are, according to Dahlberg, not the outcome of interpretation 
and therefore not reliant on me as researcher to decode or decipher.  
Merleau-Ponty (1968) has written of essences saying they belong to the ‘‘flesh 
of the world’’; all phenomena are connected and it can be hard to see where 
one phenomenon ends and the next begins.  
 In order to makes things clearer, I have arrived at three possible phenomena: 
the adult who remembers; the imaginary companion as remembered and, the 
remembered as told. Each has a different focus. Each lending itself to a 
particular experiential end. Pivotal to our experience of self, human body and 
relationships to others and the physical world, all three phenomena are valid 
dimensions of understanding an imaginary companionship.  
Although for the purposes of this study only one of the phenomena is selected, 




selfhood, embodiment, sociality, spatiality, temporality, and discourse 
(Ashworth, 2003). That which has been selected to be the focus of this study is 
the remembered as told. The rationale for this choice was that it offered a wider 
lens through which to view the data. By choosing this I felt I would be able to 
show the structural whole, that is socially shared as well as revealing how 
imaginary companionships are experienced in individual ways. It thus seemed 
possible to provide an expanded understanding of the experience.  
  
The phenomenon of: The adult who remembers  
This study comprises a small sample group of young adults have remembered 
their imaginary friend (s) and, through their own volition, have volunteered to 
share their information with me, the researcher. The aim was for participants to 
speak freely about their experience, to interpret and reflect as they so choose. 
Investigation of this phenomena would yield questions concerning the 
psychological essence of individuals, who is this person? What is their intrinsic 
experience? How are they known by others or by the researcher?...The belief 
that memory would work in an unpredictable manner, I hypothesised that other 
related co-occurring experiences may emerge, events that would link the 
imaginary companion to family happenings, to moving house, starting school, 
nan and granddad - extensions as it were. Furthermore, after re-visiting the 
literature, it seemed highly likely that the recollection would extend to other 
individuals in the family system and that their perspectives on the imaginary 
friend would become known. For this reason, the adult (who remembers) was 
not to be the phenomenon investigated.  
That is not to say there is no regard for the adult as subject. Limiting the study to 
this phenomenon might have meant a psychological interrogation. There has 
been discussion of the limitations of studies looking at ‘those with’ versus ‘those 
without’ imaginary companions. I did not wish for this to be an adult version of 
these earlier studies, explaining differences or similarities, identifying qualities 
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residing in the adult. This phenomenon is all about the adult, not the 
remembering or the content of the memory or the act of telling another. 
The phenomenon of: The imaginary companion as remembered 
Here the focus is on the imaginary companion, the meaning of the object-as 
experienced. An understanding of this phenomenon would permit some form of 
personal interpretation but not take into account the meanings of context or 
significance of the self as a reflective being. There was a danger for me in 
positioning the imaginary companion as a remembered object. Choosing to 
understand this phenomenon would have meant losing sight too of the changing 
nature of things as they exist in mind. Consequences of events in childhood do 
not stay the same in mind or memory but are transformed by later experiences. I 
was concerned that this phenomenon would not permit an understanding of 
intersubjectivity  
Memory studies suggest both image and feeling components to the things we 
store. For this reason it was important to provide scope in the study for 
participants to access sensorial memory, to share images as they arose and to 
be able to relate this kind of textured recall in a narrative form.  
Should this have been selected as the phenomenon under investigation there 
would have been, as mentioned above, a measure of personal interpretation. By 
wanting to understand ‘just’ the imaginary companion I could have worked with 
participants’ own definitions, looking at how and why the IC comes to be defined 
in various ways and how this relates to definitions in the literature. If the 
question raised by this phenomenon was, what is an imaginary companion, my 
role as researcher may have been more influential, a judge of definitions, 
measuring personal sentiments against one another and against the available 
literature. The reader may have by default played this part too.  
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The Phenomenon of: The remembered as told 
This is the phenomenon under investigation. It has to do with telling someone 
else a story about something particular one remembers, something that 
happened and that one was a part of. This has a special kind of temporal value, 
as much about what happened as about where it happened, when, who was 
there, what else was going on at the time etc. It is the reflective understanding 
not of experience only but of the memory of that experience.  
I take a risk here by suggesting that both ‘the adult’ who remembers the IC as 
well as ‘the IC’ as remembered, are less experiential investigations. In order to 
understand what the experience means for the people who have had the 
experience, a first person report of experience was needed. This is to be shared 
by the ‘I’, a reflective position that is weighted in personal significance. It 
concerns subjectivity and identity because the construction of a story (from 
autobiographical memory) involves imagination and humanness. Reflection 
however is also a decentring process. The lifeworld, the lived context of this 
experience gives an intersubjective component, with the ego in a less 
egocentric place human experience is open to intersubjectivity.  
It felt necessary too for researcher and reader to witness and appreciate 
ambiguity. The whole story from telling to listening to the writing down or 
recording becomes relational and situational. Sharing of the remembered across 
interpersonal space has researcher and the participant storyteller assuming that 
their words will be understood as spoken and intended.  
I argue that the value of this phenomenon is the ‘felt’ component, the “felt 
meaning” of the experience. van Manen (2007), in his commentary of  
Langeveld’s (1983) The Secret Place in the Life of the Child, has connected one 
early experience to other understandings of development and pedagogy. The 
felt meaning extends to the reader who should feel that they have vicariously 




coming to similar conclusions about what it means (Starks & Brown Trinidad, 
2007).  
The lived experience, the sharing of the remembered, is further able to be 
interpreted through the use of a post-interview feedback form which was 
developed purely to aid in following up the participant narratives and 
summarising the experience for the participants. The form will be detailed in a 
later section but it is fitting for me to share at this moment that I did not have in 
mind any specific way in which the form would be used interpretively until I 
began my own reflection on this phenomenon. The commitment to detailing 
exactly what it was that I was looking for and the decision to look at the multiple 
layers of an autobiographical memory experience brought to mind the potential 
utility of this feedback form. As I have stated, the reader will be guided through 
the form in a later section.  
  
Some ground has been cleared on the subject of phenomena, the nature of the 
phenomenon under investigation and how interpretive process can assist in an 
understanding of the experiential component of phenomena. The next step is to 
explain the methodological tool selected for this study.  
  
The Research Tool: Narrative Interviewing  
“The history of narrative begins with the history of (hu)mankind; there does not 
exist, and has never existed, a people without narratives” (Barthes 1966 p.14). 
Simply put, narrative is an act or process whereby one informs another of an 
event or happening (Smith 1981). Theoretical definitions such as those 
belonging to narrative theory include Polkinghorne’s (1988), idea of narrative as 
a story relating a series of events, either true or false; his belief that narrative 
accounts have a unique explanatory power, (Richards 1989, p.258). This 
definition highlights formulaic expression, the importance of organisational and 




scientists should learn to read people as they would a text, (p.259). Along these 
same lines, the genre of story for instance, the focus would be on the act of 
creation as well as the finished product - how parts and plot work in syncronicity. 
However, as noted by Sikes and Gale, (2006), a definition such as  
Polkinghorne’s could equally apply to the genres of communication that include 
quantitative experimental description and report, considering such findings to be 
narratives within these parameters.  
This current study relies on the ideas expressed by narrative theorists Connelly 
and Clandinin, (2000 p.20), with an emphasis on the collaborative and dialogical 
nature of narrative. As a form of scientific inquiry, narrative is considered a 
dynamic and social means of reaching experiential understanding. Their ideas 
differ from the likes of Polkinghorne in that the communicative elements are in 
motion, parts shift, and the collaborative meeting of communicator and receiver 
is transient. The end product too exists only in interpretation. Although having 
looked to Polkinghorne for his ideas on temporality, there was more to be found 
in the way of applying narrative to the explanation of human action and 
experience in the work of Clandinin and  
Connelly. Polkinghorne’s propositions for example are difficult to follow in terms 
of how meaning may be expressed in and through narrative (Richards 1989,  
p.259). It is this experiential element that I found most attractive in the work of 
Connelly and Clandinin: “Narrative inquiry as a methodology entails a view of 
the phenomenon. To use narrative inquiry methodology is to adopt a particular 
view of experience as phenomenon under study (2006 p.375).  
Essentially mindful of the research purposes for which narrative is appropriate, 
this section is part explanation and part justification. The kind of narrative inquiry 
used is firmly located within the ‘turns’ of post-modernism – “linguistic”, “textual”,  
“reflexive”, “poststructuralist” and “literary” (Maclure 2003). In terms of 
methodological decision-making, it would be well for readers to understand that 
both phenomenologists and narrative researchers are concerned with the 
essence of lived experience and interpretation. Self-authorship of life events 
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make narrative an appealing research tool in the phenomenological approach. 
Influenced by phenomenology, some would argue that the story in its telling is 
the construction of the reality, that the phenomenon is formed out of the stream 
of consciousness (Young 1987). As I had searched for a means by which I 
could gather experiences, connect to them, and interpret them in a loyal 
manner, it seemed not only that narrative permitted this very thing but that it 
would carry the ethical, ontological and epistemological torch for its part of the 
journey. Despite the claim that narrative is a contested, complex, transitional 
and developing field (Chase 2005), narrative interviewing seemed a best-fit 
option for this study on imaginary companionships, for accessing the personal 
memories of participants.  
After consideration, the decision was made to use the story for the purposes of 
scholarship. A storyteller-listener type narrative I deemed would work best in 
uncovering ‘unanticipated’ themes with ‘storyteller’ participant relying on their 
own personal narrative. Although the word ‘story’ in relation to a research paper 
may have negative consequences for how the work is regarded I have used it 
with all intent and purpose and without defence. It is beyond the scope of this 
study to engage in any kind of debate around the science vs non-science, 
objective vs subjective, binary. What follows is a succinct rationale for my choice 
of narrative.  
1.The narrative interview is purposeful. The act of listening was to a natural
extent beholden to authorial intention and academic intent and could be made 
explicit to participants. Although the researcher’s control over the conversation 
is intended to be minimal in narrative interviews, there is a sense of importance 
inherent in the act of listening. The purposeful ‘spontaneity’ of generating 
questions or remaining silent, of being so obviously present as to warrant a 
feeling of trust, of mindfully reflecting what I had heard and understood, these 
were important factors for me. Yet despite its humanness, the narrative 
interview is far from random or spontaneous. There exist the basic generative 
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rules of storytelling as well as the study’s purpose, aims and research questions 
(Fife, 2005). As a researcher seeking to understand the phenomenon of 
imaginary companionships and the stories/ counter- stories that encase these, 
there was a sobering awareness of the non-randomness of the dialogical 
relationship.  
2. Narrative is concerned with self. The giving of voice to participants implies
with equal measure to their sense of being heard. It has been my aim, as it is for 
phenomenologist enquiry, to honour each individual story, beholden to agency 
and intent. It has been said that the personal worth of narrative lies in the act of 
owning a story and choosing to share it (Snowden, 2002). It is worth noting  
Taylor’s finding, through her own imaginary companion research, that the 
‘source’ of experience and experiential detail is oftentimes obtained second 
hand. The parent, usually the mother, may be consulted even by adults in the 
verification of their imaginary companion experiences as if in a matter of 
testimony. The imaginary friend may therefore in some manner be considered a 
familial artefact, belonging to more than just one member of a family. Although 
this theme is elaborated on further in the data interpretation and discussion, it is 
worth mentioning one interpretation of the life story – the way in which an 
individual arranges their self-script to include other characters, plots and scenes 
- as psychosocially constructed. This would suggest the story to be co- authored
by the culture and social interactions of the individual (McAdams 1996). A 
further reason for my choice of the narrative interview.“…Life stories may be 
judged by such aesthetic standards as coherence and richness and by such 
pragmatic standards as credibility…somewhere between pure fantasy and 
slavish chronicle, life stories are psychosocial constructions that aim to spell out 
personal truths...” (p. 307)  
3.Narrative accounts are contextual. Connelly & Clandinin, (1990), have argued
that as vectors of social location, narrative episodes are embedded in context, a 
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position that permits them to be viewed somewhere between total relativism and 
complete reality. Consequently, to understand a narrative is not merely to 
understand its chronological sequence of events but also to be aware of its non-
chronological dimension. That is, the construction of a whole from successive 
events, or the configuration of a plot. In human life the vast majority of social 
phenomena flow without precise beginning and end. Yet, in the scientific 
tradition of making sense of life events it so often taken that investigation 
demarcate a beginning and an end. But even more than the structural 
configuration of story is the context-dependent nature of language itself. 
Wittgenstein’s (1953) use of language games for instance, has highlighted the 
need to see language as an integral part of social behaviour. He has argued 
against claims suggestive of language as able to offer us lasting descriptions in 
immutable ways. The use of a narrative form has allowed me to look at 
language, choice of words, emotive connotation, the connection to other words, 
repetition and emphasis, to see language as connected to larger structures of 
meaning for instance to family. Most importantly, contextuality disavows claims 
of transcendence making the narrative loyal to its time and place.  
4. Narrative permits deconstruction in terms of reaching alternative or
multiple understandings of experiences. When, such as in this case, there is 
more than one participant giving an oral account of their experience, it is 
possible that discordancy be exposed in text/transcription. I am of the belief that 
cognitive ambiguity, because it is uncomfortable, oftentimes wishes to be 
expressed. When someone is permitted to talk freely about their experiences 
and cognitions surrounding the experience, reflexive questioning may expose 
inconsistency. Transcribed interviews also permit the researcher to, originally as 
Derrida did with deconstructionism (1976,1978,1982), search for instability, for  
‘essentialised’ elements of text, irritate the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ qualities of 
commentary and to remain cognisant of the instability of text.  
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5. Narrative interviews can be recorded and transcribed. Taking notes
during the conversation was something I wanted to avoid. It was most important 
that the participant felt listened to. Eye contact and reflective listening are 
impossible if one is taking notes and it is also in my opinion a block to 
establishing rapport. According to Smith and Osborn, (p.64) it is however 
important not to “reify the tape recording”, not to rely solely on it to the exclusion 
of other non-verbal cues and nuances. The audio recording would be useful in 
capturing semantic elements as well as for transcription.  
Although narrative inquiry has gained a degree of acceptability in academia as a 
valid research approach (Sikes 2006; Richardson 2000; Plummer 2001); Angus, 
1995; Clandinin & Connelly 1986, 2000; Lieblich, Tuval-Mashiach, &  
Zilber, 1998; Pinnegar & Daynes, 2007; Riessman, 2008; Webster & Mertova, 
2007) there are issues to consider in any narrative interpretation. Firstly, there  
are the natural defence-mechanisms at work in accounts of self or life events. 
Protection of the self, self-concept and ego integrity may for some individuals 
preclude sharing certain self or familial integrity or, things that are considered 
anti-social may, for example, not be shared with an interviewer. What is deemed 
socially undesirable is oftentimes left out of the recounted experience. It is 
possible that the hesitancy of participants to ‘reveal themselves’ be lessened 
through rapport with the researcher and a belief in the ethical integrity of the 
particular research process.  
In short, storytelling as a way of recounting and creating order out of experience 
begins as a natural process in childhood and continues through all stages of life. 
Researchers such as myself who make the choice to use the sorts of narratives 
that explicitly tell stories do so because we believe this approach is most 
effective for communicating to others the ‘data’ we want to get across and 
through making this choice convey our own epistemological, ontological and 
ethical position. “We sought personal stories, believing that they offered the 
only, as well as the most ethically and methodologically acceptable, means of 
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obtaining the sort of personal sense of the lived experiences we were interested 
in” (Sikes & Piper 2010: pp.39–42).  
The Post-Narrative Feedback Form  
Before moving to a discussion of the data and the chosen method of 
interpretation, it is fitting to give some idea of what took place following the 
narrative interviews. Each of the nine participants was asked, once they had 
finished speaking, to listen to an audio recording of the narrative, by means of a 
small tape recorder shown to them prior to commencement. Participants were 
given the choice, for reasons of privacy and discretion, to listen with 
headphones. If they felt that narrative needed extraction (deletion), or they 
wanted to add or clarify a part of the conversation, this too was amended 
accordingly. Once satisfied, the participants were asked to complete the post-
interview feedback form. The participants were given the choice to complete the 
form and all nine participants consented. 
The form was suggested to the University research ethics committee following 
the thesis proposal and their recommendations. This was in response to the 
legitimate concern for participant wellbeing and best-interest. In particular, 
because I had stated my professional role as a mental health specialist when 
seeking ethics approval, it was felt that safeguarding measures needed to be 
put in place to minimise the likelihood of the narratives moving into a 
therapeutic domain, or disclosing upsetting/uncomfortable content. Besides a 
safeguarding plan, other contingencies in the event of personal distress for 
participants included a referral list of university counselling telephone numbers, 
university based student support services and other external help agents such 
as the Samaritans counselling service. Although this seemed an unlikely 
scenario, there is a necessary ethical responsibility placed on researchers and 




  The form was designed to give participants a moment for self-reflection, a de-
briefing of sorts, immediately following our conversation. My rationale for using a 
semi-structured tool in an interpretive study was to allow some distance 
between participants and myself, moving out of the shared personal space in 
which we found ourselves when engaged in personal conversation.  
The rating scale comprised nine statements which I felt captured salient aspects of the 
overall experience. Participants were asked to indicate the choice that best expressed their 
feeling toward the following statements:   
- I expected something different from this experience;   
- I found it strange sharing my childhood memories with the researcher;   
- I found it relatively easy to recall details about my imaginary friend(s);   
- Some details about my imaginary friend were difficult to remember;  - As an 
adult I am surprised by the role my imaginary friend(s) played in my childhood 
years;   
- Some of the things I remember about my imaginary friend were difficult to put 
into words;   
- I feel the location on campus was suitable and appropriate;   
- I would have been more comfortable sharing my stories somewhere else;  - I 
am able and willing to contact the researcher with any questions I might have, 
even if these are at a later stage.   
All nine participants completed the form once they had listened to the audio 
recording of their interview.  
The Post Narrative Form (shown below) forms the basis for Table 4 in the 
sections ‘The Memory Experience’.  
    
Post Narrative Feedback Form. Directions: Please indicate the choice that best expresses your 
feelings about the statements below by circling one of the five choices. Your choices are:  
Strongly Disagree (SD), Disagree (D), Undecided (U), Agree (A), or Strongly Agree (SA).  
1. I expected something different from this 
experience   
SD  D  U  A  SA  
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2. I found it strange sharing my childhood memories
with the researcher
SD D U A SA 
3. I found it relatively easy to recall details about my
imaginary friend
SD D U A SA 
4. Some details about my imaginary friend were
difficult to remember
SD D U A SA 
5. As an adult, I am surprised by the role my
imaginary friend played in my childhood years
SD D U A SA 
6. Some of the things I remember about my
imaginary friend were difficult to put into words
SD D U A SA 
7. I feel the location on campus was suitable and
appropriate
SD D U A SA 
8. I would have been more comfortable sharing my
stories somewhere else
SD D U A SA 
9. I am able and willing to contact the researcher
with any questions I might have, even if these are at
a later stage.
SD D U A SA 
Method of Data Interpretation: Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) 
Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis (IPA), (Smith, Harré and Van 
Langenhove 1995; Smith & Osborn 2003; Smith, Flowers & Larkin, 2009), has 
been selected for this study because I felt it would best serve the aim of 
understanding, through interpretation, the experiences of multiple participants 
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as well as to preserve the integrity of each individual story. There follows further 
on in the paper a short reflection on my personal research journey 
encompassing some of the methodological decision-making processes and the 
reader will find therein that Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis was not my 
initial choice and in fact had not considered it until after the narrative interviews 
when I began working with the data.  
Prior to my consideration of IPA, the ‘Listening Guide’, developed by Gilligan 
(Gilligan, 2003; Gilligan, Spencer, Weinberg & Bertsch, 2003), was going to be 
used as a data analytic tool. The Listening Guide is considered a feminist, 
voice-centred methodology most often used with narrative data. As a feminist 
methodology it was originally intended to amplify marginalised voice and voices 
have become central to analyses produced (Balan 2005). For a single story, or 
another type of ideologically- weighted research question, I may have ended up 
selecting the Listening Guide as a means for making sense of the data.   
However, after spending considerable time re-engaged with the interview 
recordings and transcripts, (with months passed since the actual interviews), it 
seemed to fall short. My feeling was that the reach of the Listening Guide may 
not grasp other elements lying outside the self. I decided, again after spending 
time with the narratives, that it would be difficult using this method to get a 
sense of the connection to context/ contextual factors and it may not adequately 
account for temporal elements in the narrative. Although the Listening Guide 
appears very much concerned with self and the mental processes surrounding 
self and identity such as perception and emotion, I wanted to retain the 
ecological integrity of the phenomenon which for the purposes of the study was 
an important part of the experiential interpretation.  
Moving forward, I endeavour now as I have done in the preceding narrative 
section, to use this space to explain IPA and offer some justification of it as a 
choice for the interpretive section of the study.  
Understanding: 
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IPA is a phenomenological approach with the principal concern being the 
meanings particular experiences or events hold for individuals. Within the ambit 
of social psychology for example, the approach has proven its utility, prizing 
personal perception over attempts to yield generalisations regarding lived 
experience, (e.g. Duncan, Hart, Scoular & Brigg, 2001, Thompson, Kent & 
Smith 2002; Clare 2003; Biggerstaff, 2003; French, Maissi, Marteau, 2005). For 
this reason it is seen as connected to theories of interpretation and symbolic-
interactionism. I am particularly fond of the method’s embracement of 
understanding as inclusive of identification and empathy as well as the type of 
understanding that ‘makes sense of’.  
The workings of IPA, the stages of which are elaborated on further to this, 
involves something similar to an individual case analysis with each transcribed 
interview read individually at first, and each recording listened to multiple times. 
Initial annotations and comments are made and include reflection on content, 
language use, deliverance and, with multiple readings, more interrogative 
comments (Smith et al., 2009). Each interview transcript is further re-engaged 
with noting emergent themes, clusters of related themes, resulting finally in a 
tabulation of superordinate themes which represent the range of experiential 
narratives of participants. I value the affordance this method gives to 
participant’s voices by encouraging the use of verbatim extracts in the 
interpretation of data.  
Table 1: Stages of IPA analysis (adapted from Smith et al., 2009, p.79). 
Transcription of recorded/ taped interviews. 
Line by line analysis of concerns and understandings of each participant. 
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Identifying emerging themes within these data highlighting commonality and 
difference for each case and then across multiple cases.  
The researcher develops a ‘dialogue’ between themselves, their themed data 
and psychological knowledge to ascertain the meaning behind these concerns 
within this particular context.  
A structure is developed which brings the relationships between these themes 
together or ‘gestalt’.  
The organisation of this material is transparent because the analysed data can 
be traced back through the process of transcription and emerging themes.  
The interpretation is supported through supervision or collaboration so that it is 
coherent and valid.   
 Reflection of the researcher of their own perceptions throughout this process 
(Smith, 2007).  
Hermeneutics: 
IPA employs what is known as a “double hermeneutic”. That is, researchers 
attempting to make sense of a participant’s sense-making. (Smith & Osborn, 
2003). This was an important consideration in adopting this method to work with 
the narrative data, especially insofar as my own role was concerned. IPA offers 
the opportunity to make things explicit and through its epistemological stance I 
felt comfortable that my interpretation of the narratives would test any existing 
(personal) capacity for reflexivity. And, as a point of first reflection, I have taken 
this interpretive epistemology as resonate of a good 'fit' with my personal 
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experience and own narrative encounters both with participants and the 
literature.  
IPA draws on the theoretical perspectives of hermeneutic theorists Heidegger,  
Schleiermacher and Gadamer (Larkin, Watts & Clifton 2006; Smith, 2007;  
Smith, Flowers & Larkin 2009). Formatively, Schleiermacher’s ideas 
transformed the practice of interpreting text for example by inviting researchers 
to engage in both linguistic and psychological interpretation, to search for 
meaning which was potentially beyond a person’s own awareness,(Smith,  
Flowers and Larkin, 2009). Conscious oblivion forms a salient part of 
Heidegger’s perspective too, with the acknowledgement that the IPA 
researcher’s personal beliefs, assumptions and sense-making may emerge well 
into the interpretive process, or may not become fully conscious at all. That said, 
IPA studies such as this current project are considered indicative and 
provisional rather than definitive.  
Sample size: 
Because IPA is an idiographic approach concerned with understanding 
particularly defined phenomena in particular contexts a small sample size, such 
as was the case in this study, is considered acceptable,(Smith, Flowers & 
Larkin, 2009 p.49). The aim is to say something in detail about the perceptions 
and understandings of a particular group with the rigour of the study residing in 
the light it sheds. Beholden to the normative deadlines and time constraints of 
doctoral study, I had to consider the finality of the project and to decide when 
enough would have to be enough. Although tempting to wait it out for more 
participants and their stories there arrives a point, noted in IPA research, at 
which saturation takes place. A sample size of nine is therefore within the 
suggested parameters for an IPA study despite the literature showing favour for 
single, n = 1 studies,(Eatough & Smith 2008; Smith, Flowers & Larkin 2009).  
Narrative:  
The choice for IPA was further prompted by its proven relationship with the 
narrative interview. Smith et al. (2009) have suggested that the best way to 
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collect data for an IPA study is through the semi-structured interview although 
this is not necessarily the only way. Data in the form of diary entries, letters or 
journals where thoughts have been recorded are also useful in IPA research. 
The loose type of narrative conversation I had engaged in with participants 
meant an increased opportunity for the emergence of novel and unanticipated 
information. The use of narrative in this form is I feel anchored to important 
phenomenological tenets concerning lived experience. This holds especially 
true for the interpretation of (autobiographical) memory narrative as 
contextually, socially and historically located.  
Data Interpretation Stage 1 
The stages identified, although not stipulated by the approach itself, I have 
drawn from other phenomenological studies where IPA has been employed with 
good merit (Smith, Flowers & Osborn 1997; Smith 2004; Larkin, Watts & Clifton, 
2006; Langdridge 2007; Quin,Clare, Ryan & Jackson 2009; Reid, Flowers & 
Larkin, 2005; Willig 2001). What must be included according to the founders of 
this approach, are the following characteristics: (a) movement from what is 
unique to a participant to what is shared among the participants, (b) description 
of the experience which moves to an interpretation of the experience, (c) 
commitment to understanding the participant’s point of view, and  
(d) psychological focus on personal meaning-making within a particular context
(Smith et al. 2009). 
Following multiple readings of the nine interview transcripts a list of emergent 
(subordinate) themes was composed. Although crude and loosely defined, the 
ideas were recurrent across the nine transcriptions and were signifiers of the 
individual’s particular experience. The process I followed was such that themes 
were listed roughly on one side of the transcripts and evidence pulled from the 
text for thematic content. I do not feel I was conservative at this first stage of 
analysis following a mantra of ‘If in doubt take it out’. The rationale for this was 
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that in losing data -it was left behind in the original text- my interpretations would 
be just that, mine, sans evidence. The whole purpose of selecting IPA for this 
study was to enlarge the scope for understanding of such a phenomena, to 
include the experiences that did not conform, the exceptions and outliers, and to 
offer to the reader enough experiential content that they may form their own 
interpretation.  
The themes arose from the data, are present in the data, but are also a result of 
my interpretation. In the act of my reading and re-reading, and the moments 
between, there is a process of self-consultation. For me as interpreter, these are 
negotiated themes.  
In the following table (table 2) the subordinate themes have been listed and 
alongside the approximate number of statements/excerpts that were interpreted 
as supportive of a particular theme. The purpose of the table is to give a 
concrete and visual representation of how important each theme was for a 
particular participant based on the number of textual clues lifted from each 
interview transcript. This then provides a starting point for further interpretation 
of the content of participant narratives as well as their relevance to each theme. 
It should be noted that although a participant may have only one or two 
statements in support of a theme the content and more importantly the ‘felt 
sense’ of the statement may hold more relevance than another participant who 
has for example seven statements which are experientially speaking less vital.  
This is about each participant’s experience of a phenomenon and my 
interpretation of this experience. Narrative is ambiguous – there are statements 
which may have represented more than one theme and perhaps others which 
represent none of the themes identified. The value of Interpretive  
Phenomenological Analysis is that it is the narrative itself out of which these 
themes have arisen and not a case of the themes having existed a priori.  
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Table 2: Emergent themes and estimate number of validating statements 
Remembered 
relationship with IC and sense of 
significance.(Ownership, Attachment, Control, 
Mastery). Referential & Intersubjective. 
P1 = 6 
P2 = 5 
P3 = 3 
P4 = 9 
P5 = 10 
P6 = 5 
P7 = 4 
P8 = 7 
P9 = 11 
 Social Comparison/ Evaluative. Perceived 
positively or negatively/ social desirability; 
perceived social deprivation. Conformity. 
P1 = 7 
P2 = 2 
P3 = 1 
P4 = 4 
P5 = 5 
P6 = 5 
P7 = 8 
P8 = 1 
P9 = 1 
Introspection/ Reflexivity 
Meta-cognitive process, making 
sense of it all. Includes own 
evaluation of memory. 
P1 = 6 
P2 = 5 
P3 = 3 
P4 = 7 
P5 = 4 
P6 = 4 
P7 = 6 
P8 = 2 
P9 = 4 
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Continuity of identity/ Self 
Continuity. Identity solidified vs. 
destabilised. 
P1 = 1 
P2 = 2 
P3 = 1 
P4 = 4 
P5 = 7 
P6 = 0 
P7 = 1 
P8 = 0 
P9 = 7 
Family/Social network/ key figures 
in memory. (Includes testimony by 
family member). 
P1 = Mother 9 brother 
4 
P2 = Mother 5 
P3 = Sister 3 
P4 = Sister 4 
P5 = Mother 4 
P6 = Mother 3 
P7 = Father 6 
Mother 3 
P8 = Mother 2 




Temporal –chronological/ linear 
time and related idea of loss. 
(Things must end). Included is 
loss of memory content.  
P1 = 1 time  
P2 = 5 loss of  
IC  
P3 = 0  
P4 = 4 loss of  
IC  
P5 = 3 loss of  
IC  
P6 = 0  
P7 = 0  
P8 = 1 time  
P9 = 5 time  
  
  
    
Stage 2  
The second stage involved grouping emergent themes into clusters. The seven 
super-ordinate themes arrived at were: The relationship experience, Social 
comparison, self-evaluation, impact of the imaginary companion relationship on 
identity formation, the influence of mother as a key figure, the influence of others 
in memory, the experience of temporality and loss. The themes are listed and 
described in the following table (Table 3).  
  
Table 3 : Super-ordinate and related sub-ordinate themes.  
The Relationship  
Experience  
   Asymmetrical distribution of power  
Developmental mastery/Self-Efficacy  
Referential / intersubjective   
 Social  
Comparison  
  Perceived positively: social desirability, social 
cognition.  
Perceived negatively- (Perceived deprivation of 
social relations,  
Conformity,  
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Self-Evaluation  Meta- 
Cognition 
: Making sense of the IC relationship 
Evaluation of memory 
The Impact of the 
IC relationship on 
Identity 
Formation 
Continuity: Self understanding 
Discordance: Destabilise remembered identity 
The Influence of 
Mother as a Key 
Figure 
Collaboration & Support 
Control of mother 
Testimony 
Interlocution 





The experience of 
temporality and loss 
Time. Loss and the IC relationship 
Time, Loss and memory 
Stage 3 
In the next stage excerpts have been taken directly from the interview 
transcripts and are used as support for a particular theme or thematic strand. 
Excerpts are presented in italics and placed within the text so that the narrative 
flow is uninterrupted. The aim is for patterns and convergences within the larger 




The Relationship Experience  
Ownership: In the cases where the relationship experience is one of ownership there exists 
an obvious asymmetrical distribution of power in the relationship between the individual 
and the imaginary companion. This is exemplified in the following excerpt: I suppose it was 
more like a friendship with yourself because you create the imaginary friends. So you kind 
of have more control over that friendship than over the interaction whereas with friends 
like real friends they have their own personalities (P4)  
 In terms of the imaginary companion having a subordinate role, being under the 
child’s control, P8 commented: I could be angry with her and send her home 
away from me when I would get fed up. Although there is the mention of anger 
as an emotional component the overriding sense in this narrative seems to be 
the ability to dispense of the IC as and when the child chooses. For a child this 
must surely be an empowering phenomenon.  
P9, who had multiple imaginary characters represented in pictorial form on 
paper, remarked that his characters were replaceable not in a transient sense 
but in a way which diminished the capacity of the characters to exist 
independently: they were replaced … I’d play around with the characters a little 
bit and then use them in all sorts of ways … (make) them speak to each other 
(P9). This same individual emphasizes their belonging to him by stating: there 
was the real world and there was my world and they were in my world (and he 
repeated at a later time), in my world (and), they were for me. (P9)  
For P4, her sense of ownership over two imaginary frogs translated in her 
getting to do more of what she wanted, having to rely less on real friends: yeah 
you want to do something and you think, oh my imaginary friends would do that 
with me because they are mine… not having to share them and probably also 
get to do more unusual things.  
  
The notion of a child’s perceived control over the imaginary companion does not 
always seem to be the case. Taylor, (Taylor & Mottweiler 2008, pp.47-54) has 
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found in her research that IC’s “come and go on their own schedule rather than 
according to the child’s wishes, and they do not always want to play what the 
child wants to play”. Approximately one third of children in a study by Taylor, 
Carlson, and Shawber (2007) described their imaginary companions as 
disobedient or unpredictable. However, in this small sample of adults 
interviewed there was a common theme of ownership and control of the IC.  
Constant thought: In these memory narratives there seems less of an emotional 
attachment and more a form of cognitive attachment as P9 remarked: I’d think 
about them all the time; they had their own lives; I would usually have a certain 
character in front of me in my mind. So the memory here is one of holding 
something important in mind with the investment of cognitive energy. The active 
construction of the fantasy, according to Bouldin et al.(2002), involves 
monitoring and continually updating the model of the other (imaginary friend’s) 
mind states, and on the basis of these invent conversation.  
The fact that they are constantly at the forefront of mind for some is an 
indication too of resultant behaviours. Behaviours such as marking paperwork, 
explaining things, organising activities, being a leader, I used to line them 
up…take them into the garden…,(P1) and assuming adult-like responsibility, like 
putting seatbelts on all my imaginary friends to go out, (P1) being examples of 
what Somers and Yawkey (1984) refer to as the process of de-contextualisation. 
It is defined as “the use of real situations out of their contexts during play” (p.86). 
Interlocution: In cases of ownership an exclusivity of relationship exists. Only the 
child has direct access to the IC and will, in mediating for others in the family for 
example, act as an interlocutor. Trionfi and Reese (2009) reported in their study 
children with IC’s produced richer narrative accounts than their non-IC peers 
both when telling a story and when narrating a personally experienced past 
event. And according to Gleason (2004), narrative skills may be increased as 




With regard to the stand Gleason takes on interested adults facilitating 
communication through an interest in the child’s experiences, this has worked in 
an opposite way for P5: there weren’t many adults in my life I guess that would 
just sit and listen to a four or five year old kind of talking at them …I just 
remember talking, it was about talking… I think it was more about her listening 
to me than it was about her talking to me, but yes. I knew it was just an outlet; it 
was just talking and it was probably child stuff … I think she was safer than to 
talking to adults, not having the adults there to talk to… It was a bridge between 
the solid reality adults need to be there to talk to me and I can talk to people 
when they are not there. In this instance P5 remembers not having her parents 
around to talk to and her very dear imaginary friend is an old lady who sits on a 
rocking chair just listening to the little girl talk.  
  
P6 recognised this sense of exclusive ownership and in a self-effacing manner 
shared her sentiment: I don’t know [does] that sounds selfish? (Then goes 
further to state), he wasn’t a secret I don’t remember trying to keep him a secret 
at all.  
  
Compensation for peers: In terms of an emotional attachment, there can be a 
compensatory element served when the adult remembers either not having 
many friends or that the friends were not pleasing to be around: More attached 
and nicer to me I think -my peer friends weren’t very nice… And I found it quite 
hard to make friends and stuff like that so my imaginary friends were more of a 
comfort I’d say, probably closer than my other friends and actually I didn’t have 
that many (P1)     
  
A back and forth debate plays out in which some suggest ICs are invented to 
compensate for children failing to make real-life friendships (e.g. Gleason, 2004; 
Gleason, Sebanc & Hartup 2000). Gleason and Hohmann (2006) found that 
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there were no differences in children’s reported interactions with ICs or friends 
with whom the friendship was reciprocated. However, according to Hoff (2005), 
imaginary companions not only had a social compensatory function, but also 
provided social practice and enhanced the children’s social competence. 
Gleason (2002) maintained that make believe friends may provide practice in 
conceptualising relationships. Harter and Chao (1992) purported that the 
competence of the child in general might be increased through the invention of 
an imaginary companion. The suggestion implied by some studies is that 
children with imaginary companions may be creating them precisely because 
they lack the social skills or opportunities to create real friends (Ames & Learned 
1946; Nagera 1969; Svendsen 1934).  
Compensation for family members: The IC serves to meet an attachment need 
created by some form of familial deficit. In one instance, the birth of a brother is 
remembered as perhaps a difficult or lonely time, P1: I have one sibling who 
was born when I went into reception, I was like four and he was quite a sick 
baby, like quite colicky and stuff like that…I think it probably was because my 
brother was born at that age as well. And they were with me at that time… I was 
mainly alone and having a new born baby that was quite a big thing. P1 later 
remarks: I don’t remember my dad being around much of my childhood.  
I spent some time reflecting on whether to include this excerpt from P2, 
uncertain as to whether it pointed to some form of familial deprivation for this 
person. The recalled experience led me to wonder whether at the time she had 
felt lonely, left out, less attended to, despite there being other siblings and a 
constant stream of visitors to the family home. So it is included here for the 
reader to make up their own mind: we had a big family always seemed busy… 
We always had other children over at our house so it seemed noisy, busy.  
As a final word on the theme of relationship experience, I wish to raise the fact 
that none of the nine interviewed participants in this study reported having a 
personified object as a companion. This would have been interesting especially 
95 
in terms of understanding the different friendship experiences that adults 
reported back on. Findings by Gleason, Sebanc and Hartup (2000) that 
egalitarian relationships are formed with invisible friends whereas relationships 
with personified objects resemble parent-child (authoritative, asymmetrical 
power distribution) relationships.  
Social comparison 
This theme arose from participant narratives concerning self-evaluation and 
thoughts on perceived normality. This was not in all cases seen as a bad thing. 
In some instances the sense of being different from others was positively 
perceived: I think I like that I had them and maybe that is because they might 
have as being unique and different. (P4)  
Different IC’s: For some participants the social comparison was around having 
heard about others’ IC experiences and sensing a non-alignment with their own.  
In all instances it was the imaginary companions themselves that were different. 
P2 shared: She wasn't like I've heard some others talk about imaginary friends - 
she wasn't naughty as far as I can remember. You do hear about little children's 
imaginary friends always getting the blame for bad behaviour, I've heard that 
before but I honestly can't remember Minnie getting into a lot of trouble. For P5, 
it was her IC’s name and age that served to differentiate: I think from knowing 
about my friends imaginary friends this is when we are in school so we are in 
year one having a set of imaginary friends is quite strange and I felt almost 
embarrassed of Mrs Barlow and the little darlings. My other friends had 
imaginary friends that had pretty names… I think it’s different. I think it’s different 
to have a much older imaginary friend. I think that's one thing I’d like to know is 
what are these imaginary friends like because my experience from childhood is 
that mine was very different.  
For P1 it was the number of IC’s she had that was perceived as unusual: 
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children normally have only one… (I had) like loads of imaginary little friends… 
(Mom said), well you didn’t just have one you had a whole school.  
Difference in Family & Culture: The following excerpt is from a young lady who 
had a strict and Muslim upbringing (both of which she attested to). Her father 
was according to her unhappy with her childhood imaginary companionship, P7: 
It's not that common is it [pause] or maybe not as like normal as other things 
that children do like dress-up games;‘ I'm the only one out of my siblings that 
had a little imaginary friend neither of my sisters have; As I said earlier it's quite 
a unique thing. So for P7 the experience of being different may naturally include 
her outlier status in multiple systems, her difference in the family, the family’s 
culture and ethos and extended social networks. To assume it normal that a 
child have access to a Barbie doll, Lego and a set of matchbox cars is naïve 
and misguided: That's another thing my father wasn't in favour of, (when 
referring to not having had a Barbie doll), family and religion are very 
important… friends didn't come to our house a lot though to play like we didn't 
have sleepovers but that's a culture thing too, you just play at school or with 
your siblings (P7).  
In turning to the literature on culture and pretend play one notices that in 
western families fantasy and pretence is considered advantageous and normally 
encouraged. Parents tend to involve themselves in the play and in joint play 
adults scaffold the pretense.(Carlson, Taylor & Levin 1998). Religious ideology 
may then be one aspect that shapes parental attitude towards this type of play.  
Mills (1992) found that when East Indian children talk to ‘entities’ that adults 
cannot perceive, the entity is referred to as invisible rather than imaginary. The 
assumption is that the child is communicating with an actual being who exists on 
a spiritual realm and may be part of the child's past life. However, the suspicious 
attitude of parents towards imaginary play does occur in western quarters. In 
North America for example, certain fundamentalist Christian sectors express 
objection to pretend play. Taylor and colleagues unearthed concerns within this 
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group that a child with an ‘imaginary friend’ might in fact be communing with an 
evil entity. Pretend play was viewed as a gateway to deceitfulness (Taylor & 
Carlson, 2000, p.264). The researchers added too that religion-inspired 
attempts to discourage pretend play appear quite ineffective (Carlson et al., 
1998; Taylor & Carlson, 2000).  
As far as her recall of not having had friends around after school for play dates 
there may be a broader ethnoreligious priority of work (chores and homework) 
over play.  
Difference of Age: This was the case for more than one participant, the feeling 
that compared to what they remembered about other children their behaviour 
had seemed developmentally inappropriate, P1 : And do you know what I 
remember being quite old to have imaginary friends as well… Like I still used to 
play schools and doctors and nurses way into like I was in year six, year seven 
and I thought I was quite old to play schools.  
For P6 it was the experience of having her IC named Swampy at an older age:  
He genuinely was around a lot longer than others I’ve heard about slightly 
concerning [laughs]; I consider myself normal [laughs] I know a few people that 
had imaginary friends as kids but obviously all different. Although the theme of 
perceived difference is significant across cases I am careful when it comes to 
the interpretation of emotion. P6 for example, even though verbal and nonverbal 
cues suggested to me she may have been embarrassed or concerned by the 
fact she perceived herself too old to have an IC, she wanted me to know : I 
wasn’t embarrassed of course I don’t think my regular friends played with us.  
It was of interest to me that none of the adults recalled any form of psychosocial 
or functional adjustments to minimise perceived differences between self and 
others.  
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The Imaginary Companionship and Sense of Self 
This theme has to do with identity, the collapsing of space and time, linking 
memory to an emergent and embodied sense of ‘who I am’. What became 
evident from the nine interviews was the natural potency of memory to inform 
the construction of self.  
As can be seen from P5, participants of their own volition included experiences 
from the past in describing the self: Sometimes I have a very vivid picture of her 
in my imagination and I can recall that with ease and clarity or the frequency... 
call that up and use that just in place of either real conversations or my own 
thinking seems better to talk with that image.   
As far as continuity goes, Singer and Singer (1992) proposed that even if 
imaginary companions disappear in their most primitive form between 6 and 8 
years, “the process of peopling one’s private thoughts with companionable 
souls” (p.110) continues throughout life.  
An example of identity formation would be perceiving one’s adult self as creative 
and citing evidence from childhood of ways in which that disposition may have 
come about or been nurtured. In the study of imaginary companionships there is 
much talk of creativity as a faculty associated with rich imaginative play. Hoff 
and Carlsson,(2002, p.22) define it as a productive or generative novel way of 
experiencing reality including the perceiver’s own self. The only male participant 
in this study, (a post-graduate student), P9 spoke at length about his 
relationship with fantasy and creative engagements. He showed with pride his 
animated fantasy sketches, an interest he had nurtured since childhood and 
spoke with fondness of early creative writing projects. Creativity and fantasy 
were obvious themes in his narrative both in terms of memory content, self- 
evaluation of the experience and continuity of identity : As a kid I wrote fiction 
which… I wrote my first poem when I was seven… I was writing a long fantasy 
story when I was thirteen …I relied on my own imagination… I think it had an 
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effect on developing my own unique language… (I) consider that they are an 
affliction of myself, they’d always be curious and interested…: I like writing and 
creating out of the world stuff ever since I was young// I don’t know how far back 
they go but even today half of my thinking is dialogues… today I’m still planning 
on writing a very long fantasy story. I’m planning on eleven books now and I’m 
thinking one of those characters that I imagined ten years ago actually.  
Skolnick and Bloom (2006 cited in Richert, Shawber, Hoffman & Taylor 2009) 
have suggested that children’s ideas of what is fictionally represented are seen 
as distinct from each other and from what constitutes ‘the real world’. The 
mental act of ‘quarantine’ (p.41) describing this separation casts doubt by the 
authors as to whether children are able to make use of fantasy in any way in 
another / real world. For the participant above there does seem to be a 
usefulness attributed to the fantasy characters and the generative way they 
have come to inform his adult personality. In the article cited above, Taylor and 
colleagues conducted three separate experiments to test their hypothesis that 
“the use of a fantasy character may not be beneficial for teaching preschool 
children real world information”. They found no evidence of improved learning or 
information transfer when using a fantasy character. Although I have not 
hypothesised that knowledge or learning is facilitated through fantasy, the 
memory narrative of this male participant looking back at his own childhood and 
in fact adolescent experiences may suggest that it holds some value, that it has 
informed. Perhaps this is because it was his own creation (unlike Taylor’s study 
above where children were presented with ready-made fantasy characters), and 
that his characters held meaning and permanence. According to Taylor,  
“Children’s decreased likelihood of transferring from stories about fantasy 
characters suggests children viewed fantasy characters as a less appropriate 
source for information for solving real world problems than real characters” 
(p.60). I reiterate that I am in no way challenging this hypothesis nor stating my 
own but in the case of this young man there seems little evidence of quarantined 
realms. He remembers being inspired by classmates (real world) and then later 
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coming to rely on his own imagination. A sophisticated sense of cognitive 
mediation is implied by his words: these would all change I mean depending on 
what I want to think about and how I want to think about it. And as far as their 
relevance to real world adaptation, P9 says: it had an effect on developing as a 
way of understanding things and making sense of the world my own way of 
getting around in conversation.  
The imaginary companion relationship has been shown to support autonomy 
and ego integration (Klein 1985, Nagera 1969, Singer & Singer 1990). A sense 
of emergent selfhood could potentially be facilitated by the unconditional 
acceptance from an IC. And perhaps this is evident in the next example, P5 who 
remembers learning to read (and enjoying it) from a very early age. Her memory 
narratives draw together her love of reading with time spent in parental 
company. Her IC is a character in one of the books her parents read to her and 
although the exact book is (she claims sadly) no longer in her possession, she 
is nevertheless able to: recall that [vivid image of her IC] with ease and clarity or 
the frequency...call that up and use that just in place of either real conversations 
or my own thinking seems better to talk with that image. As a side, she does 
share that she has copies of the book series which she still loves. There is a 
connection to the adult self of P5, her work as an academic, when the 
reminiscing turns: There was a presentation I attended at a psychology 
conference last year about some forms of this and I got thinking about it after 
that a fair amount. At the end of the interview I ask if there is anything else she 
wishes to add: I think she was important to me and still is I’d say at least 
linguistically and maybe socially I think. Although a later comment casts doubt 
on whether this experience is altogether a positive one: just to note that maybe 
one could become quite... I think I might have been better off speaking to 
somebody as opposed to effectively myself almost. Reflecting back I’m unsure 
as to why I did not interrogate this statement further. Perhaps I sensed 
discomfort or maybe the comment was swept up in narrative flow.  
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In my search for other studies linking this theme of identity and integration of 
selves I came across a survey study of imaginary worlds (R. Root-Bernstein & 
Root-Bernstein, 2006). Students and fellows at Michigan State University who 
had invented imaginary worlds as children perceived connections between this 
particular form of childhood play and their adult vocation. Fellows (61%) and 
students (72%) recognised imaginary–world play in their self-expressive 
processes and saw it as a strategy for success in the workplace. “I think make 
believe or hypothetical worlds or situations will be very important in teaching,” 
stated one participant; “My future career [in public relations] will require that I am 
able to look at multiple possible situations,” wrote another (pp.414-415).    
In Camahalan’s (2014) grounded theoretical study (which I refer to again further 
on), there is a thematic component relating self-growth to childhood memory in 
all seventy-five of the graduate student narratives. Specifically, all the 
participants shared the belief that their childhood memories were integral in 
defining concepts of self and identity. Even negative experiences/ aversive 
episodes seem not to have been rejected in the self-story but instead 
interpreted positively as indicative of early familial support structures, a self-
affirming sentiment of ‘I am loved and cared for’.  
I would like to highlight at this time the possibility that adult’s recall of early 
memory may be a de-stabilising factor, one that alters remembered identity. 
What, for example, might it feel like for participants to remember being a 
relational or sociable child, (identity as a relational being) and see themselves 
as less gregarious or withdrawn as adults? I follow this up in depth in the 
‘discussion’ section, pulling on the strands of other research and offering my 
interpretation of the nine adult narratives.  
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The Influence of Mother as a Key Figure 
Looking at these experiences systemically there is a sense of preserved family 
ecology. So much about the family and its members became apparent, the story 
of the family as it was – their manner of engaging, coping/ adaptation, 
boundaries and culture. Although not a question I set out to ask, it appeared a 
natural route for the narrative around childhood. Apparent in five of the nine 
interviews was a narrative strand pointing to the mother as a central figure in 
memory. A key proponent, she appeared pivotal in terms of, i)co-constructing 
the content of the memory (what was remembered) : Yeah, like she said to me, 
like, you didn’t have them for very long you had them for quite a short period 
and I don’t remember that, ii) providing validation or testimony : I spoke with my 
mum about it; It’s a bit weird but my mum remembers them too,and, iii) adding 
to the emotional valence of the memory: mum used to have to hear all my 
stories and nonsense about what I’d been up to with Swampy and I think she 
enjoyed it actually; My mother would tease me about that when I was growing 
up and when imaginary friends were mentioned on television or wherever and, 
iv) a target for the exercise of mastery : my mum would have to wait to seatbelt
them in. 
The triangulation of mother, child and IC was a common theme in the narratives. The 
mother appeared to be the person that was most privy to information about the IC : I 
would obviously have to explain to my Mom for example what Minnie was up to; My 
Mum remembers when Minnie died well you know what I mean when she disappeared 
(P2); I used to talk with my mum about it (P8). According to Gleason (2004), the 
friendship with an IC may promote social interactions with others because of the 
attempt to share details with interested adults (see Gleason, 2004b). Accordingly, this 
researcher has suggested that adults may ask more questions about the IC than they 
would ordinarily do about other topics for which both adult and child shared knowledge. 
Information from the participants might suggest that because she is the primary 
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caregiver and spends more time at home with the children, it is predominantly the 
mother who asks the questions.   
It appeared that for some participants, the control they exercised in the imaginary 
relationship extended to perceived control in a parental relationship. For P1 this is an 
extension of the attachment to the IC and implied her ability to manage her mother’s 
behaviour around the IC: I used to like take them in the car and my mum would have to 
wait to seatbelt them in; she used to like help me seatbelt them and stuff like that… So 
my mum played with them. Mum would take us out. I would tell her to seatbelt them in. 
This excerpt from P1 is not only an example of the fondness towards the IC and the 
involvement of mother but is also an example of fundamental role play wherein the child 
models parental behaviour, practicing mothering behaviour, readying that part of herself 
which will later come to care for others in her charge.  
For P6 one gets a sense of the perceived control over mother from her words: My mum 
used to have to hear all my stories and nonsense about what I’d been up to with Swampy. 
Added to this is her projection of pleasure onto her mother:… and I think she enjoyed it 
actually, listening to what I’d done cause she didn’t work. P8 shares a similar memory of 
mother perhaps having little choice but to be involved in the relationship even if just as a 
spectator: I used to talk with my mum about it… then mum would just have to sit and 
listen to me (P8). Involvement of parental figures, in these cases the mother, in something 
akin to enforced listening may be an extension of what developmentalists term ‘parallel 
play’. In parallel play the younger child would require another to be present alongside 
them in play even though there is no direct engagement. As Singer (2013, p.5) suggests, 
“ the idea of the company is enough”. So perhaps for the older child with an IC although 
they alone are directly engaged with their friend there is an awareness of the mother 
sharing an imaginative space. As she goes about her daily business the child plays 
alongside her, stopping at times to make sure she is in a way still present, letting her 
know what is going on.   
The inclusion of the mother in the relationship has continued for some participants to 
the present day. A desire to involve or include the mother figure in the project is 
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evidenced in the following excerpt: Because I said I’m doing some research help on 
imaginary friends with you and I asked her stuff about them, she was like, well you 
didn’t just have one you had a whole school and you were playing with them all the 
time.   
Not always an explicit supporter of the IC relationship, for one of the participants 
the mother acted as mediator between father and daughter, relaying his 
disapproval of his daughter’s engagement with an imagined friend. So although 
this participant stated that it was a positive experience for her, I enjoyed having 
the friend very much… I felt a lot of love for her, the father, a strict man she 
said, perceived the relationship in a negative light. My father wouldn’t speak 
directly to me I think he would ignore me about it he spoke to my mother; He 
would relay that to my mother and I must’ve been aware that father did not 
approve. Through that narrative I got a sense of how the participant experienced 
her family culture as well as perhaps her ethnicity, recounted to me with emotion 
: It wasn’t an easy thing for me to have an imaginary friend that was like 
craziness or something; Although it is encouraged for children to play and have 
toys etcetera and a fair amount of freedom I still don’t believe there is the same 
type of freedom as in British white families or western culture. And, when asked 
how it felt reflecting back now as an adult she replied, I have that sense now 
thinking about it almost not a very nice feeling.  
Dialogues between children and adults are, according to Vygotsky (1934/1978), 
an essential part of acquiring higher order cognitive processes such as 
regulation of attention and behaviour, ability to reflect and strategies for solving 
cognitive and social problems (Berk, Mann & Ogan 2006). These processes are 
said to appear first in social communication for example between mother and 
child and later translate to internal thinking whereby the narrative is integrated in 
private speech. The inclusion of mothers in the memory narratives is therefore 
an important theme and relates to theories of social cognition and development.  
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The memories have reiterated the mother’s cardinal place, her voice weaved 
into the relationship narrative of her child and their special companion.  
The Influence of Others in Memory 
In this theme I have included references to the larger family environment, to 
others in the family. It has been included because in more than one instance 
someone other than the mother was talked about (in relation to the IC). I did feel 
it would be interesting to note the juxtaposition of these two themes.  
There were two participants, P2 and P7, who referenced the family in their 
narratives and in both cases initiated their interviews with a comment around 
family, giving me a sense of what it was like for them being a part of this family. 
Participant P2 began her interview by describing her family as big, noisy and 
busy. She remembers a house full of other children and a mum who stayed at 
home. She did not give any indication of how she felt as a child about the busy 
home or her role therein but there is a sense overall that the IC may have been 
an emotional buffer in this environment: I think she was always with me; she 
was like one of us; I'd see if she'd listened to me; they (siblings) did know about 
her, she was my friend though; After Minnie was gone I may have played more 
with the other kids.  
For P7, it was the family culture that she wanted to talk about. Words she used 
to describe the familial atmosphere of her childhood included: strict; deep 
respect for our parents; very strict; very respectful; My Dad was very strict; 
family and religion are very important; we didn't have sleepovers; you just play 
at school or with your siblings. There is an awareness of her father as being 
strict. For P7 the home atmosphere is reflective of larger ideological systems, of 
faith and ethnicity. There is a comparative element to the memory wherein she 
states that children in westrnised families are afforded more freedoms. She 
does not share with me any form of regret, unhappiness, anger or upset that this 
was the case. She does not use our interview as an opportunity to cathartically 
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offload. She states it wasn’t an easy thing to have the IC in this family and that 
thinking about it gives her not a very nice feeling. I would go as far as to suggest 
that there is a measure of acceptance by this participant (P7) for what was.  
P4’s narrative included references to my parents in general, but singled out her 
sister in relation to talk about the IC’s importance to the participant: My sister 
earned her degree in education as well and she had to do a research project… I 
had suggested that she do imaginary friends. That’s probably more my interest 
than hers but she was actually going to. For P4 it seemed important to project 
the attachment feelings, to want others to develop an interest in IC’s. Firstly she 
mentions wanting her sister to choose imaginary companions as a topic for a 
university project. She then shared how in her employment as an afterschool 
teaching assistant she asked the children to draw their imaginary friends: I 
thought it would be quite interesting to draw; I did get some of the children to 
draw their imaginary friends and it was brilliant... I think a couple of them 
definitely were real imaginary friends. It was very interesting to see the  
children’s drawings of them. When I told the kids to draw it I thought I should do 
it as well, and so I actually did draw mine. It may be that as a child P4 simply 
wanted to reduce her perceived outlier status, the dissonance caused by being 
the one that is different. Or perhaps there is a child’s wanting to share what for 
them is a purely joyous experience. And we see still as an adult how P4 extends 
the systemic range to include her charges in the day care, bringing ‘Carlene’ 
and ‘Ping Ling’ vicariously to life.  
P5 shares a warm and heartfelt memory of her IC, the elderly Mrs Barlow, and 
how upon reflection this reminds her of her grandmother: she shared some 
resemblance to my grandmother who I had a very positive relationship with, but 
who didn’t live anywhere near us so I saw her every twice a year. And my 
grandmother was somebody I could relate to very well. This participant 
expressed a similarity between her IC and a known individual, a person she had 
a close emotional attachment to but did not see very often. Whether or not Mrs. 




an opportunity for P5 to re-enact the formative attachment experience, one does 
not know. It is often difficult for young children to comprehend geographical 
separation. Whatever cognitive processes are involved in the child’s making 
sense of it, for P5 it meant having someone that resembled her grandmother 
with her on a daily basis, sitting in the chair and she is just watching...listening to 
me. Her comment on picture books might just as easily be taken as a reference 
to grandmother: being able to talk to people who are out of sight, but they are 
not out of mind as well.  
In Camahalan’s (2104) study, ‘Recalling Childhood Memories’, she found that 
most of the participants, (75 graduate students), shared events that had taken 
place within their immediate social environments or microsystems, (family and 
school) because this is where children spent the majority of their time. Only a 
few of the stories according to the researcher had highlighted moments of 
solitude during childhood. Linked to narrative around the family was ‘the 
atmosphere’ within the home. Parents were described by the adult students in 
endearing terms – supportive, loving, and enjoyed being with the child. The 
family structure in terms of how things run around the house also played a factor 
in facilitating happy memories during childhood. About 50% of the participants 
reported that their parents organised house rules for them which helped them 
become better individuals.  
Finally, it has been argued that family environment influences whether IC’s have 
facilitative or inhibitory roles. Lefrancois (1989 p.299), claimed that in “fearful 




Temporality and Loss 
Included in this theme are excerpts highlighting an emergent theme of loss and 
the temporal, examples of the termination of the IC relationship. I have also 
chosen to include instances where there has been a ‘felt sense’ of loss in terms 
of participant access to images or memory content. These few cases also show 
the lost friend being replaced by someone else - ordinary peers, siblings or 
other human agents - that step in to pick up where the IC left off.  
P2 spoke forthrightly about her relationship with her IC, Minnie, coming to an 
abrupt end: She got run over by a car in the end… It's also maybe a little bit sad 
because she was obviously important to me; I'm not sure why I would have 
imagined her dying, getting run over by a car, seems horrible. She is aware that 
after Minnie was gone she may have begun to play more with other kids and 
been more outgoing.  
P4 shares at the beginning of her interview that an imaginary friend could be 
someone that doesn’t exist that [one] can play with when [one] doesn’t have real 
people there to play with. She recalls her friends Carlene and Ping Ling leaving : 
First of all they moved down the road I think to another house but in our same 
area … And one day I held the letter box open and they all disappeared and I 
just remember my mum said, where are they all gone? I said, ‘oh, they’ve 
moved down the road to a bigger house because there was too many of them’.  
P4 goes on to say that a while later when someone enquires as to their 
whereabouts, her response is simply, they moved. Interpreting their loss, she 
muses over the fact that her siblings were born and the possibility her friends 
may no longer have been needed.  
P5 says of Mrs Barlow: I think when Mrs Barlow vanished, she vanished and in 
her place came other people who were real people who I would imagine where 
with me. Well I think she didn’t pop off, she didn’t disappear she just declined in 
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frequency I guess. When, at the end of the interview, I asked P5 if there was 
anything else she wanted to add, she added to this theme: I have a younger 
brother and when I was five he was three so he was becoming lingual and that 
probably for all I know coincided with less imaginative dialogue in that he was 
there to play with more.  
P9 shared with me the temporal nature of his relationships with the various 
characters he invented, suggesting on one hand their dispensability while on the 
other their permanence: they were replaced… I’m thinking one of those 
characters that I imagined ten years ago actually one or two of them I think I will 
keep there, (a book he is writing),…I haven’t spoken to them since maybe I was 
fifteen, but they are still there I mean. Some would last a week and they would 
go, other characters would last a year.  
In line with what participants P2, P4 and P5 have shared, Kastenbaum and 
Fox’s (2008), study revealed something similar. Investigating the termination of 
child-IC relationships, the finding was that some endings were abrupt and 
definitive while other endings were described as a fading or drifting away 
without incident (pp.123-1520. Death of the IC was reported by 8 of the 36 
respondents. Participants in the Kastenbaum study stated that changes, for 
example in the family, made them feel less lonely and they were therefore more 
involved with other people. As is the case with the current study, the  
Kastenbaum participants did not recollect expressing regret stemming from the 
parting or loss nor recalled having the subject of death mentioned in their family. 
Interpretation of this phenomena led Kastenbaum et al. to suggest that children 
with imaginary friends are able explore the notions of reality and non-reality, test 
boundaries and probabilities and operate within their own zone of 
permissiveness.  
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The Memory Experience 
This theme has been placed last for a reason. It is concerned not only with 
narrative content but the reflective process following the act of reaching into the 
past. For some participants it appeared as self-talk, explaining to themselves, to 
me or to the future readers of their stories what was going on in their minds. A 
meta-cognitive process of sorts. It occurred to me that they were weighing-up 
the experiential validity of recalled memory, testing their own evidence and 
determining the memory’s representational standing. I noticed that in the 
beginning/initiation of conversation with participants more than half of them 
began by sharing with me either what they considered I would want to hear, 
what is most interesting to you or, by beginning the narrative with what they 
could recall most clearly.  
As the aim was to understand the phenomenon of the whole memory 
experience – the remembered as told - I felt it would be fitting to include within 
this theme the findings from the post-interview feedback form. As previously 
explained, this form was given to participants immediately following the 
interview. They were asked to rate nine interview-related statements, indicating 
the choice that best expressed their feeling toward the following: I expected 
something different from this experience; I found it strange sharing my childhood 
memories with the researcher; I found it relatively easy to recall details about my 
imaginary friend(s); Some details about my imaginary friend were difficult to 
remember; As an adult I am surprised by the role my imaginary friend(s) played 
in my childhood years; Some of the things I remember about my imaginary 
friend were difficult to put into words; I feel the location on campus was suitable 
and appropriate; I would have been more comfortable sharing my stories 
somewhere else and; I am able and willing to contact the researcher with any 
questions I might have, even if these are at a later stage.  
Table 4 Your choices are: Strongly Disagree (SD), Disagree (D), Undecided (U), Agree (A), 
Strongly Agree (SA)  
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P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8  P9  
I expected something different 
from this experience.   
SD D U D D D D  U  D 
I found it strange sharing my 
childhood memories with the 
researcher.  
A A A D D A D SA D 
I found it relatively easy to recall 
details about my imaginary friend. 
U A D A A A SD D SA 
Some details about my imaginary 
friend were difficult to remember.  
SA A A A D D A SA D 
As an adult I am surprised by the 
role my imaginary friend played in 
my childhood years.  
D D D D D D D U SD 
Some of the things I remember 
about my imaginary friend were 
difficult to put into words.  
SA A SA A A A SA A D 
I feel the location on campus was 
suitable and appropriate.   
A A A A A A A A A 
I would have been more 
comfortable sharing my stories 
somewhere else.  
D D U D D U U D D 
I am able and willing to contact the 
researcher with any questions I 
might have even if these are at a 
later stage.  
SA A A A A A A A A 
An interpretation of the ‘memory experience’ theme begins with a summarisation 
of the findings from the form and moves into a discussion of other experiential 
correlates.  
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Two out of the nine participants were unsure of what to expect from the 
interview, (item 1) and as the form did not explicate an affective component it 
would be left to interpretation as to how participants P3 and P8 must have felt 
not knowing what to expect. One could expect a feeling of increased anxiety 
around the not knowing and a dissonance around volunteering to do something 
which has elicited anxiety and loss of control. Examination of the transcripts 
revealed no narrative around this sentiment during either of the two interviews. 
In other words, neither of the two participants shared with me the fact they had 
no idea what to expect or that they felt anxious. For P3 the memories are not 
evidently very clear or well defined, the interview is comparatively short and I 
noted at the time that she spoke quickly, perhaps wanting to get it over and 
done with. P8 does appear to struggle towards the end of the interview to 
access her memory of the IC stating, I’m trying to remember it’s not something 
I’ve thought about in ages, so maybe for her it was a case of not wanting to 
know, having no desire to think about the interview before it took place.  
The form showed mixed consensus in terms of it being considered strange to 
share childhood memories with myself as interviewer, (item 2). I was 
surprisingly not asked by any of the participants to expand on or clarify the word 
‘strange’ so there is no indication whether this was to be construed negatively or 
positively. Four out of nine claimed they did not consider it strange. Those who 
did consider the experience to be strange were P1, P2, P3,P6 and P8.  
In terms of whether participants found it easy to retrieve memory content about 
the imaginary companionship, (item 3), P1 felt unsure,P2, P4, P5, P6 and P9 
felt that it was easy to recall detail about this early relationship. P7 felt strongly 
that it was not an easy task for her to bring to mind this childhood memory. 
Three out of the nine participants disagreed that there were at least some 
details from the experience that they found difficult to remember. The 
assumption would be that for P5, P6 and P9 they were able to recall what they 
considered to be a full and complete story about the childhood relationship. For 
responses to the statement ‘As an adult I am surprised by the role my imaginary 
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friend played in my childhood years’, there was disagreement from all except P8 
who felt uncertain of her position, ambivalent as to the significance this 
relationship had for her. P9 strongly disagreed with the statement implying he 
was not at all surprised by his IC’s role. There is a sense from this response that 
participants are self-aware, linking knowledge about their current self to an 
earlier child self. Item 6, ‘Some of the things I remember about my imaginary 
friend were difficult to put into words’ received a largely affirmative response. 
The one participant who disagreed with this was P9, the male participant. The 
implication being that he found words, the right words perhaps, to capture the 
experience and to explain it to another person. As an extension of his cognitive 
repertoire the possibility exists that narrative fluency, or perceived narrative 
fluency, goes back to childhood. The ease at which he is able to find and use 
words to describe the IC may relate to his early dabbling in fiction writing: As a 
kid I wrote fiction…creating characters then speaking to them…my own unique 
language…speaking to them and making them speak to each other…quite a lot 
of monologues. And most interesting to me, someone trying to explain 
something to someone else.  
Item 7 concerned the participants perceptions of the suitability of the spatial 
context in which the interviews took place. All nine participants agreed with the 
statement, ‘I feel the location on campus was suitable and appropriate’. My 
rationale for including this item was to ascertain whether participants felt 
comfortable in the space or whether they were embarrassed, distracted or 
uncomfortable being in public. For ethical reasons I had chosen not to interview 
at participant’s homes. They were however encouraged to suggest a place on 
campus they would feel most comfortable. As it happens, for the most part this 
ended up being the cafeteria or dining hall. One participant, a smoker, 
requested the interview take place outdoors.  
Item 8, ‘I would have been more comfortable sharing my stories somewhere 
else’, is a confirmatory statement tailing item 7. In my construction of the 
feedback form I felt the item may assist in identifying any ambiguous feelings 
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around the physical space in which the stories were shared and I have 
obviously attached some importance to environment. Participants 3,6 and 7 
gave an ‘unsure’ response.  
The last item on the form aims at understanding whether the participants would 
feel comfortable contacting me post-interview. This would include any 
questions, concerns or reflections that might arise or perhaps any new 
memories that are later recollected. There was overall agreement with item 9, 
participants confirming ‘I am able and willing to contact the researcher with any 
questions I might have, even if these are at a later stage’. This item was 
important for me in terms of ‘closure’ following the interview but also as a last 
reminder to participants that they had been invited to contact me with any 
experiential leftovers; thoughts or feelings harboured from the interview.  
Representational certainty: This part of the experience has to do with the ease 
or difficulty of recall and accessibility of memory content. For some, it was the 
clarity of their images that facilitated a positive experience. For P6 making sure 
she was on the right track was important: Can I start anywhere?.. I remember 
more about this aspect of my childhood than most other stuff, and I think the 
actual images are clearer more precise I don’t know …in my mind now  
I can see him… Okay good I’ll carry on describing him then as that’s the part I 
remember. This is in line with her response on the feedback form and my 
interpretation that P5, P6 and P9 considered their recollections to be full storied 
accounts.  
The importance of image retrieval and clarity for a positive autobiographical 
experience is revealed in the following excerpt from P1:Yeah they are quite vivid 
memories quite clear actually. I had quite a happy childhood… I can keep 
remembering the big garden in the house we moved to. Scenes she spoke of 
extended beyond just the IC to include the car, the new house, the garden and 
school. In examining her overall narrative however P1 makes use of the 
testimony of her mother a fair amount, corroborating what she believes she 
remembers with her mother’s account. This may explain why P1 felt ‘unsure’ as 
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her response to the item ‘I found it relatively easy to recall details about my 
imaginary friend’ because she is unclear as to what ‘belongs’ to her.  
P8 begun her account confidently and without hesitation: What I think is most 
clear in my mind to recall. My friend's name was Claudia. There is some talk of 
the IC’s physical appearance and within a fairly short time the narrative appears 
strained, thin, and she remarks : I’m trying to remember it’s not something I’ve 
thought about … it’s not something I’ve really thought about in ages. I question 
whether the memory experience was a positive one for P8.  
In response to the item, ‘As an adult I am surprised by the role my imaginary 
friend played in my childhood years’, there is disagreement from all except P8 
who felt ‘unsure’. She did not know what to expect at the interview (item 1), and 
found it strange sharing her childhood memories with me (‘the researcher’, item 
2). Although she spoke of how she used to share information about her 
imaginary friend with her mum in childhood there was surprisingly no mention of 
present-day talk with her mother or anybody else in her adult life. One wonders, 
given that she had not thought about it ‘in ages’, not talked about it, whether the 
experience of ‘bringing it all back to life’ was in some way unsettling for P8. In 
terms of the potential for memory to destabilise aspects of the self or life story, 
this will be followed-up in the discussion section. There is of course the 
possibility that having an imaginary companion was simply not a big deal for P8. 
In this case, there is little investment cognitively or emotionally and the arms 
that cradle the significances of childhood hold something else more important.  
Not all participants had a clear route of access. What is remembered versus 
what participants were told by others is sometimes unclear. P4 stated: I think I 
remember them, but also I’ve been told about them… It’s quite a tricky age to 
remember but some things rather than others do stand out…. I suppose maybe 
I don’t remember quite a lot… I think it’s difficult to separate the stuff I remember 
from what I’ve been told by other people. At the time it appeared to me that she 
(P4) was making a concerted effort to retrieve the content - closing her eyes at 
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times and long pauses noted. There were ‘warnings’ to me around the validity of 
content, suggesting more than once that she may have been told certain things 
as opposed to remembering them herself. Her frustration with not owning the 
memory is evidenced in the following: I just wish I could remember more…it’s 
nice actually talking to someone else about them that didn’t know about them. 
There was something positive for her in the knowledge that I was unacquainted 
with her history and perhaps therefore not perceived as a threat to the memory.  
Significance: This part of the memory experience concerns my perception of 
the overall importance for participants of sharing their memory. This is for 
example evidenced in the narrative of P7, as the opportunity to speak out about 
her experiences seemed significant to her. I had received email correspondence 
prior to the interview assuring me she was interested and enquiring about 
ethnicity or religious exclusions to the study. I had informed her there were no 
exclusionary criteria on this basis and agreed to meet. The interview began with 
her statement: Let me begin by explaining that as you may have noticed I’m 
Muslim and that for a start is something that will be interesting for you in your 
study.  
Her feelings about being Muslim, perceived as different from the other 
participants in the study and therefore of particular value, these are important 
things for P7. The message in its simplest form says, I am different and because 
of this difference I am interesting or important. A poignant piece of narrative, I 
consider its potential relevance to childhood and the idea that children with 
imaginary friends see themselves as different, valued because of their 
uniqueness. Could it be that the idea of self-as-different is not lost but translated 
with time into an adult who perceives themselves as different. As the IC no 
longer serves as a marker of distinctiveness something else can take its place. 
Something internalised perhaps, an aspect of the self, such as a personality 
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trait, an aptitude or behaviour type. For P7 the difference may lie in her ethnic 
identity.  
Returning to the discussion on the significance of sharing the IC memories, P7 
on being asked how it felt speaking to me about her experiences remarked: I'm 
okay speaking about it I’ve been looking forward to this actually… I thought it 
was going to be rather strange hearing myself talk to a stranger about it… I 
have thought a lot about it since I heard about this.  
 Following the interview I received an email stating that she had begun reading 
literature on imaginary companionships and had informed her sister of the 
project. She wanted me to know that she had been encouraging her sibling to 
take part.  
P2 had invested effort in thinking about the study initially after seeing the advert 
for volunteers: I thought about it quite a bit before meeting you and after I saw 
the leaflet, and seemed like the more I thought the more I remembered. There is 
a real sense of friendship when listening to P2 talk of her companion Minnie, a 
warmness that is conveyed in her voice as well as her words: My clearest 
memories I think are of us doing stuff together, playing and talking. When asked 
how it felt now as an adult to talk about Minnie she replied, It’s kind of strange 
but not in a bad or awkward way.  
In short, it makes psychological sense that vague and incoherent memories may 
allow individuals, for instance those high on avoidance, to down-regulate their 
emotions. This would be an individual coping strategy that may bring short-term 
relief. However, the inability to reflect meaningfully on past experiences may 
contribute to both incoherent memories and incoherent life narratives (Sutin & 




Nine university students shared their memories of what it was like to have an 
imaginary companion. Their narratives were audio-recorded and transcribed. 
The data from the transcriptions was interpreted using IPA (Interpretive 
Phenomenological Analysis), through the emergence of themes and variations 
across stories, clustering like themes together and eventually arriving at seven 
superordinate or master themes (table 3.).  
 The aim here is to relate the current data to what is already known about 
imaginary companionships, to what has been addressed in the earlier sections 
on imaginary companionship in childhood. In terms of putting together all the 
pieces, I will discuss the important role of memory (autobiographical) and 
memory narratives in terms of expanding our understanding of experiences 
‘located’ in childhood. I hope to make clear in this discussion how adult memory 
narratives shed further light on the experience of imaginary companionships as 
well as, in human geographical terms, the experiential landscape of self from 
young to old. Thus, how the process of remembering things from childhood may 
impact current notions of self and identity.   
Through the use of adult memory narratives it becomes possible to show how 
the imaginary companion may play a role in self-representation as it is 
discussed as a self-event, a phenomenon that links past and present.   
I have chosen to bring the participant’s stories into the discussion first so that 
the reader may get a clear and immediate sense of what it is I am referring to 
above.    
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Interpretation of Experience 
Participant 1: The Imaginary School 
One of the most recurrent themes in this study, which was apparent to a varying degree in 
all of the participants, was that each of them seemed to have shaped their identities from 
a perceived difference of some sort. Hoff’s (2005) study suggested that children with ICs 
may have what she terms “negative self-images” (p.170) and this may go some way 
towards explaining this first participant’s frequent employment of words such as: “weird”; 
“different”; (comparatively) ”quite old”. In Hoff’s study, the children described themselves 
as being “different from others”, having “lower psychological wellbeing”, and rated low on 
measures of self-image (p.176)  
In spite of this, it seems she remembers the characters of her imaginary school 
with fondness. There is a warmth in her narrative and an emotional attachment 
to the characters and the memory, “…they were always with me”, “they 
belonged to me.”  The images have remained “vivid” and “clear” and are 
associated with what this participant said was a “happy childhood”.   
The mother is significant in this story. It is evident she spent time listening to her 
young daughter’s tales about the characters and facilitated the relationship by 
being a part of the referential narrative. The assertion, made as an adult, that 
the ICs ‘belonged’ to her, and that she allowed her mother to be privy to 
information regarding her ICs, links to an earlier discussion in this paper on self- 
knowledge and the hypothesis made by Davis, Meins and Fernyhough (2011), 
which was that those with imaginary companions would show a greater sense of 
authority concerning aspects of their interior knowledge states and a refined 
awareness of their thoughts.  
My understanding is that during the time the participant was engaged in her 
relationship with the imaginary characters she was also going through other 
significant transitions such as the birth of her baby brother, the family moving 
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house, the start of formal schooling and her diagnosis with dyslexia. It is 
therefore possible that we can see evidence of what Goncu (1993) termed 
expansion in this participant’s imaginary play. Using her imaginary school as a 
pathway to her own “introduction, extension, acceptance, revision and 
conciliation” of a new (not imagined) school, friendships etc.   
In my reflective notes following the interview I state that the participant seemed 
excited to share what she remembered and was eager to get talking. She said 
she enjoyed being a student, working with children and was studying towards a 
degree in Education. She presented as relaxed, (confident), and listened to the 
audio recording twice, smiling. She chose not to add or alter any of the recorded 
narrative. Given the participant’s relaxed confidence, her enthusiastic 
engagement with the topic, the fondness with which she recalls her imaginary 
school, one could infer that the experience was facilitative in terms of coping 
creatively with periods of normal developmental conflict.   
Participant 2:  Minnie 
The story begins with a description of a large, noisy and busy family. There are 
multiple siblings meaning that, between them and their friends, the home has a 
steady stream of children. Once I am able to understand the environment as 
experienced, I am able to understand the potential this participant may have had 
to experience loneliness there. That is, the felt sense that attention was divided 
among many and as such, the environment felt overwhelming for this individual 
who later describes herself as a ‘sensitive person’. Taylor & Carlson, (1997) 
state that the positive association between children with an IC and their 
tendency to focus on mental characteristics in describing a real best friend is 
consistent with the notion that having an IC entails that the child becomes 
practiced in focusing on cognitions and emotions. This could go some way to 
explaining why this particular participant feels able to describe herself as a 
‘sensitive person’.   
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Minnie, the Imaginary Companion, was introduced to the narrative immediately 
following the setting of the bustling family scene. It is as if she emerges out of 
necessity, suddenly yet naturally. After listening to the vivid description of an 
almost chaotic home atmosphere, I began to feel that perhaps this participant 
uses Minnie to escape, to assist in the ‘quieting of (her) mind’, something 
suggested by Hart & Zellars (2006) and corroborated by Taylor (1997) - 
facilitating her coping with the ‘hustle and bustle’ in the home.   
There was a shift in the tone of the narrative when Minnie is introduced and I get 
my first sense of what was a warm and genuine IC friendship. She shares 
initially how Minnie began going with her to “Nan’s” and to “the farm”, “like one 
of us”. The “clearest” memories for this participant are intimate and personal, 
the two of them doing what close friends do, playing together, talking, 
explaining, listening.   
Mum, who she recalls stayed at home and didn’t work, is brought into the story 
initially when Minnie “dies”, a memory that belongs to the mother. The mother 
has shared with her daughter that “Minnie was there one day and gone the 
next”. This participant is forthcoming in sharing the experience of her loss, 
described as a sadness, and is aware of the emotive power of the memory. In 
her adult life, she has contemplated Minnie’s “disappearance”, confused as to 
why she would have imagined her companion getting run over by a car, ending 
in such a “horrible” way.   
Much like the first participant, the inclusion of her mother into the world of Minnie 
and herself, along with the description of the activities carried out by the two of 
them: playing together; talking; explaining and listening could point to an 
increased sense of self- knowledge and a refined awareness of the privacy of 
her thoughts as a child, as hypothesised by Davis et al (2011).   
In my reflective notes following the interview I state that the participant seems 
interested in the research project having inquired afterwards about the literature 
and other areas of research on the topic of imaginary companions. She does 
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share that she thought about it “quite a bit” before our meeting and after she had 
seen the volunteer recruitment poster and that this ‘thinking’ had resulted in her 
remembering more and more.  
Participant 3:  The Old Man 
The narrative begins with the participant sharing that her memories are not vivid or clear. 
I sense an anxiety around her perceived frailty of the images and a reciprocal sense that I 
have been forewarned. I had already considered the possibility that some participants 
would try to draw cognitive sense from their experiences, intellectualising what they 
recalled, choosing to do the mental work themselves before they ‘handed over’ to me a 
raw image. In this case however, one of the ways I interpreted the participant’s uncertainty 
of what she remembers as stemming from her lack of context /background information, 
leading her to fear that the stand-alone images would make no sense (for me as listener). 
However, in spite of this, she shared with me a detailed description of her 
wizard-like IC, concrete images of physical appearance and place description, 
trusting her recollection of him living under the house. The central plot concerns 
an “imagined little old man” who lives under the original childhood home and 
whose name she cannot recall. She describes him in fairy-tale terms, looking 
like a wizard but with a short beard. She repeats the fact that he has a short 
beard and I wonder if that is to clearly differentiate him from fairy tale 
stereotype.  I have a picture of him now in my mind and I wonder if the wizard 
similie implies wisdom or gentleness. She tells me that she remembers him 
telling her silly things, which she thought he did to make her laugh. I wonder 
what kinds of things he said but I don’t ask her, hoping she will tell. Then I 
wonder if she was a sad child that needed someone outside the family to make 
her happy. She must have enjoyed his company as she remembers waiting 
excitedly for him, and fetching her sister to wait there too.  
 There is a brief relationship narrative as she recalls them spending much of 
their “time together talking”, her being told “silly things” making her laugh. 
123 
Listening to this part of her recorded interview, I can hear her smiling, a soft 
giggle. This lighter side of her narrative is juxtaposed by an admission of fear. 
Thoughts of the old man have triggered an emotive memory which she seems 
to trust, “I do remember actually being afraid”. This is resonant in her adult self 
too and she pauses to reflect out loud- “it sounds fairly scary now…the thought 
of it”.   
Experienced initially as a fragmentary memory narrative, reflexive engagement 
with the transcript and audio brought clarity of a different sort. I noticed how, in 
subtle ways, I was trying to ‘close’ the story, even if only in my head. I struggled, 
trying to make sense of how she was making sense of the experience, 
assuming she had.  
For this participant ,there may be a struggle in the re-storying process itself- the 
frustration of ‘being stuck with images’ which either don’t fit an existing story or 
can’t be used in a new one .Towards the end of the interview, she mentions that 
she had told her sister of the research project. Another affective component is 
introduced to the narrative, the first mention of embarrassment, “I’m sure I 
convinced my sister…she’s here at Uni too, I told her I was doing this. She’s 
more embarrassed about it”.   
The interview comes to an end at this point, almost without warning, a long 
pause, followed by “that’s all I remember”.     
In my reflections afterwards I have noted the brevity of this interview compared 
to the previous ones. I was aware that the participant seemed shy, softly 
spoken. I sensed an embarrassment, as if she wanted to tell her story and exit 
the dialogue. This could equally have been a matter of time, a practical 
constraint or simply wanting to be outdoors on this warm sunny day.   
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Participant 4: Frogs Carlene and Ping Ling 
This fourth interview was important for me in terms of reflexive process and 
memory, revealing how the participants themselves make sense of how and 
why certain things are remembered.   
From the outset it seems the narrative moves between layers of abstraction, 
between her sharing her story and evaluating it, drawing inferences from 
remembered conversations with parents and from her own filed memory. In my 
initial readings I find the narrative rhythm difficult to follow, getting stuck in the 
spaces between cognitive and meta-cognitive process. I went back to the audio 
recordings multiple times, helping me to locate in a different way her narrative 
voice and my interpretive voice. This highlighted for me the importance of ‘the 
memory experience’ as an emergent theme.  
 Although she articulates that it is “difficult to separate the stuff” in her mind, she 
is willing to make explicit this process. In other instances, this could be 
perceived as frustrating, an affect used to support resistance in remembering. 
She does say, “its nice actually talking to someone else about them”, going on 
to share detailed accounts of her two imaginary companions.  
Bound to what is remembered and what is lost to memory for this participant, is 
a recurrent theme of temporality and loss. I noticed that the transience of 
memory is akin to the temporal dimension of her IC relationship, with her use of 
the words, “leaving”, “didn’t have them anymore”, “ they came in and out”, and 
then “didn’t have them anymore “, “they disappeared”. In adult terms, she 
perhaps copes with the temporal nature of memory and loss of her IC 
relationship by getting preschool (aftercare) children in her class to draw their 
own imaginary companions.  
This is one of two participants who related their imaginary companions to 
characters from children’s fiction (picture books). I was informed, in this 
instance, that her “favourite story” in preschool was The Frog’s Holiday, 
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although she cannot explain her IC’s names or appearances in terms of what 
she remembers from the book.  
In my reflections following the interview I note that the participant shows a keen 
interest in the topic of the imagination and appears eager to share info about the 
research project with others, (asks where the posters and adverts are on 
campus), and has requested her sibling contact me for a chance to volunteer.    
Participant 5: Mrs Barlow and the little darlings 
This participant shared with me that her imaginary companions - Mrs Barlow,  
Tom and Lucy - were drawn imaginatively from a series of children’s stories (by 
Shirley Hughes), which her parents initially read to her and with which later she 
would read to herself. Her IC relationship is perceived as an extension of a 
creative engagement with fiction, early ability to read and time spent together 
with parents involved in the story.   
Imagery appears an important component of the memory experience. This is 
evident in terms of the ease at which she is able to call to mind the pictorial 
representations of her memory as well as her focus on the clarity of what she 
sees in her mind. Thus, she shares confidently what she is able to “call up with 
ease”, the “very vivid picture(s)” in mind, but narratively makes little inference or 
speculation around that which she ‘cannot see’.  This supports Bouldin’s (2006) 
findings that children with Imaginary Companions are able to imaginatively 
produce vivid mental constructions. She shares detailed snapshots (memory 
fragments) which, interestingly, she does not attempt to augment by weaving 
them into larger coherent narratives.  
A part of the narrative which stands out for me because of its personal value is 
the participant’s suggestion that the IC (Mrs Barlow) “shared some 
resemblance” to her grandmother, of whom she was fond but sadly did not get 
to see that often. This is the moment when I get a sense of the importance of 
the relationship and how much of the self is personally invested in Mrs Barlow. 
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She is aware that the IC relationship served at least a social compensatory 
function (my sense is for both peers or adults) stating, “in place of real 
conversation”, it was “better to talk with that image”,“she helped because she 
was just there listening”. Not seeming to ever leave her chair, Mrs Barlow is 
consistently present, curiously attentive to the little girl, as an audience would 
be.   
The participant, a post- graduate with a psychology background, spoke 
eloquently and with confidence during our time together. This was the only 
participant who added to their narrative after listening to the audio-recording – 
she felt it important, in the interests of the study, to mention that she is the 
eldest child and has a younger brother. She recalled that when she was five 
years old and he was three, his becoming lingual may have coincided with a 
decrease in her imaginative play and dialogue.  
The information that this participant added at the end may, according to Edith 
Ackermann’s hypothesis, evidence that Mrs Barlow and the little darlings were 
used as a positive coping mechanism during the years prior to her brother 
developing linguistic capacities. She starts the interview saying that her parents 
read her to her from a book which she then went on to read to herself, perhaps 
alluding to the fact that once her brother was born she used her IC to cope with 
the effect a new family member can often have on an older sibling feeling like 
the attention has been divided.   
Participant 6: Swampy 
This is another descriptive narrative with the participant emphasising what is 
remembered and how it is remembered - image retention and clarity. As the 
interview starts, she explains to me potentially how significant the memories are 
for her, “I remember more about this aspect of my childhood than most other 
stuff”, “the actual images are clearer, more precise”. Much of the narrative is 




The “less clear” images appear to distract her from the storying process, as if 
she loses her way negotiating from past to present and back again. The inability 
to access a whole memory chunk at once causes frustration, “my memory is 
obviously a bit sketchy”, “now I’m stuck”, “I can’t remember for sure”. Her 
process of making sense of the experience thus seems thwarted by partially 
complete memory. Where some others may use fragments to frame or scaffold 
a memory narrative, this participant uses certain specific memory, (clear and 
precise), like a compass to navigate her way back to the past. I have considered 
this may well be a consequence of the type of interview, (unstructured), used in 
the study. Some find it more difficult to ‘talk freely’ without the directive potential 
of questions.   
This participant felt uncomfortable when reflecting on the length of time she had 
her IC. Although she noted it was not embarrassment, as an adult she 
remembers later being concerned not only that she had the companion but that 
the relationship had lasted “for so long”. Her sense of having Swampy around 
longer than she perceives others (have their ICs) is carried through the narrative 
and for this reason I consider the ‘being different’ part of a larger social 
comparison theme.  
In my reflection following the interview, I note that she was perhaps nervous, 
(not certain of where to place her hands, moves them around, fidgets with 
paperwork on the table surface). There are pauses in the narrative although at 
the time I did not interpret the periodic silences as feeling uncomfortable  
  
Participant 7: Unnamed IC  
Family culture and social comparison were strong themes in this participant’s 
story of her IC, speaking less about her experiences of the early companionship 
and more about the home environment, how it was for her to be part of this 
family system. I very quickly get a sense that the memories hold feelings of 
sadness for her child self, the belief that ‘it wasn’t fair’ , the perceived injustice 
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that children feel when they compare themselves to others and realise that they 
are indeed different. The adult mind, as hers does in this case, rationalises the 
injustices we feel in childhood as ‘just the way things were’ or, ‘it was good in 
some respects’.   
The participant recalls how as a child she did not have the freedoms afforded 
other children such as sleepovers and Barbie dolls. This is seen by her as part 
of a cultural membership and not necessarily blamed on parental enforcement. 
So although there is talk of her father and his authoritative style of parenting I 
interpret that time, age and awareness has enveloped this as part of a cultural 
identity.  
Her IC relationship is explained in these terms, defined by its impact on family 
relations, something her father “was not in favour of”, something she says was 
“unique” in the family, that elicited the attention of both mother and father and 
something that her siblings did not share with her. She “enjoyed having the 
friend very much” despite her father’s disapproval, stating that it was a special 
friendship.  
Notes following the interview reflect what has been stated previously that is, the 
participant’s correspondence with me disclosing of her own volition the fact she 
was of a certain culture. She spoke confidently throughout, pausing to consider 
her thoughts and clarify memory. She verbalised that she had been thinking 
about her participation (in the study) and that she had been looking forward to it. 
Not long after, I received email correspondence thanking me.   
Participant 8: Claudia 
The story is presented with an obvious emphasis on the physical appearance 
and presence of the imaginary companion named Claudia. The narrative seems 
to be an experiential parallel which the participant felt at the time, between her 
child-self and her imagined friend. Recalling that the IC was inferior to her on a 




in this relationship. The power-differential is manifest in the participant’s story as 
she remembers occasions when she would get angry, “fed up”, with Claudia and 
“send her home”, “away from me” as a punishment it seems.  
The mother is a supporting figure in the narrative, reaffirming her child’s early 
sense of self (self-identity), as beautiful, “I was prettier” and “my mum felt quite 
proud of how cute I was”. The participant recalls how her mother “used to have 
to” listen to bemoaning about the IC as if ,not by choice ,drawn into the 
relationship and its early narrative, affirming her daughter’s position of authority 
even through the neutral cues of ‘just listening’. Support by the mother of the IC 
relationship status quo is implicit - there is nothing to suggest mother’s 
countering the behaviour.   
Reflecting on this interview I have mentioned a commonality amongst several of 
the participants whose narratives begin spontaneously with ‘what is clearest in 
my mind…’.This particular participant shared with me that she had not thought 
about her IC “in ages”, “it’s not something I’ve thought about”.  
  
Participant 9: Stories and Fantasy Characters  
For the one male participant in the study, this was an engaging narrative in 
terms of both the sense-making process and the experiential content. Fantasy, 
creativity and fiction are central features of the story.  
 Although there is no mention of parents, siblings or reference to family, a 
unique affiliative theme emerges from his talk about the characters he creates.  
He speaks of them in plural terms, none are referred to by name and there is 
little in the way of identity or personalisation. When interpreted comparatively 
with the other participants, this is a different sort of companionship. Despite this 
difference, the characters have an enduring presence which has remained 
through to adulthood and which continues to manifest through “dialogue” and 
“monologue”.   
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For me, the narrative is self-satiating with the characters having enabled a 
sense of mastery. I try to imagine the cumulative impact of the self-referent 
messages, for instance, the idea that they (characters) were “always curious 
and interested (in what he had to say)…as curious as I am about my thoughts”.  
He says,“they were usually detached from the rest of the world; there was the 
real world and there was my world and they were in my world”. This is an 
example of what Kantor (2013, p 265) means when explaining the interaction 
between the ability to pretend and imagine and the rules of social/community 
living, an interplay which he deems significant in development. Although the 
other participants do not use the same phrasing, as in ‘real world’ and ‘my 
world’, I believe the experiences resemble similarly the effects of ‘our/your 
world’ on ‘my world’ and ‘my world’ on ‘our/your World. And this, according to 
my interpretation, is yet another route to an understanding of self and other. 
In terms of identity consolidation, the characters may at least have preserved 
some of his beliefs about himself - that he is interesting, unique, creative, and so 
forth. It is because of them he says that he is able to explain his thinking “in a 
much more complex way”. Edith Ackermann (2005), introduced in an earlier 
section of this paper [p.23], asserts that it is the sustained narrative “between 
what is and what could be, between actuality and possibility, which is a condition 
sine qua non to the development of both human creativity and rationality” (p2) 
and goes further to suggest that these “urges” contribute to helping people find 
their place and their voice in the world. As this finding of voice and place has 
emerged as an important component in this study it will be reflected on further in 
the discussion and conclusion sections.   
This participant seemed relaxed throughout the interview and after listening to 
the audio recording he had wanted to show me some drawings, “fantasy 
sketches” for his next creative writing project. His predilection towards fantasy 
ties in with Klausen’s belief that relations between children and their imagined 
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constructions be taken as a “vivid merging point” between fantasy and reality 
(Klausen 2007, p.356).   
I am reminded of Boudin & Pratt and Taylor’s studies (Bouldin &  
Pratt 2001, Taylor et al.1993) suggesting that children with IC’s are able to 
readily and easily process the content of their fantasies. Although this is not the 
case with all of the participants, he seems able to confidently elaborate on his 
ideas to me, explaining where his ideas where drawn from and what facilitative 
factors kept the creative process in flow and he is able to clearly articulate his 
thoughts and to want to explain the ‘inner workings’ behind his stories and 
drawings. When I, for example, asked P2 how it was for her to talk about  
Minnie, she remarked, “It’s kind of strange but not in a bad way or awkward 
way”. P4 is frustrated in articulating her thoughts or putting things across in a 
way that seemed concordant with her internal reflection and this, compared to  
P9, has something to do with her own sense of understanding: “I think it’s 
difficult to separate the stuff I remember; I just wish I could remember more but 
it’s nice actually talking to someone else about them; I have wanted to 
understand it”. P5 does not appear to struggle in narratively expressing what 
she sees in her mind remarked, “Sometimes I have a very vivid picture of her in 
my imagination and I can recall that with ease and clarity; call that up and use 
that”, and of her child self she says, “I was constantly verbalising what I was 
doing and I was doing it out loud…I just remember talking, it was about talking”. 
It seems for P6 that the ease and readiness to process the content of fantasy, or 
put another way, her ability to portray the details of her experience, is contingent 
on image quality, the fact that she feels confident in her mind’s ‘stored evidence’ 
:“The actual images are clearer more precise; In my mind now I can see him  
;how vividly I remember”. In psychological terms, I would suggest this to be less 
of a content ‘process’ and more of a descriptive recall , which to varying degrees 
is evident in all the narratives.  
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Finally, parallels can be drawn between the participant’s predilection for fantasy 
and artistic creativity and other imaginary companionship studies, for instance 
Myers et al (Myers 1979; Singer & Singer 1992) which showed that those who 
had imaginary companions in their childhoods exhibited creative capacity as 
adults. Taylor, Hodges, and Kohanyi (2003) reported that more creative writers 
recalled having an imaginary companion than the normal population. In this 
study, the authors stated that the writers had a high mean score on the 
Dissociative Experiences Scale ,particularly on the ‘Absorption’ subscale, 
measuring the tendency to become highly engrossed in activities, something I 
could draw from P9’s narrative : “I’d think about them all the time ; they were 
with me in my mind; I would usually have a certain character in front of me in my 
mind ; All my life has been filled with fantasy stuff ; even today half my thinking 
is in dialogues”. Suggesting his ‘absorption’ in an active imaginative life from 
childhood through to his adult self.   
 The remembered as told  
This section of the discussion will pull together a number of threads, beginning 
with the phenomenon of the ‘remembered-as-told’. This is not only a critical 
feature of the study but also holds potential for future study of ICs. I believe it 
pertinent to clarify the value that the phenomenon holds for the study as a whole 
and do this by re-visiting its origination. 
When exploring the characteristics of memory, or what may be referred to as 
the ‘quality’ of a memory, there is often reliance on constructs such as its detail/ 
specificity, sensory information, the ordering or sequence of events, storyline or 
scene reconstruction. However, the aim in this study was to understand the 
memory outside traditional markers, as an experience/ series of experiences.    
Through the experiences other, meaning-laden elements, could be seen: the 
relation to sense of self, the voice of others, discourses of time and loss and, 
the link of recollected experiences to the personal and familial geographies of 
the participants.  
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The remembered-as-told located an experiential space in which lived-through meaning 
and new meanings were to be revealed. I suggest that envisioning the space began even 
before this, through the choice to not define the imaginary companion, allowing it to 
‘show itself’. I would argue that the phenomenon, defined in this way, does well to 
position the participants as experiencers, a role that is the result of their direct 
participation. Active agency extends to narrative and particularly to the re-storying 
process. A choice was made not to examine narrative structure or components through 
the likes of narrative /discourse analysis although the study acknowledges the 
embeddedness of meaning within words noting the confines of the spoken word and the 
potential issues that emerge from attempting to access memory though language. 
However, the ‘intelligibility’ of a speech act assumes that participants/ narrators own 
words can work to fend off or mitigate against misinterpretations and, that the participants 
are able to signal to an audience how they want to be understood (Maple & Edwards, 
2005). 
There is an underlying thematic strand in the study of disconnection and reconnection, 
and I would argue that this is measured well by the ‘remembered-as-told’. The 
remembered-as-told was a conscious decision to link researcher to researched to reader. 
Through talking and listening, there was an opportunity for ordinary human connection 
and shared experience between myself and the nine participants. Moments of 
disconnection are however present in attempts to narrate their experiences, to describe 
the imaginary companionship to other individuals or readers in my own terms, evidenced 
in ‘telling versus showing’. Using IPA as an interpretive tool meant I could ‘show’ others 
via narrative excerpts and participant examples, closing the gap between participant and 
reader. In a similar vein, I feel the phenomenon is sensitive enough to ably reveal the 
distance between the memory and its recollection; connecting the storyteller to their 
authorship through the acts of remembering and interpreting, and disconnecting through 
the human process of forgetting. The synchronicity of this coming-together and moving-
apart coming-together and moving-apart, is evidenced throughout the participant 
narratives.  
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Extension of this thematic strand moves inevitably on to the notion of 
temporality. I think the phenomenon has revealed a tension between the 
continuity and support of memory to the unfolding self, versus the changing 
nature of self, memory and experience. The tensions have to do with how 
participants’ narratives change through time yet also at certain junctures appear 
embedded or fixed. This may have, as is discussed later in more detail, 
something to do with the self and whether memories in-service to the self, form 
part of something longer-term (the long-term self) and antithetically, the 
memories that are self-discordant are housed temporarily before being let go or 
replaced.     
Finally, there is the phenomenological attitude and my belief that the phenomenon, 
differentiated as it was, supported or at the very least represented this attitude. Along 
with the phenomenology’s call for humanity (a rudimentary pre-condition), there is a 
similar call to consciousness. For when one is ‘conscious of’ something, an experience in 
this case, one is ‘in-relation- to it’, aware of it and importantly, it holds meaning. In my 
preparatory readings on phenomenology, I turned to Langeveld’s (1983a) The Secret 
Place in the Life of the Child, to which I have referred previously in this study (under 
‘Research Examples’),and was struck by the researcher’s account of this remembered 
experience, how he positions in-relation-to what he is looking at. This, and the sensitivity 
imparted in his illumination of the experience to the reader, suggested to me that memory 
phenomena exist in the space between who we are and who we may become which, 
Langeveld implies, are quite ordinary aspects of life.  
Sense of Self 
The construction of ‘a sense of self’ has become an important part of the project 
and I do believe emerged because of the way the phenomenon was delineated. 
I have given examples of other studies wherein stories of remembered 
experiences are collected and understood in reference to the self and self-
transformation. By structuring the phenomenon as I did, I felt it would be able to 
show that which is socially shared, how the meanings were of a social nature, 
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as well as revealing how imaginary companionships are experienced in 
individual ways. I predicted that it seemed highly likely that the recollection 
would extend to other individuals in the family system and that their 
perspectives on the imaginary friend would become known In terms of memory 
and autobiographical process, I had some idea that the self would be important 
but not to the extent that it would be considered, as Roediger and Marsh term, 
the “critical defining feature” (2003p.485).   
Although I have referred to the memory experiences in this study as 
autobiographical, I have not set out to prove this. My belief is that the memories 
which were shared with me are meaning-full. How and why they hold meaning 
for each of the nine participants is left to interpretation.  
If it holds that self-referential memories, (autobiographical accounts), are the 
building blocks in constructing and maintaining ‘a sense of self’ (Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce 2000; Robinson, 1992, McLean, 2005), it would be necessary 
to understand how this links to the participant narratives. The answer appears to 
lie in the active agency of self - a role that the current (in this case adult) self 
actually plays in organising and interpreting past experience. Thus, our beliefs 
about the kinds of people we are (present tense) influences the kinds of stories 
we share, and impact the specific manner in which we relate them to others. 
This has to do with congruence, with seeing ourselves as the same person over 
time, integrating past (childhood) and present (adult self), (Barclay 1987, 
Markus 1977 1982, Neimeyer & Rareshide 1991). It would follow that stability-
maintaining narratives around  self and self-events would be most prevalent in 
the everyday discourse of adults and that in order to maintain a stable sense of 
who I am over time, I would need to ‘adapt’ self-experiences by dismissing what 
is incongruent, (McLean & Pasupathi, in press; Pasupathi & Mansour, 2006; 
Pasupathi, Mansour, et al., 2007).The narrating of an event that was ‘not like 
me’, may pose a struggle for the self and be reflected in incongruent narrative 
content. Maslow’s (1903-1970) theory of self for example states that who I am 
today provides a path to my understanding of my childhood experiences such 
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that, throughout the life span, it is the experiencing person that is in the centre 
(1903-1970).   
McAdams particularises this by suggesting a role for imagery and sensory 
expression where, over time, an individual may accrue a set of “favourite 
metaphors and symbols” which become an important feature of their identity, 
used to affirm continuity or understand change in the ‘me’ (1966,p.308). In  
Waller and Maine’s (2011) study, discussed under ‘research examples’, their 
findings have suggested that adult readers who expressed “difficulty in 
imagining” the landscapes (from the childhood tale), who could not fully 
immerse themselves imaginatively, were “removed from their aesthetic 
experience”. Listening to the participants talk of their companionships, I agree  
with McAdams’ explanation for the accrual of metaphor as an integrative, sense-
making and self-explanatory feature of the personality. Although it is the ego’s 
job to deal with dissonance, ego integrity coming from the acceptance of 
‘dialectical’ behaviours and experiences, for some participants in this study, I 
notice the metaphorical significance of their IC experiences. P5 is an advanced 
postgraduate in psychology and says of her IC : “ I learnt to read when I was 
very little; There was a presentation I attended at a psychology conference 
about some forms of this (imaginary companionships)…and I got thinking about 
it…I have a very vivid picture of her in my imagination and I can recall that with 
ease and clarity…use that in real conversations…talk with that image; my 
parents were always reading to me…it was about talking; listening to me; 
important…linguistically and socially; I was constantly verbalizing out loud”. In 
this extract one sees evidence of what McAdams refers to in the linkage 
between the (past) stored images/ (present) recall, her interest in and aptitude 
for psychology (differentiated identity), view of herself (as different, as 
intelligent).     
Relating further the experience of self to the literature on imaginary 
companionship, it has been discussed earlier that children who indulge their 
imaginations are better equipped to understand the mind of self and other 
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through observing the self in relation to the other and by looking at the self from 
both inside and outside (Taylor 2007; Taylor et al, 2008; Davis, Meins & 
Fernyhough, 2011). Thus said, children who remember engaging often in 
pretend play may also recall their experiencing the self in different roles, in an 
“as if” world (Burris & Raif 2015, pp.91-106). When considering the landscape of 
child and adult across time, IC’s may serve at least some purpose toward 
identity formation through what Hoff (2004) has termed an ‘inner mentorship’. As 
mentorship implies, the IC would facilitate exploration of ‘the self’, aspects of the 
personality that are tested out, possible selves that are experimented with.  
It is interesting to note too how Bettelheim, (Bettelheim 1977) describes fairy 
tales as particularly rich microcosms to work out identity issues. The materials 
provided in a fairy tale are evocative of a person's psychological and emotional 
struggles, which growing up entails.   
At this point in the discussion I would like to raise an important contextual 
variable from the IC narratives, that of the listener/observer. Variations in  
“listener-responsiveness” from those who are witness to the events and 
experiences in our lives have the capacity to skew the relationship between self-
event and self- identity (Fivush & Nelson, 2004; Reese, Bird, & Tripp, 2007). 
Researchers who have studied this phenomenon suggest that ‘responsive 
listeners’ are those who are attuned - convey their interest, contribute to the 
narrative, and support the telling of a story. For instance, children whose 
mothers are highly responsive, and adults whose friends are this way will tell 
more elaborative stories to those listeners and have more elaborated memories 
for the experiences they have narrated (Fivush & Nelson, 2004; Pasupathi & 
Hoyt, 2009). Interestingly, highly attuned mothers are involved in supporting 
their child’s production of a ‘complete’ autobiographical narrative to the extent 
that even when the child is an adult these parents assist in linking current life 
experiences with lifelong proclivities and future directions. Evidenced in this 
study was the fact that four out of the nine participants had contacted in the 
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present tense (spoken with and emailed) their mothers to discuss the study and 
memory of their imaginary companions. Another two of the participants had 
discussed the topic with their siblings, (sisters in both cases).  
The act of narrating our experiences to someone else and therefore not being-in 
the experience itself, relates to the work of Kegan (1982) in his Evolving Self, 
and to Edith Ackermann’s paper on education and virtual reality worlds (1993). 
Both authors argue that experiential learning is limited as long as an individual is 
immersed in the experience itself .Yet, when they are able to remove or 
separate themselves from the experience such as in the act of remembering 
and narrating, they can contemplate better this experience from a distance. As 
time goes, they can ‘encapsulate’ their experiences, give it a ‘form’, which 
eventually, according to Kegan, gains a life of its own. It is plausible then that 
these experiences, such as for the nine participants, become ‘artefacts’. Within  
the dialogue between "me" and "my artefact" there is, according to the authors, 
opportunity for new and deeper understanding. Ackermann refers to it as “the 
alternation between embedded-ness and emergence from embeddedness”, 
which she relates to self-knowledge and growth .To be ‘embedded’ 
experientially, being-in the experience as the experiencer I suggest is both a 
dissociative and integrative process. I will not argue here against experiential 
narration (as this study’s bedrock) nor take issue with Ackermann’s 
‘embeddedness’ in terms of the phenomenal self, both beyond the scope of this 
paper. My desire to understand another’s unfamiliar past experience and their 
desire to assist in my understanding is an act of integration, absorption in the 
narrative, “I want to understand you”, “I want you to understand me”. At the 
same time, I am aware of the dissociative qualities attributed historically to the 
imaginary companion. Traditionally, the discourse around a social dissociative 
theme has centered on self-isolation, the only-child hypothesis, social skill 
deficit, lack of social closeness (no understanding or empathy from others) 
,perceived mental incapacity leading on then to an array of cognitively 
dissociative factors. The point I am making is that, by ‘looking at the bigger 
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picture’, as I hope to have done with this study, one sees the experience 
evolving together with the evolving self.   
Early on in the study I gave an overview of the historical context of IC research 
describing how interests have shifted, how contemporary findings have pointed 
to higher levels of sociability and pro-social orientation,( Roby &Kidd,2008; 
Seiffge,1997). There was no disclosure in the participant narratives about their 
personal social lives, current peer relationships, friendship ties or romantic 
partnerships, social pursuits or interests. From the data did emerge a common  
(superordinate) theme of ‘others’, others in the family notably the mother, that I 
have discussed. There is a sense of ‘social closeness’ noticeable in some of the 
stories, a concept I am borrowing from previous IC research using the 
Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire (Tellegen 1982, cited in Kidd et al, 
2010), which points to sociability, close interpersonal ties, turning to others for 
comfort and help.   
Regarding her memory of peer friendships, P1 says, “I don’t think I had many 
friends at the primary schools I used to play with; my imaginary friends were 
much more my friends, more attached and nicer to me – my peer friends weren’t 
very nice; I found it quite hard to make friends and stuff like that”. She found 
school “difficult” socially and academically (given her diagnosis of dyslexia and 
dyspraxia). So although she seems attached to the characters in her imaginary 
school, “my imaginary friends were more of a comfort”, it is a less ‘personalised’ 
(no names or appearance qualities), hierarchical relationship.  
I perceive a different closeness in P2’s relationship with Minnie. In spite of her 
having siblings, a stay at home mum and the potential availability for peers, ”big 
family; always had other children over” , she forms an attachment with an 
imagined other who, in her words, “was obviously important”. She begins 
engaging in real friendships becoming “more outgoing” once Minnie is gone but 
feels “sad” about the companionship ending. There are parallels between P1 
and P2’s companionship in terms of teaching/ helping/ instructing, both 
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participants recalling how they explained things to their IC, gave them 
instructions, “see if she could do them, if she’d listened to me” (P2). As a source 
of social provision, Gleason and Hohmann’s (2006) study (a predominantly 
female sample), revealed that children’s imaginary friends provide much of the 
same social value as do real friends in terms of “conflict, power, instrumental 
help and nurturance” and that when examined within the context of significant 
social relationships, there was a “lack of statistical difference” between real and 
imagined companions (p.141). Following this argument, which again links the 
current data to previous IC research, in P4’s story she states that “an imaginary 
companion is someone or something…you can play with when you don’t have 
real people there to play with”. She does note however that even after her 
younger siblings are born, she recalls the continuation of the IC companionship.  
For P6, social closeness is evidenced in multiple play contexts. She has her 
friend Swampy who was “closer” to her than her “regular friends”, she kept him 
separate from them although he was not a secret, and she had her brother and 
sister whom she considered her friends too. Her narrative provides support for 
Taylor’s counter-argument that imaginary friends more than likely have “special 
qualities” not found in real friends and that the two forms of relationship are 
inherently different (1999,p130). This is premised on the fact that children don’t 
necessarily give up their IC’s when real friends come along. P5 said, “I’d say it 
was certainly companionship and I’d say she shared some resemblance to my 
grandmother who I had a very positive relationship with…so I would say a 
unique companionship on those grounds; I think she was important to me and 
still is”. She does say that “she’s not sure about the social thing” in terms of the 
companionship’s facilitation. In year one at school, she disclosed being 
embarrassed of Mrs Barlow and the little darlings when comparing herself to her 
peers, “I think it’s different to have a much older imaginary friend”. Similar to P2, 
when Mrs Barlow is gone (vanishes), “in her place came other people who were 
real people”. From P7’s story, my understanding is that the companionship 
bares resemblance to Gleason’s explanation of a traditional friendship (even 
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toy-like qualities), a source of provision in a context where real friends and 
Barbie dolls were not sanctioned. She says, “I enjoyed having the friend very 
much; almost a sister just like a little sister or a doll”. Interestingly, there is no 
name given nor little in the way of physical description as in the case of a real 
friend. Similarly, for P8, Claudia is similar to a real friend, “my same age ; she 
wasn’t as pretty as me… we kind of made a good pair…I liked her and wanted 
her to be my friend ; I could get angry with her and send her home”, revealing 
too the examples of social provision ,in this case conflict and power, that  
Gleason asserts. Lastly on the issue of sociability, of self and other, is P9’s 
experience of his relationship with multiple fictional characters. As a child he 
said he got “inspiration” from his “classmates” but there is nothing in his story 
about peers or family (he has an older brother I find out). When asked if he ever 
spoke to anyone about the characters his reply was, “it’s usually disguised in my 
writing; I can usually talk about my imaginary friends by the things I write; in a 
disguise; I didn’t share a lot what I wrote with most people back in the day”, 
confirming a sense of his privacy, a boundary which may serve to protect his 
rich inner-life.    
 CONCLUSION    
Since imaginary companionship is a difficult thing to get one’s head around 
proving tricky to define or describe, contributions that draw on alternative 
perspectives such as phenomenology and that use a variety of methods should 
be welcomed. Phenomenology may yet prove its worth in terms of moving the 
imaginary companion out of some of the ‘conceptual straightjackets’ which have 
historically benefitted research in the cognitive sciences. Set against a backdrop 
of theoretical tensions, Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) has 
provided for this study a multi-layered way of tapping into methodological, 
epistemological and ontological dimensions of the imaginary companion. 
Phenomenological researchers can remain caught in what feels like a 
theoretical impasse, what Hollway and Jefferson describe as “the transparent 




for me was a question of ‘knowing’, or rather how to know, included in the 
concern that I/we would never really know the full story, because the 
assumption that participant narratives give access to authentic parts of the 
self/lifeworld, may be fallacious. There seems to be no way of escaping the 
tensions inherent in this type of research project but I am satisfied that the study 
has made an honourable and worthy choice in phenomenology and that the 
phenomenon itself has exposed what is experientially meaningful for nine 
individuals.   
Imaginativeness is explained as a particular kind of flexible disposition which is 
said to invigorate other dispositions or ‘ways of being’. In everyday living, this 
human ability represents the novel, the resourceful, the unconventional and, the 
unorthodox. Imaginativeness also includes the ability to extend oneself beyond 
the sensorial, to experience what is extrasensory. If one then thinks of 
imaginativeness in such broad terms, as a human way-of-being, then imaginary 
companionship could be regarded as the experiential component of this way of 
being, an outcome or consequence of having an imaginative disposition. And 
when regarded such, as a type of experience, it is understandable that it has 
proved difficult to pin down or define, net alone operationally. Attempts have 
aimed at defining the companion, less so the relationship, and current empirical 
practice follows Svendsen’s definition (1934), declaring the imaginary 
companion to be “an invisible character named and referred to in conversations 
with other persons or played with directly for a period of time, at least several 
months, having an air of reality for the child but no apparent objective basis” 
(p.6). As earlier discussed, this has proved problematic in terms of its non-
inclusionary  characteristics, neglect of the personified object and potential 
negation of an entire range of other imaginal manifestations. I have also pointed 
to Gleason's (2004) argument that we are dealing with two or more separate 
phenomena and her call to examine invisible companions and personified 
objects as distinct experiences. The de-limiting consequence of abiding 
steadfastly to definitional criteria does mean that anything in the mixture 
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deemed subtly distinct gets washed away. This is evidenced in a personal 
example I have provided (see appendix 2):  
Seated around the dinner table at a recent social gathering I was asked… why I had 
earlier said that an imaginary companion “should hold a significant place” in the 
child’s life and why too I had added that they usually are known by the parents or 
caregivers to exist. I explained that they were distinct from other forms of projective 
play and objects in the child’s life and that the quality and quantity of time spent 
engaged with them implied a certain significance. That the rest of the family unit 
would in due course be made aware of their presence, and that children mostly were 
quite happy to talk to others about this relationship. She had a look which I can only 
describe as concern, then asked, “So if the parents don’t know about it, then you’re 
saying it doesn’t exist? So what if I had one and didn’t want to share it, I just kept it 
all to myself, would that not be an imaginary friend then?”…  
I was really taken with this response and again almost forced to pause and 
think. How potentially limiting our definition for this phenomenon may be, and 
how many stories out there will be discounted and/or extinguished. In 
experiential terms, this is a most crucial consideration. As this study has sought 
to understand and interpret personal experiences and the meanings contained 
therein, there was reason enough to decide that no definition would be offered 
to the research participants. It was in no way a prerequisite of the study that 
participants themselves describe or narratively define their imaginary 
companion(s). The idea was to reflect questions (such as those concerning 
definition) back to the participant. A position of naïve curiosity on my part was 
relatively easy to adopt as my personal history does not include an imaginary 
companion.   
Aside from choosing to leave open the definitional space, the intent was also to move 
away from historical, binary interpretations by looking at the IC with its lived exchanges. 
Imaginary companion studies examining ‘those-with’ versus ‘those-without’ are 
referenced earlier in this current study, their findings credited for identifying with pin-




literature on free play, creativity and imagination, and imaginary companionships 
proffers links to other cognitive and psycho-social markers, valuable indicators when 
understood in terms of a traditional developmental trajectory. The intention was for this 
study to attempt a purposeful collapsing of boundary de-stabilising the categories 
hitherto employed in researching the IC, to reveal another type of personalised 
understanding.  
 
When children’s drawings are used for research they are often commissioned 
and thus directed, to some extent, by the adult driven research process, so too 
with play for example. Of the categories that were re-visited, perhaps the most 
significant is that of child-adult. From a human geographical perspective, it 
made sense to negotiate the landscapes of/between each through the 
collapsing of space and time, imagination and memory being the portals through 
which such a thing is possible. The loosening of constraints around child-adult 
encourages a freedom similar to that of imaginative play- freedom to choose 
who to be, how to be, switching and swapping one role to another, one rule for 
another, abandoning and beginning again. Through liberation, when we can 
look beyond child-adult, at ways of being and connect those to the traditions, 
places and practices of society, we may begin to notice something quite 
encompassing in the form of whole ecologies. More than bringing something of 
the inner self to the external world, ecology refers to the web of relationships 
that exist between living things and their environments. Benhabib talks in 
ecological terms of “interrelational selves” whereby lives interact and connect 
whilst being grounded in the “material reality” of everyday life (1999,p.354). A 
relevant key component, according to the author, of the grounding is formed by 
the narrations of selves and other selves-in-relation. The remembered-as-told, 
in Benhabib’s terms, is constituted through “webs of interlocution” (354), as a 
phenomenal encounter managing to reveal the intersection of participant stories 
with other social factors and selves. It was hoped that ecologies would be 




other remembered experiences. And it does appear that the laying down of 
narratives gives form to a kind of multi-storied ecology, their narratives moving 
back and forth through chronological time as Elspeth Probyn has described , 
“…where images of childhood brush up against other images, where the past 
quickens a lust for the present and for the possible” (1996,p. 123).  
 
 Defining the phenomenon as ‘the remembered as told’ achieved certain crucial ends, one 
of which is the preservation of ecological integrity. Essentially to do with how participants 
have experienced and made their own sense of the memory, I would suggest the 
phenomenon has managed to capture the sense of wonderment which accompanies 
forays into the past. Further, through drawing on personalised accounts the phenomenon 
has highlighted the idiosyncrasies of the self- storying process, exposed my positionality 
as listener and has managed not to sentimentalise nor trivialise the recounted 
experiences. Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) supported an authentic 
interpretation of the experiences, moving from individual representations to a sense of 
what was shared between all nine participants. This method permitted reflexivity in terms 
of both myself as researcher and reader being able to see how the experiences have been 
interpreted and made meaningful. The core themes for example, emerged from the 
narratives in a way that is accessible to the reader, does not depend on implication or 
expertise: the relationship experience, social- comparison, sense of self, influence of 
mother and others in the memory, temporality and loss and, the memory experience.  
Throughout our lives the narratives that we construct for ourselves change, as do the 
meanings we take from them. Some narrative theorists suggest, so important is our self-
storying, that a more ‘coherent’ and organised life story contributes to psychological 
health/ or wellbeing (McAdams,2006). I do not take this to imply such a finely 
choreographed ordering of life that it ultimately becomes impossible to re-author for with 
its haste and contradiction, there must be room enough in life for re-interpretation, 
opportunity for it and acceptance that this is so. Somers refers to the temporal and 
relational aspects of self-related narratives as “ontological narratives”, and this resonates 




masterfully negotiating their own place within the narrative, and where they had 
opportunity to speak about who they believe they are (1994,p.61). “Ontological narratives 
make identity…something that one becomes” (p.61). The study was an opportunity for 
participants to reorganise the meanings attached to their IC experiences, to explore 
through narration their sense of self and to share some of the private sense-making out 
loud.  
Readers may be aware of a parallel process of interlocution which took place involving 
myself as listener, the intersubjective space and history repeating itself. In a remarkably 
similar manner to participant’s early experiences with their mothers (and others), they 
have interpreted the companionship, making accessible through narrative reporting that 
which is personal. As immersive as this experience was for me, I was unaware of the 
parallels at the time, only realising during thematic emergence of ‘others’. Interestingly, 
none of the participants commented on this parallel process which is not to say they 
weren’t aware of it.  
    
My understanding of the experience is that it does permit not only children but 
adults who have had the companionships earlier in life an opportunity to 
privately work through the conundrum of what it means to be ‘self’ and ‘other’. 
The mental simulations that begin in childhood I see as continuing through to 
adulthood. The introjected ‘other’ seems to remain available to the adult self in a 
narrative way, as ‘internal-state talk’, a faculty that at the very least must assist 
in self-understanding and self-other discernment. After all, to relate (even to an 
internalised ‘other’) is to negotiate boundaries, to regulate exchanges and to 
continue to reconfigure both outer and inner worlds. My sense from listening to 
the experiences is that they have much to do with identity- renewal and 
negotiation. I noticed how the IC’s have ‘grown’ with the adults as they continue 
to reconfigure ideas of self and others in their lives.  
  
This study has provided a novel contribution to imaginary companionship 




developmental approaches and identifying the tensions between coherent 
theoretical explanations on the one hand and experiential appreciation on the 
other. We cannot know everything and this study certainly does not profess to 
have provided any deeper knowledge than a series of interpretations, a view of 
nine experiences. All I can know is what has been told to me by the participants 
and what I have shared with readers through excerpt and example. There will 
certainly be things beneath or behind these nine stories, things that are kept 
private, the ‘real self’ of participants, and their narratives regarding their 
imaginary companionships will change as they continue on a lifelong course of 
making sense of themselves. Benhabib declared, there will always be “retelling, 
remembering, and reconfiguring” (p.348) but this does not negate the capturing 
of rich and salient experiences. I believe the study provided an opportunity for 
these young adults to give voice to a marginalised and historically pathological 
experience. I concede that there is a measure of ‘risk’ involved in memory work, 
in the veracity of personal testimony and selectivity of memory but this is 
mitigated, evidenced in the study narratives, by participants themselves noting 
the limits of their memory. The memories in this study have linked together in a 
way that reaches beyond the IC, telling us something of families and friends, 
time and change, reaching all around the imaginary companionship without 
being-in it. Interpretive phenomenological analysis permitted an experiential  
proximity sufficient for meaningful themes to emerge: The relationship 
experience, Social comparison, Self-evaluation, Impact of the imaginary 
companion relationship on identity formation, Influence of mother, Influence of 
others in memory, Temporality and loss.  
Within an emerging field, the study is set apart in its examination of the  
personal meanings attached to and the lived experiencing of these 
companionships, permitting a new understanding of the experience within a 
context of intentionality and temporality. Through an interpretive lens, the study 
has shown that this experience holds personal and social meaning, facilitating 
for those who have had an imaginary companionship, a complex understanding 
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of themselves and others through observing the self-in-relation to the other, 
through looking at the self from both inside and outside. Themes from this study 
point to an introjected ‘other’, an increased awareness of ‘the other’ in life, which 
remain available to the (adult) self and which meaningfully assist in self-
understanding and self-other discernment…“the process of peopling one’s 







Appendix 1: Interview Transcripts P1- P9  
  
  
Interviewer:    Caroline W.  
     
Respondent:  
  
 P-1  
     
Respondent:  
  
 Have you got any specific questions?  
Interviewer:  
  
 Alright so how we can start is, if you’re happy with this – by telling me what you 
remember about your imaginary friend or friends. I’m just going to try and see if 
I can turn this up a bit more – I also want to mention to you that I didn’t have an 




   




 Whatever memory comes first  
Respondent:  
  
 So I didn’t have an imaginary friend I had an imaginary school.  
Interviewer:  
  
 Okay.  
  
Respondent:    Yeah, I used to have like loads of imaginary little friends.  But not one, like you know lots of 
children normally have only one imaginary friend that they form an attachment to I think, I 
had one and we used to play schools together and I used to do that for hours on end. So I 
used to like take them in the car and my mum would have to wait to seatbelt them in and I 
used to take them on school trips together and teach them maths and teach them English 
and play with them in the garden. I loved being with them in the garden .  
    
Interviewer:  
  
 Do you have any idea how old you may have been?  
  
Respondent:    No I can’t. I just remember them being there. I must have been about 5/6 – pre-like 
reception age and I think it probably was because my brother was born at that age as well. 
And they were with me at that time.  
    
Interviewer:  
  
 Okay.  
Respondent:  
  
 Yeah, and so – that’s how far back I can remember  




    
Respondent:    Yeah [pause]. My Mum does too [ pause] ; she used to like help me seatbelt them and 
then stuff like that. So my mum played with them and  then my brother was small- so he 
did .  I don’t remember my dad being around much of my childhood.  We used to stop and 
have places laid for them at the table at my school. A bit weird?  Is that weird? [pause] I 
think that’s a bit weird.  
    
Interviewer:  
  
 I find it very interesting. I’m interested in hearing more.   
Respondent:    I don’t know.  So I think that's quite weird the whole school thing and that they were 
always with me.  
    
Interviewer:  
  
 May I ask what  you remember about their physical being , what they looked like 
?   
  
Respondent:   
  
  
   
Like young girls and boys - like a mixture and I used to line them up and teach them. And 
do you know what - I remember being quite old to have imaginary friends as well.  Like I 
still used to play schools and doctors and nurses way into like I was in year six, year seven  








Yeah I mean I don’t think I had many friends at the primary schools I used to play with, 
until like year six, year seven so again I was quite old. Like I used to play in schools- I’m 
like the teacher and then have a little clipboard and I used to teach them maths and 
science and do notes and mark their paperwork and they had homework.   
   
Interviewer:  
  




Yeah [pause] A lot  
Interviewer:  
  
So you would play schools with them at home . And did you include your other 
friends in this play ?  
   
Respondent:     
No I don't think I did, probably not they didn't play with my imaginary friends  
Interviewer:  
  
They didn’t?  
Respondent:   No [pause] just me  
   
Interviewer:  
  
Much of your play was homed based ?  
Respondent:  
  
Just home based.  
Interviewer:  
  
The activity that you most remember - is it just teaching them or do you 




   
Respondent: Yeah and going in the garden together because we had a big garden. So we moved from a 
small flat with like a little bit of an extension and then we moved into a house up the road 
and it had a massive garden. We had to move.  My little brother used to climb into bed with 
me and I must have been four and my bother was just one and that's when I remember 
specifically having imaginary friends.  




Respondent:   Yeah I used to take them into the garden and I specifically remember like putting seatbelts 
on all my imaginary friends to go out, mum would take us out. I would tell her to seatbelt 
them in.  
   
Interviewer:  
  
 You remember wanting them too be safe,  that's a significant memory for you.  
  
Respondent:   Yeah.   
   
Interviewer:  
  












It’s a bit weird but my mum remembers them too  
Interviewer:  
  
Are they vivid memories?  
  
Respondent:   Yeah they are quite vivid memories quite clear actually. I had quite a happy childhood.  





Respondent:   Yeah, they are quite vivid and I'm remembering more when I'm talking   
   
Interviewer:  
  








So you confirmed your memories with your mum ?  
Respondent:   Yeah like  she said, to me like you didn’t have them for very long you had them for quite a 
short period and I don’t remember that.  
   
Interviewer:  
  
You don’t ?  
Respondent:   I remember them being quite a long time actually and being quite old. So it could have 
been like how she noticed or something because she's a parent.  
   
Interviewer:  
  
Yeah because sometimes I guess as children our perception of time is different. 
And it seems this is a clear memory for you ?  
   
Respondent:   Yeah and I think from going from, because transition to school is quite a big one and I was 
mainly alone and having a new born baby that was quite a big thing- I think they must 
have been.  
   
Interviewer:  
  












Yeah close to me.  
Interviewer:  
  
Ok [pause]  
Respondent:   My imaginary friends were much more my friends, more attached and nicer to me i think 
my peer friends  weren’t very nice. And also I was actually diagnosed dyslexic at primary 
school so I found it quite traumatic. Maybe that's why maybe.  
   
Interviewer:  
  
At primary school you were diagnosed with dyslexia ?  
  
Respondent:   Yeah.  






And I found it quite hard to make friends and stuff like that so my imaginary friends were 
more of a comfort I’d say.  
   
Interviewer:  
  
Yeah.   
  
Respondent:   Thinking back I dont think they came with me to school . No I think I had them at home 
when I like came home from school, but I had them through school so they were at home 
for me.  
   
Interviewer:  
  
Okay   
Respondent:   Yeah to be with after school and other times.  












So you have one sibling ?  
  
Respondent:   I have one sibling who was born when I went into reception – I was like four - and he was 




Do you remember if your brother played with your imaginary friends ?  
  
Respondent:   
He might have but I don’t think - he was quite a colicky baby.  I don’t think … maybe?   
Maybe, I think he did, yeah, I think he did - maybe like a little because I'd invite him to. 










So to summarize what you've said we can play this back if you'd like. And if you 
want to add or take out anything you can.  
  




[Recorded conversation is played back - nothing is changed]  
  
Are you satisfied with your words and story ?  
Respondent:   Yeah , its fine , just strange hearing my voice.  
  
 ================================================================================  
     
    
Interviewer:  
  
  Caroline W.  
Respondent:  
  
 P-2  
     
Respondent:   Teaching them like stuff. And then maybe because I found it difficult at school like they 
were diagnosing me with dyslexia and dyspraxia. My mum used to go to meetings regularly 
and the school couldn’t really deal with it because of me being dyslexic.  
   
Interviewer:  
  
So you went through a difficult time then ?  
Respondent:  
  
Yeah quite difficult but I did have a happy childhood like I said earlier, and I had my baby 
brother.  











 Thank you for choosing to participate and you've been through the explanation for 
the study on this sheet. So really it's a case of you sharing what you remember about 
your imaginary companion or companions and these like I explained earlier can be of 
your own defining. [pause] If you're ok with the tape recorder I'll move it a little closer 
just because there's a little background noise. So please feel free to start whenever 
you're ready.  
Respondent:  
  
   
Ok I'm guessing it was early childhood maybe four or five and we had a big family always 
seemed busy playing or doing stuff . My Mum didn't work then she was a fulltime mum so 
she was around for us .I don’t think my brothers or my sister had any imaginary friends but 
I know I did, her name was minnie not sure why and I think I had her for quite a while. 
She got run over by a car in the end [pause] That was when I started school. Minnie just 
wasn't around anymore. My Mum remembers when Minnie died well you know what I 




 So you had Minnie in your life for quite a while ?  
Respondent:  
  
 Yes yes , definately and I remember going to my Nan's with her and to the farm, I think she 
was always with me, that's what it seems like. My family knew about her 'cause she was 
like one of us and I would obviously have to explain to my Mom for example what Minnie 
was up to. She wasn't like I've heard some others talk about imaginary friends - she wasn't 
naughty as far as I can remember. You do hear about little children's imaginary friends 
always getting the blame for bad behaviour, I've heard that before but I honestly can't 
remember Minnie getting into alot of trouble. I wasn't really naughty as a child 
anyway.[pause] My youngest sister was probably the naughty one.  
Interviewer:  
  
  It sounds like you have some really clear memories of Minnie 
?  
Respondent:     
My clearest memories I think are of us doing stuff together,playing and talking. I could  
 explain things to Minnie and then I'd see if she could do them, if she'd listened to me.  It 
probably seemed more fun to play with her than my sister or brothers.We always had other 
children over at our house so it seemed noisy ,busy. I can't remember any clear instances 
of my brothers or sister playing with Minnie[pause] or teasing me, but they did know about 





How is it for you now, as an adult, to talk about Minnie ?  
  
Respondent:   
  
It's kind of strange but not in a bad way or awkward way. I thought about it quite a bit before 
meeting you and after I saw the leaflet, and seemed like the more I thought the more I 
remembered. It's also maybe a little bit sad because she was obviously important to me 
[pause] I'm not sure why I would have imagined her dying, getting run over by a car ,seems 
horrible. But I don't remember crying or being upset at all [pause] and I'm quite a sensitive 
person. My mum says that Minnie was there one day and literally gone the next. [pause] 
After Minnie was gone I may have played more with other kids and just been more outgoing  





Is there anything else you would like to add or to say? We’ll listen to the recording 
and then you can decide. { Participant satisfied, no changes are made }  
  
  
       
==================================================  
Interviewer:    Caroline W.  




    
Interviewer:  We’ll put the recorder here if that’s alright. We can start whenever you’re ready and 
with whatever memories you want to talk about first. Okay?   
  
Respondent:   My memories aren’t very clear but what I do remember is that a little old man like a wizard 
from a fairytale used to live under the house and I used to talk to him. It sounds  
  
fairly scary now and I do remember actually being afraid sometimes [pause] afraid 
probably more so by the thought of it. I’m also sure I convinced my sister, if that’s 
possible. [pause] She’s here at Uni too and I told her I was doing this this study.[pause] 
She’s more embarrassed about it.   
Interviewer:   So it was a little old man that you can recall and you say he lived beneath your house?   
  
Respondent:  Yes if I had to describe him to you I’d say he looked like a character out of a fairy 
tale,[laughs] almost like an old wizard. Not a very long beard, white and he was short but I  
 honestly couldn’t tell you his name. I think he would tell me silly things to make me laugh and I would wait for him at 
the side of the house. It was exciting for me to wait there for him and then I’d get my sister 
to come there too. I know it was me who would try and convince her.   
Interviewer                 So you remember being excited waiting for him and then wanting your sister to join  
  
  
Respondent:  Yes [pause] but some of the time maybe more of the time it would just be me chatting  
away to him and also I remember wondering what it was like under our house where he  
  lived.[ lengthy pause] That’s really all I can remember.  
Interviewer                   That’s fine if that’s all you can remember. We’ll just listen to the recording to   
make sure you’re happy with it with what you’ve said.                                                  
            =========================================================================  
Interviewer:    Caroline W  
     
Respondent:   P4   
    
Interviewer:  
  
 So we can start as I said whenever you would like as I explained also it’s up to you 
to talk about whatever memories you have, I don’t have any specific questions to 
begin with.  










 I suppose an imaginary friend or such like could well be someone or some of sort of creature or animal that doesn’t exist that you can play with when you don’t have real 
people there to play with. For example in the childhood years that would be quite a special 




 Yes I suppose that could be the case. What was it like for you   
Respondent:    I did have an imaginary friend or rather friends plural as a child and I think I think I remember them, but also I’ve been told about them by my parents. It’s quite a tricky age to 




 Okay so your parents remember this too.  
  
Respondent:    Yes I think I remember having them but I also probably remember more from being, from 




 Okay  
Respondent:  
  




 A family, okay.  
Respondent:    There were two frogs, I guess they were a mum and dad frog I don’t really you know and 
they had names. They were called Carlene and Ping Ling and I have no idea why. Maybe 
because my parents had a friend who was called Carlene, but I have no idea where the 
name Ping Ling came from. [pause] Quite honestly it’s a bit weird but those were their 
names and when I think back I can’t remember the other names of the others.    
  
Interviewer:   So you recall there being a few frogs and you can remember the names of two.  
    
Respondent:   I don’t remember the others in the family only the mum and dad frogs and I do remember 
having them [pause] I remember them leaving as well because at some point I obviously 
didn’t have them anymore. Strange that I’m now talking about them leaving I’m not sure 




Is there a feeling or thought behind that memory of them leaving   
Respondent:   Not really anything in particular. First of all they moved down the road I think to another 


















Yeah and then one day I held the letter box open and they all disappeared and I just 
remember my mum said, where have they all gone and I said to her, “Oh, they’ve moved 




And you didn’t see them again  
  
Respondent:   A little while later they hadn’t been around for a very long time and I think somebody asked 




So that made sense to you as a child the idea that they had just moved on.  
  









I think it probably would have started initially when I was quite young I had a brother and a 
sister who were younger than me. So I imagine it was before they came around, but then 
they were still there later on. I think it was probably around infant school age when they 










Is there anything else that you can remember about your imaginary companions?  
  
Respondent:   I don’t think I remember a lot actually.[pause]  I think I remember that I had them but I don’t 
remember  a lot of what we did together. I remember them coming and going, going out 




Going out, leaving the house?  




Okay .  
Respondent:  
  
But I don’t remember if I was playing with other people, I don’t remember whether they 












 I do know also that when I was at that age I had a big thing about frogs and I collected  
frogs. I had cuddly frogs and I had little watermelon frogs and my favourite story was The 




So there was something special about frogs   
  
Respondent:   Must’ve ,there were a lot of frogs around so it would make sense that my imaginary 




And in terms of friends if we are talking about imaginary friendships could you say 
something about that   
  
Respondent:   
  
I suppose it was more like a friendship with yourself because you create the imaginary 
friends. So you kind of have more control over that friendship than over the interaction 
with others whereas with friends like real friends  they have their own personalities and 
you hadn’t created them so its a very different sort of relationship but then they are real as 







I think I suppose , yeah you want to do something and you think, oh my friends would do 
that with me because they are mine. They don’t like belong to anyone or not having to 




yeah that's a nice way of putting it.   
Respondent:   I think it’s difficult to separate the stuff I remember from what I’ve been told by other 




Yes, do you mean by talking about the memories in adulthood   
Respondent:   Yeah, because I have sort of read here and there about imaginary friends over the years 
and differences between people who did have them and who didn’t have them and that 
kind of thing. So I don’t know it’s difficult to answer that question really because I might 
say yes, but then that might actually just be what I... because I’ve been told. I obviously  
have wanted to understand it because I thought it was different maybe to whether other 




Okay that’s interesting you have an awareness of them as maybe being something 
that’s different.  
Respondent:   I think I like that I had them and maybe that is because they might have as being unique 
and different. I think that they probably were because before my brother and sister came 
along I was an only child so I mean its only for two years and obviously my memories of 
that age, I don’t have memories of that age its just why I think that they might have come 










I don’t know whether they helped me to make real friendships or whether they got to be 
included in my other friendships – and it’s so difficult to remember the smaller details from 




May I ask if you’ve spoken with your mum about it as an adult or maybe shared 




Yeah we’ve talked about it before. My sister earned her degree in Education as well and 
she had to do a research project I think it was something to do with Art or children’s 
literature and I had suggested that she do imaginary friends. That’s probably more my 




You thought it might be interesting ?  
  
Respondent:   Yeah because I thought it would be quite interesting to draw children’s  imaginary friends 
or fantasy images. But she couldn’t actually do that project, she did something else, but 
before she changed her mind I was working in Afterschool class and I did get some of the 
children to draw their imaginary friends and it was brilliant, but I don’t know whether 
children drew the imaginary friends they’d really had because I’d said, do you have any 
imaginary friends and a couple of them had said yes, maybe others thought I want an 




It sounds like a great idea  
  
Respondent:   Yeah so I think a couple of them definitely were real imaginary friends. It was very 
interesting to see the children’s drawings of them. [pause]  So yeah back to what you 
asked earlier I’ve talked to my mum about my imaginary friends and she definitely 




Yes it does happen that our parents help us remember things from our early years 




   
When I told the kids to draw it I thought I should do it as well, and so I actually did draw 
mine but they came out just looking like frogs. I kind of imagine they look a little bit like a 
cross between Jeremy Fisher and the frogs from Rupert and the Frog song they are quite 
small, but light green with lovely kind big eyes.  
  
    
             
    
    
    
    
    
Interviewer:  
  









I think it was nice having them and I’m glad I did I just wish I could remember more but it’s 




Thank you we’ll play this back hopefully loud enough but there are headphones too 
so take a listen  
================================================================  
 
Interviewer:    Caroline W  
Respondent:                P-5  
    
Interviewer:               So we just start off with what you remember about your imaginary friend or friends   
whatever  you remember and we’ll just take it from there . I’ll leave this here and hopefully it won’t be a  
distraction so whenever you’re ready go ahead  
Respondent:  Okay so I learnt to read when I was very little when I was four or so I could read, read things to  
myself and then my parents were always reading picture books to me and they read a series of  
  
books to me about two characters called Lucy and Tom.  The books are by somebody called  
Shirley Hughes and I still have them and still love them and in one of these picture books Lucy 
and Tom do Christmas and they have all their relatives around and one of the relatives they 
have around is their elderly Aunt Mrs Barlow and I had a lot of imaginary conversations with Mrs 
Barlow who is their elderly aunt, and with the little darlings. Mrs Barlow and her little darlings of 
course. She called Lucy and Tom her ‘little darlings’. So I had Lucy and Tom who I normally 
called the ‘little darlings’ and Mrs Barlow and I just had imaginary conversations with them and 
that was when I was about five or six I’d say - so that's my starting point if you like.   
  
Interviewer:  So your memory is of a picture book and a set of fictional characters which you clearly 
recall having conversations with  
  
Respondent:  Yes Mrs Barlow and the little darlings.  
Interviewer:              And what do you remember about Mrs Barlow?  And I’m going to call her as you refer to her 
-                                         what kinds of things do you remember about her?  
  
Respondent:   Only this kind of picture and I can vividly remember this picture from the picture book of her; 
she’s sitting in the chair and she is just watching what's going on and I think she was someone 
who would just sit and there weren’t many adults in my life I guess that would just sit and listen  




Since already you mention a picture, you’ve got a picture can you describe that 
picture to me?  
  
Respondent:   Yeah, so she’s a little old lady with a very small frame, curly grey hair, glasses, sat on a chair 
maybe a rocking chair but I’m not certain, sat on it frontways looking sideways at what was 













And is there any narrative or story around that picture you remember ?  




Okay   




Talking, talking about dialogue or can you describe to me what you mean.  







I think it was more about her listening to me than it was about her talking to me, but yes. I 








Go for five, yes.  
Interviewer:  
  
Was it frequently can you remember  




Do you get to share about your imaginary relationship ?  
Respondent:   Yeah. There was a presentation I attended at a Psychology conference last year about some 





I’m so sorry I missed that –  
Respondent:  
  
And I remembered  that normally I have Mrs Barlow and the little darlings [laughs] My mother 
would tease me about that when I was growing up and when imaginary friends were mentioned 
on television or wherever and yeah. I checked out what age I was so that was January this year 
and she thought about five, it was when I was reading this picture books which was when I was 
about five. I don’t have the picture book anymore with that particular story in it and I’m very sad 










Respondent:   Yes indeed especially when they are an important part of your life even growing up.   
   
   
Interviewer:  
  
How does it feel for you talking about this   
Respondent:   I certainly haven’t told it to anyone else simply because its quite, I think from knowing about my 
friends imaginary friends this is when we are in school so we are in year one having a set of 
imaginary friends is quite strange and I felt almost embarrassed of Mrs Barlow and the little 
darlings. My other friends had imaginary friends that had pretty names and I didn’t feel quite 
able to share when I was a child and then my mother teases me about having this imaginary 
friends so its kind of like yeah. And I said, how old was I? She said, oh about 19. Thank you very 











Respondent:        
    
  I think it’s different. I think it’s different to have a much older imaginary friend. I think that's one 
thing I’d like to know is what are these imaginary friends like because my experience from 
childhood and obviously your friends have imaginary friends is that mine was very different the 
very fact it being based on a picture book so having at least some sort of visual image and then 




My feeling is that imaginary friends vary quite considerably from person to person  
  
Respondent:   Yeah.   
Interviewer:  
  




Respondent:   It’s a fond childhood memory I think – at the moment. I think when Mrs Barlow vanished, she 
vanished and in her place came other people who were real people who I would imagine where 
with me if that makes sense and I’d talk to them as if they were, but they weren’t there and its 
about conversation. I think she was safer than to talking to adults, not having the adults there to 
talk to. Having picture books and then being able to talk to people who are out of sight, but they 
are not out of mind as well. So I don’t know that kind of developmental stage I guess. It was a 
bridge between the solid reality adults need to be there to talk to me and I can talk to people 
when they are not there or I can, I don’t know.  
Interviewer:  Would it be fair to say it was meaningful, a meaningful relationship  
Respondent:                I’d say it was certainly companionship and I’d say that she shared some resemblance to my  
grandmother who I had a very positive relationship with, but who didn’t live anywhere near us  
  
so I saw her every twice a year. And my grandmother was somebody I could relate to very well. 
So I would say a unique companionship on those grounds and   
 
Interviewer:  Right.  
Respondent:                Yeah fairly unique.  
Interviewer:  And did the imaginary relationship terminate   
Respondent:                 Well I think she didn’t pop off, she didn’t disappear she just declined in frequency I guess.  
Sometimes I have a very vivid picture of her in my imagination and I can recall that with ease and clarity or the frequency.  
  
Interviewer:  Which you hold still.  
Respondent:               Which I hold still, but the frequency with which I would call that up and use that just in place of either  
real conversations or my own thinking seems better to talk with that image.  
  
Interviewer:  So there was no definitive parting or finishing off in that sense   
Respondent:  She didn’t just vanish, no that's not what the case was for me she gently faded       
Interviewer:              Okay so before we play the tape back would it be alright to kind of recap so I make  
sure I’ve understood your story in a way you would want     
 
Respondent:  Yeah sure I think she was important to me and still is I’d say at least linguistically and maybe  
socially I think . Helped because she was there just listening and I was constantly verbalizing  
   
what I was doing and I was doing it out loud. My friends at school is that, you know, ‘you can’t  
sit there, my imaginary friend’s sitting there’, kind of … yeah weird. So socially other people’s 
best friends [laughs] …  other people’s, sorry, imaginary friends didn’t help at all. So I’m not 
sure about the social thing and also just to note that maybe one could become quite... I think I 
might have been better off speaking to somebody as opposed to effectively myself almost.  
    
Interviewer:                   Anything else you’d like to add  
Respondent:   I’m the eldest not sure if you were going to ask that but may be worth something. I have a 
younger brother and when I was five he was three so he was becoming lingual and that probably 
for all I know coincided with less imaginative dialogue in that he was there to play with  
more but I think you’ve captured it all    
 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Interviewer:    
 
Caroline W.  
    




      
   
Interviewer:  
  
 Okay so if it gets too noisy in here I may just move this closer to you as 
long as it’s not a distraction whenever you want you can start just chatting 
about what you remember of your imaginary friend or friends   








 Yip that’s fine so I can start now then    
Interviewer:   Yes please   
     
Respondent:   My memory is obviously a bit sketchy just because of the time  that’s passed but I   remember 
more about this aspect of my childhood than most other stuff, and I think the actual images                                  
are clearer more precise I don’t know but I can say that my  friend was called swampy [laughs] seriously I 
don’t know why that name at all. He was an orphan and the closest character I can compare him to would 
be Tom Sawyer although if I’m honest I’ve only read that story once or twice so I’m fairly certain it didn’t                                 
originally start from there but in my mind now I can see him he was older than me and always had a straw 
hat with dirty denims and a red and blue checked shirt. Please tell me if I’m going off topic here or                                  
if what I’m going on about is relevant at all or should I talk about what  we did   
  
Interviewer: Please carry on it’s whatever you remember and however you remember it  
                                       
Respondent:  Okay good I’ll carry on describing him then as that’s the part I remember the most or maybe 
easiest to explain. As I was saying he wore the dirty denims and no shoes [pause] now I’m stuck I can’t 
remember for sure its frustrating I think he was barefoot he definitely wore a straw hat and always had the 
same clothes on. He was older than me like a big brother even though I do have a younger brother and 
sister so it’s not like I was an only child and I think I had him as my friend maybe til nine or ten I’m                         
sure definitely through early stages of my schooling cause I’d play with him after school in the field next to 
our house and in the garden cause we had quite a large garden well we still do my parents live there it’s still 
the family home. That’s really what I remember best about it all about swampy he genuinely was around a lot 
longer than others I’ve heard about slightly concerning [laughs] but he was like a genuine friend  
  
Interviewer:  Yes so you say he was like a real friend to you and you had him                             
for quite some time maybe until you were nine or ten you say  
Respondent:  He was well it felt like he was my real friend probably closer in a way than my my other friends and 
actually I didn’t have that many. My brother and sister were my friends and I did play with them too but mainly we’d 
play together when it was a family thing like going camping or when my folks were around but I think for me swampy 
was special and it felt like a close relationship maybe in terms of not having to share him or I don’t know that                      
sounds selfish. I don’t remember being sad around him maybe angry once or twice [laughs]  
Interviewer:  Was the rest of the family aware of your friendship  
 Respondent:  Yes I know they were well definitely my folks my mum used to have to ear all my stories and nonsense 
about what I’d been up to with swampy and I think she enjoyed it actually, listening to what I’d done cause she                                 
didn’t work and stayed at home with us. My Dad I’m not sure about he may have known and my brother and sister did 





Interviewer:           So you spoke about him and there is no memory of trying to keep him a  
                                a secret 
Respondent:          No no he wasn’t a secret definitely not I did speak about him and Mum did                               
know that we played together and what we did she never seemed to be upset about it I wasn’t embarrassed of course 
I don’t think my regular friends played with us sure they didn’t  
 Interviewer:             Is there anything else you want to say                                
  
Respondent:            Just maybe that it was a good time for me and even though I was later a bit                              
worried about the fact that I not only had an imaginary friend but also that I had him for so long well at least 
until I was nine or ten, other than that I think that’s all the most important part I did want to say in this is how 
vividly remember him and what a happy time it was for me, and I consider myself normal [laughs] I know a 
few people who had imaginary friends as kids but obviously all different [pause] I feel quite glad I had one     
  
Interviewer:                  Thank you. I’ll play the recording back for you to listen and as I said before 
we started if there’s anything you want to add maybe other things you remember or anything you 
want to take out then we can do that.   
===============================================  
Interviewer:     Caroline  
    
Respondent:   P- 7  
     
Interviewer:    If you want to start by telling me whatever you remember about your imaginary 
friend and I may ask questions if I need to clarify something but I’m really wanting 
this to be your story as I said so just go ahead whenever you’re ready  




   
Okay sure let me begin by explaining that as you may have noticed I’m Muslim and that 
for a start is something that will be interesting for you in your study. We come from a 
very strict upbringing and although it is encouraged for children to play and have toys 
etcetera and a fair amount of freedom I still don’t believe there is the same type of 
freedom as in British white families or western culture. That is the way we are brought 
up there is a deep respect for our parents especially our fathers and we are expected 
to do well at school. So how’s this of relevance to my story well it’s because it wasn’t 
an easy thing for me to have an imaginary friend that was like craziness or something, 
not as in like having a doll or dress up games I have no problem saying that telling you 




   




   
Yes I believe so and there may be a few reasons for that but I would say  








Interviewer:   Could you describe a little more 
Respondent:  My Dad was very strict and we were all very respectful that’s just the way it is. Family and religion 
are very important and although I’m not saying it was like evil me having something imaginary 
following me around it was still weird but my Father wouldn’t speak directly to me I think he would 
ignore me about it like if I spoke to him tried to tell him about something I was playing but he spoke 
to my mother and kind of said to her look we've got to sort this out kinda thing [laughs] like make it 
stop and don’t encourage it or anything. So he would relay that to my mother and I must’ve been 
aware that father did not approve I have that sense now thinking about it almost not a very nice 
feeling [pause] But I'm not saying that he punished me or yelled or anything no ridicule but my mother 
would talk to me explaining  it was a silly game and not to do it.  
  
  
Interviewer:  So you were aware of that …? And how was it for you to have this 
relationship with something imaginary then?  
  
Respondent:   I enjoyed having the friend very much. If I describe her to you  
she was a little girl like almost a sister with black hair and cute just like a 
little sister or a doll which I could play with and I felt a lot of love for her 
[laughs] my father would kill me if he heard me speaking like this [laughs]. 
I'm okay speaking about it I've been looking forward to this actually [laughs] 
[pause] I think she was Muslim with dark hair and brown eyes just a cute 
little girl coming over to my house to play like a friend [pause] and just 
games and things that little girls do.  
  
Interviewer:  How has it been for you to talk to me about this ?  
  
Respondent:  Less nervous that I thought I would be I thought it was going to be  
rather strange hearing myself talk to a stranger about it after all it's not that 
common is it [pause] or maybe not as like normal as other things that children 
do like dress-up games or just playing with a Barbie doll or whatever actually I 
didn't have a Barbie to be honest [laughs] that's another thing my father wasn't 
in favour of but I definately did have dolls I was not a deprived child [laughs] I 
think he was more into pushing us to be clever or educated like doing 
educational stuff as kids maybe that he considered worthwhile to our 
development. [pause] And we've all done fairly well academically so it can't have 
been that bad of a childhood but I'm the only one out of my siblings that had a 
little imaginary friend neither of my sisters have.[pause]  
  
Interviewer:  Is there anything else you would like to add about your 
experience anything you feel is important or that you'd like to share  
 
Respondent:  Mmm, think that is about all I can remember I have thought a lot  
about it since I heard about this but nothing new that I haven't said. I 
could just emphasise that it was an enjoyable experience as most 
childhood things are and probably quite special for me in terms of why I 
had one of that I am uncertain and that's what I've given quite a bit of 
thought too maybe because again as I said earlier it's quite a unique thing 
[pause] and I wondered if it was obviously there are some theories about 
only children and being lonely but I can say I wasn't an only child and I 
never felt lonely or lacking friends friends didn't come to our house alot 
though to play like we didn't have sleepovers but that's a culture thing too 





Interviewer:   Anything else you would like to add [pause] If not, then we'll take a listen to 
the recording just to check and make sure you're satisfied with what you've said and if you 
want to add or omit any wording. Okay   
  
=================================================  
Interviewer:    Caroline   
Respondent:                     P- 8    
    
Interviewer:  
  
I'd like to know as much about your imaginary friends or friendships as 
possible and so there is not a specific format for our conversation today 





Okay. I’ll hopefully remember think I will [pause] some of the images are very 




Yes in your own time and in your own words   
Respondent:  
  
Alright then I'll begin by telling you what I think you'd be most interested in or what 
I think is most clear in my mind to recall. My friend's name was Claudia and she 
was about my age maybe my same age and was the opposite to me in looks. 
This may sound strange but I do want to be honest and say she wasn't as pretty 
as me maybe again that's how I purposely wanted her to be so I was prettier but 
she had the opposite looks like dark hair dark brown eyes and dark tanned skin 





Okay so there is quite a clear sense of what she was like ?  
  
Respondent:   Yes like I said it's clear to me how we were how opposite in looks and personality 
but that I liked her cause she was different in these ways so maybe no threat to 
me or just other parts of myself that I wasn't comfortable with but I'm sure there 
many reasons which you know about why people have imaginary friends . I was 
very aware as a child of my physical appearance what I looked like and I think my 
mum especially felt quite proud of how cute I was cause of the wavy blonde hair 
and blue eyes and in other ways too I just seemed like the typical English rose 





So for you there is a sense of your imaginary friend Claudia being different 
or opposite  ?  
  
Respondent:   
  
Yeah but in a complimentary way all the things I wasn't so we kind of made a 




And what was the friendship like ?   
Respondent:  
  
I liked her and wanted her to be my friend but I do remember we didn't always 
get on I could angry with her and send her home away from me when I would get 
fed up. I used to talk with my mum about it especially if I was angry or frustrated 
with Claudia then mum would just have to sit and listen to me going on about 
something that Claudia had done or something that I was pissed off about  
[laughs]  I guess I probably did talk to mum my mum about other nice stuff we'd done like when we were 




    
Interviewer:  So your mum knew about the friendship ?  
 
Respondent:  yes  
    
Interviewer: And what about the rest of the family   
  
Respondent:  I’m an only child [laughs] that’s the stereotype for imaginary playmates isn’t it  
being an only child I’ve heard. For me though I wasn’t lonely or bored we have family I’ve got cousins not far 
away that I played with growing up. So being an only child although that’s what I’ve heard in my case I’m not 
sure I would take that as the reason [laughs]   
    
Interviewer: So for you it wasn’t a case of being lonely or bored you say and you spoke to your mum 
about it did you take Claudia to school or play with her and other friends at the same time   
    
Respondent:   [long pause] I don’t recall playing with other friends and her at the same time no for example 
as I said I’ve got cousins and I don’t think I played with them and Claudia at the same time [pause] , I’m 
trying to remember and it’s not something I’ve thought about but I think if it happened I would remember that 
[pause] it was probably just me and her.  
    
Interviewer: Just you and Claudia ?  
Respondent:  Yes  us   
    
Interviewer: Any other memories about this relationship that you’d like to tell about, to share  
    
Respondent: [laughs] I actually can’t believe I’ve said this much already it’s not something I’ve really 
thought about in ages like I said in the beginning there are some images memories that are clear and then 
other things I’m not sure about I don’t want to make up anything that’s not in my actual memory   
    
Interviewer: It’s all about what you remember as it’s your story here that I’m interested in and I do 
appreciate it. So there’s no rush for me but if you’ve finished then we can listen to the recording I’ve 
got earphones for listening privately and as I said at the start if there’s anything you want added or 
removed we can do that     
                 
========================================================================     
Interviewer: Caroline W      
Respondent:   P-9  
Interviewer: Okay as I said it’s up to you wherever you would like to begin [pause], if you’d like to 
start with maybe your memories of the companionship and we can go from there 
Respondent:  
  
There was never one single character as an imaginary friend, but what I 
had instead was I was interested in writing as a kid and, of course, as a 
kid I wrote fiction which is basically creating imaginary characters and 
then speaking to them and making them speak to each other. The 
earliest I can remember is, I wrote my first poem when I was seven so. I 











Yes but there were quite a few   
Interviewer:  
  
Okay. That’s fine.  
  
Respondent:   I think something around, well I can’t give an exact age, but somewhere 
between five and eight, I would have started to creating these 
characters speaking to them and again then they speak to each other. I 
remember writing this one story, I don’t know how old I was, might have 
been eight or nine. I had two cats and then I created something I called 




That sounds interesting, snow cats .  
  
Respondent:   And they go to Brighton on an adventure. But I’d been to Brighton so I’m 




And these are now your imaginary characters, these two cats?  
Respondent:  
  
Yeah, they were with me in my mind for the time being and then they 
were replaced by other characters later on. I started to get inspiration 





Sorry it’s a bit noisy, that's fine ,carry on you were saying about 
your imagination ?  
  
Respondent:   Yeah and then I’d play around with the characters a little bit and then 






Respondent:   The stories that I wrote and their lives off the pages as well. All my life 
has been filled with fantasy stuff. They did start as characters in a story 








Respondent:   And then I think that stuck to me as I had that almost I don’t know as I 
said I don’t know how far back they go but even today half of my 
thinking is dialogues and usually that dialogue is between me and some 
other person and that some other person usually is someone instead of 
some random person. Especially when thinking about something 
abstract. It’s much easier to, imagine your talking to someone gives it 
much more structure your thoughts can follow a certain order. Imagine 
your speaking to someone and depending on who I imagine I’m 
speaking with if I’m imagining that I’m speaking to someone like in 
academics I can explain what I’m thinking in a much more complex way 
or if I’m trying to explain to a friend who has no idea about what I’m 
doing I will imagine explaining to that person in a much more watered 




 You’ve mentioned that you got inspiration or some ideas from 




   
One of the stories I wrote like a diary. Was like a diary, but a fantasy 
and I had all my classmates with different names and pretty much the 
way they were.  I would also imagine the school that I was in as well and 
it was quite a large school about the size of this campus I think and 
there were some underground water depots or something like that. One 
of the stories that these three characters that I created by myself would 
go down that and then whatever adventures they had there. So one of 
them was, it was basically about discovering something. Discovering 
mysteries. I mean I think that's a recurring theme in most of the stories I 
wrote. Discovering something and there are quite a lot of monologues 
as well. Someone trying to explain something to someone else. Trying 









Well they weren’t significant in my family at all. There was the real world 




Okay alright.  
  
 
Respondent:   In my world there were quite a lot of different characters. Sometimes I’d 
speak to one character, sometimes I’d speak to another character. And 
these would all change I mean depending on what I want to think about 
and how I want to think about it. I would usually have a certain character 
in front of me in my mind and then I’d be talking to that character and 
usually that character would keep on asking as if it was as curious as I 







So they would ask you things?  
  
Respondent:   Yes, about what I know. So to be a bit definitive it had a certain amount 
of significance but they were usually detached from the rest of the 







Yeah absolutely they were private.  
Interviewer:  
  
 Okay.  
Respondent:   I mean they had inspiration from the outside I’m sure, but they didn’t 




Okay correct me if I’m wrong So you had certain characters that 
were interchangeable in other words in a particular situation you 
would utilize one, but the others wouldn’t necessarily disappear?    




Okay, were they kind of continuous or were they transient?  
  
Respondent:   Both. Some characters would last a week and they would go, other 







 I was writing a long fantasy story when I was 13 and there I had five 
characters and today I’m still planning on writing a very long fantasy 
story. I’m planning on 11 books now and I’m thinking one of those 
characters that I imagined 10 years ago. Actually one or two of them I 
think I will keep there. I mean those characters I haven’t spoken to them 








They are still there I mean don’t speak to them, but I will write them 







Do you ever talk about this experience    
Respondent:   Well it’s usually disguised in my writing so I can usually talk about my 
imaginary friends by the things I write so in a disguise. Well its pretty 
much the same thing anyways I mean from one perspective either as a 
disguise as the same thing. I have been able to talk about it as in my 




So compared to say real friendships, say in childhood?  
  







I mean consider that they are an affliction of myself at the end of the 




About ?  
Respondent:   Whatever I am curious about as well, wanting to understand things that 





Respondent:   I mean back in the day when I was trying to understand some 
philosophy concepts when I was 13 I would, the best way of 
understanding them would be trying to explain it, trying to explain it to 
one of these characters. That would be the best way of understanding a 
philosophy concept. It’s not me, its nothing to do with me, but a clear 
effective way of understanding something actually in dialogue. I bet 




Yes. Okay anything else you would like to add before we listen to 
the tape?  
  
Respondent:   I think that one thing they have added to me is a certain part of creativity 
and a certain amount of, what was the word? [pause] I can’t remember 
but every person has a unique language and a way of explaining and 










I think these characters helped me to develop that, my own way of 








And plus I think they fostered a lot of creativity as well because although 
I didn’t share a lot what I wrote with most people back in the day these 
were part of it always, there was always something to share my 
creativity with and because I – well although I was quite silent I wrote 




That’s interesting .  
Respondent:   So I think it had an effect in developing my own unique language just as 





 Do you have brothers or sisters?  
  




Great thanks for this for sharing and your time. We’ll just take a 
listen to the tape to see if there’s anything you’d like changed to 








 Appendix 2 : Reflective Field Notes  
The following are diary reflections made during the course of this project.  
A fellow PhD research student asked me to share a little more about my research with him, 
and in particular seemed eager to know about what ‘constituted’ an imaginary companion. 
“What exactly is it Caroline?” was his question.  
I felt, as I have felt before, that I did not want to provide a definition – someone else’s 
definition- in the likelihood that this colleague wanted to share a story, his story. So I did what 
I’ve done before. I offered a loosely crafted explanation of my understanding of an imaginary 
companion. I said that it was a “fictitious other” with which children “regularly and consistently” 
engage, over an “extended period of time”, and that the relationship between child and 
imagined other is “pretty significant”. I added that it may well be an object, that some research 
has shown objects like teddies and dolls, (personified objects), to be conceptually equivalent to 
the traditionally defined imaginary friend. And that is where I ended my academic explanation 
and paused.  
This was a reflective pause, done almost subconsciously, to process what I’d just said. To 
make sure it made ‘academic sense’, that it was right and valid. The pause didn’t seem 
uncomfortable, and it was spontaneously followed by his sharing of a story. I will not go into 
details other than to say that his childhood experience of an imaginary relationship was richly 
informative and most unique.  
Seated around the dinner table at a recent social gathering I was asked what my occupation 
was and this took the inevitable turn to my research. There was general chatter about who’d 
had an imaginary friend and various descriptions of the forms these had taken. It was all quite 
light-hearted and spontaneous. Then a Swedish lady sitting alongside me moved in closely 
and, in a low voice, asked why I had earlier said that an imaginary companion “should hold a 
significant place” in the child’s life and why too I had added that they usually are known by the 
parents or caregivers to exist. I explained that they were distinct from other forms of projective 
play and objects in the child’s life and that the quality and quantity of time spent engaged with 
them implied a certain significance. That the rest of the family unit would in due course be 
made aware of their presence, and that children mostly were quite happy to talk to others 
about this relationship. She had a look which I can only describe as concern, then asked, “So if 
the parents don’t know about it, then you’re saying it doesn’t exist? So what if I had one and 




I was really taken with this response and again almost forced to pause and think. How 
potentially limiting our definition for this phenomenon may be, and how many stories out there 
will be discounted and/or extinguished.  
Annual progress monitoring interview – have I made any ‘progress’? I feel certain  
I’ve worked thoroughly but what can be shown for it? So much of the process is 
undocumented – reading, supervision, rough drafts, reading more, deleting, and so it 
goes with little trace of my efforts. I have to take this as an academic requirement and 
that’s that. Do I go boldly into this dark moment or with cap-in-hand?  
I’m stuck. The methodology write up is not happening. Not happening as it should nor as I want 
it to. The supervisory team seem to be feeding back the same thing over and over. So they too 
are now stuck. Pages of writing are being erased because I’ve lost my authorial voice. Then I 
begin overcompensating and the voice is loud and impeding. A borrowed voice?  
A month passes and I’m still stuck. I went on a vacation – to vacate my head, to be empty. It 
was of little practical benefit as I didn’t return with beautifully crafted methodological chapters, 
in fact I wrote nothing. The break did something to ease the mental fatigue perhaps. I’ve 
returned with a suntan and some wooden handcrafted curios.  
I had my now bi-monthly supervision meeting and am grateful for their understanding. I know 
this balancing act of how much pressure to exert must be difficult more so because I am 
erratic. I am an erratic Doctoral student. Is this every supervisors bad dream? The ontological 
interrogation is incessant and exhausting but I’ve finally got something to show for it. 
Collapsing space and time.  
Human Geography wasn’t something I’d considered but seems to work. It makes sense to use 
it as a way of explicating my idea of temporality/ temporal landscape. One life, multiple selves / 
multiple lives and one negotiated self? The ecology of memory – Is it really a case of 
reconstructing previous selves? I’m not so sure, perhaps a debate left for another time.  
Feel content with the writing I’ve done around Chris Philo and Owain Jones. My writing is 
flowing but flowery, too lyrical for a thesis methodology. I frantically read archived theses and 
dissertations, getting a sense of where I need to aim. Scrutinizing my work for academic rigour 
– I’m reminded of the ‘Good enough’ philosophy. There’ll have to come a point where I stop re-
doing work. So stop re-doing it!  
Committed myself to researching phenomenology. I would like to get my head around both the 
philosophical and practical ideas of this discipline. Small steps, lots of reading and 
consolidation. My last supervision meeting has lessened anxiety around using 
phenomenology. Moving more towards ideas of Heidegger and van Manen. Will start reading 
Edward Casey’s work : ‘Imagining’ and ‘Remembering’. How apt: The phenomenological 




Today met with a faculty member not of my supervisory team but an experienced researcher 
and philosopher, someone who may share their ideas on phenomenology. There is obviously a 
measure of anxiety – academic insecurity? This is new for me, not only the area of 
phenomenology but the act of ‘reaching out’. I feel out of my depth despite having done the 
mental preparation.  
A few days and one supervision meeting later I am feeling positive, optimistic. I feel confident 
that the data will be authentically represented and I will do justice to the participants. The 
actual write up has not happened yet, this is where I lose my legs.  
Auspicious time. I’ve taken the transcripts out the bottom drawer in a manner of speaking. 
Allowed myself to begin reading through the narrated interviews and my own memory is at 
work; seems like yesterday that I was sitting listening to these stories. Reading the transcripts 
is less evocative than listening to the audio recordings. I must do both.  
I’ve given up on using The Listening Guide – that was going to be my unique contribution to 
the field and I am fond of the I-POEM as a way of making sense. I really thought this was it ! 
I’ve got notes on the theory and have started working through the stages of the 
analysis…Seems a ridiculous notion at this late stage to change methods but I feel I have to. 
After really looking at the transcripts again there is no room for otherness in the listening guide, 
is there… I get a clear, strong sense of agency and ego presence but little scope for context so 
what do I do? Is it literally back to the drawing board?? There is of course the probability that 
I’m not understanding all of the listening guide. It is an interpretive approach and that’s what 
I’m wanting. Not sure where to turn for help on this. Is it used to capture multiple voices of one 
self? The whole point of my work is not to lose anything – that’s how I work therapeutically, no 
stone unturned. This is not a psychological case study !   
The analysis, or better described as the interpretation, is pleasant. I feel engaged, on a daily 
basis I’ve been seated at my desk with my companions – the participants, their stories, some 
of their family members. It’s really quite a sociable affair! And somehow as I am the designated 
researcher there is the part where I make sense of all the talking at the table. My 
understanding of the phenomenological analysis is to step behind the voices, the images, 
reaching into the sense-of. I have been working hard. Well, I’ve been doing a lot of work on 
paper but it hasn’t felt like work. Why? Today is an important supervision meeting for me. I will 
feel lost without this project. And lonely I’m sure. The voice is a strange thing. I’ve recorded my 
voice today and the feeling when listening to it played back is one of discomfort. Dissociation is 
a word that pops to mind. Although I’m tempted to erase it that hardly seems fair – none of the 
participants I interviewed asked for their recordings to be erased. In fact, there was I gleaned a 







 Appendix 3: Participant Invitation  
  
  
   
  
Study title : Re-presentations of Childhood Imaginary Friendships : A  
Narrative Account  
 You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether or not to take 
part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. 
Please take time to read the following information carefully.  
Purpose: The aims of this study are to explore adult memories of their childhood 
imaginary companions. Narrative methodology is a form of story collection and in this 
study we seek to collect stories from those Brookes students who believe themselves to 
have had an imaginary companion. The study is part of a PhD research thesis, and will 
run from April 2013 to September 2013.  
There is a great deal of interest in children’s various forms of symbolic play as well as 
early friendships and much can be learnt from listening to adult memories of their own 
unique forms of play. Imaginary friendships are an important part of childhood and 
social science researchers are eager to find out more about this key phase in 
development.  
Why have you been invited to participate? If you have a) seen the recruitment 
notice on campus or the message on Facebook, b) are a registered Oxford Brookes 
student, c) have good conversational English ability and, d) you feel willing and able to 




approximately 30 other Brookes students who have also volunteered. Participants are 
sought from a range of backgrounds.  
Do you have to take part?  It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do 
decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a 
consent form. If you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time and without 
giving a reason. Your decision to take part, decline to take part or withdraw at any time 
will in no way have any impact on any academic assessment or programme of studies at 
Oxford Brookes University.  
What does your participation involve? If you volunteer to be a part of this study 
you will be asked to meet the researcher on campus at a time and place, for example the 
library, an outside area, or a quiet spot in the cafeteria.  
The researcher will go through the consent forms with you, explaining the voluntary 
nature of the study and its purposes, and will ask you to sign a participant consent 
form.  
 The researcher will ask your permission to use an audio recording device (tape 
recorder), and if you are comfortable with this, then you will begin in any manner you 
choose to share what you remember about your childhood imaginary friend.  
 If you decide you do not want to be recorded, then you are free at any stage to ask the 
researcher to turn the recorder off.  
Once you have finished sharing your story, the researcher will play back the recording 
so that you have the opportunity to add or remove anything from the conversation.  
You will also be asked to complete a short 9-item feedback form. This form requires no 
writing, only that you select a choice of statement which best matches how you feel. 
The purpose of the feedback form is I) for you to be able to summarise your 
experience(s) of the interview, 2) get a sense of closure following your sharing of early 
memories, and 3) provide the researcher with information that may assist in addressing 
future research efforts.  
All of this should take between 30-60 minutes.  
If at any stage during this time you are uncomfortable for any reason, or need to take a 
drink or toilet break for instance, you are free to do so.  
What are the possible benefits of taking part?  Volunteers will get an 
opportunity to share their experiences of having an imaginary friend, something that they 




will inform further research on this topic and ultimately contribute to the body of 
knowledge in this area.  
Will what you say in this study be kept confidential?  
 All information collected will be kept strictly confidential (subject to legal 
limitations).  
Your words will not be connected to your name, unless you specifically choose 
otherwise. Once the stories shared have been thematically sorted, a number will be 
used for identification purposes. Unless prior consent has been given by you in writing, 
your words will not be used in academic presentations, journal articles and the like.  
Data generated by the study must be retained in accordance with the University's policy 
on Academic Integrity. The data generated in the course of this research will be kept 
securely in paper or electronic form for a period of ten years after the completion of a 
research project.  
What will happen to the results of the research study? This narrative study and 
its results form part of a larger PhD project undertaken in the School of Education, 
Oxford Brookes University. The results from this study can be obtained from the 
researcher towards the end of the academic year 2013, and participants are encouraged to 
contact the researcher at this time for a copy.  
Who is organising and funding the research? I am conducting this project as a 
student at Oxford Brookes University, Department of Education, Faculty of Humanities 
and Life Sciences, Oxford, UK.  
Who has reviewed the study? The research has been approved by the University 
Research Ethics Committee, Oxford Brookes University.  
What should you do if you want to take part? Contact the researcher, Caroline 
Way, by email : 12046447@brookes.ac.uk  
Or, contact the research Supervisor, Georgina Glenny : goglenny@brookes.ac.uk  
Contact for Further Information Researcher : Caroline Way 07856469747 / 
12046447@brookes.ac.uk  




If you have any concerns about the way in which the study has been conducted, you 
should contact the Chair of the University Research Ethics Committee on 
ethics@brookes.ac.uk  
Thank You for taking time to read the information sheet.  
 
   
Appendix 4: Consent Form  
   
    
                                        
  
Full title of Project : Imaginary Companionship and Adult Memory Narratives: 
An Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis  
Name, position and contact address of Researcher: Caroline D. Way, PhD 
research student, Tel 07856469747, email : 12046447@brookes.ac.uk. 
Department of Education, Oxford Brookes University, Harcourt Hill Campus, 
Oxford, OX2 9AT.  
 Please initial  
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the 
above    study and have had the opportunity to ask questions.  
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw 
at any time, without giving reason.  
3. I agree to take part in the above study  
Please circle  
4. I agree to the use of anonymised quotes in publications   Yes / No  
  




Appendix 5  
Narrative Fluency Prompts  
Researcher’s Narrative Fluency Prompts : Imaginary Companion Study 2013  
Researcher to establish rapport with volunteer at the beginning of the meeting :  
“ Hi ABC I’m Caroline, nice to meet you. Thanks for volunteering for this study, 
it’s really appreciated. Would you like a tea/coffee/ before we get started. I’m 
hoping the cafeteria won’t get too busy at this time, but if it does, we can just 
move over there where it’s quieter.  
As I mentioned when you first volunteered, I will have this little tape recorder on 
so as to make certain I don’t miss anything or forget anything, but if at any 
stage you feel you’d be more comfortable speaking without it on, then that’s 
not a problem.  
 I’m just going to go through a few forms with you, basically making sure you 
understand the purpose of the study and are comfortable with the entire 
process. And if you have any questions or concerns as we go through these 
forms, please just stop me and ask.  
(Researcher will go through participant information sheet and consent form, 
and mention that there will be a short feedback form at the end).  
The following are a list of potential questions to be asked should the narrative 
flow be interrupted by, for example, extended silences or when it is obvious 
that the participant is struggling, for example, getting frustrated with accessing 
memory content.  
• If you would like, you could start by telling me what you remember 
about your imaginary friend  
• What are some of your clearest memories of your companion?  




• How do you think your childhood, (or other time in your life when you 
had the imaginary friend),may have been different had you not had 
this friendship?  
• Looking back at your relationship with your imaginary companion, how 
do you think that friendship compared to other friendship(s) say with 





Appendix 6: Information Poster   
  
Imaginary Friend  ?  
Students at Brookes  
As part of my PhD research, I am 
interested in hearing stories from any of 
you who had an imaginary friend as  
a child. If you are happy to share your memories of 
your imaginary friend with me, or would like to find out 
more about my study, please email me. We will arrange a 
time that best suits you, and will meet on campus for 
about 30 minutes.   
THANK YOU  ………  CAROLINE  





   Appendix 7: Feedback Form  
PARTICIPANT FEEDBACK : Imaginary Companion Study 2013  
  
Directions: Please indicate the choice that best expresses your feelings about the statements 
below by circling one of the five choices. Your choices are Strongly Disagree (SD), Disagree 
(D), Undecided (U), Agree (A), or Strongly Agree (SA).  
1. I expected something different from this experience   SD  D  U  A  SA  
2. I found it strange sharing my childhood memories with 
the researcher  
SD  D  U  A  SA  
3. I found it relatively easy to recall details about my 
imaginary friend  
SD  D  U  A  SA  
4. Some details about my imaginary friend were difficult 
to remember  
SD  D  U  A  SA  
5. As an adult, I am surprised by the role my imaginary 
friend played in my childhood years  
SD  D  U  A  SA  
6. Some of the things I remember about my imaginary 
friend were difficult to put into words  
SD  D  U  A  SA  
7. I feel the location on campus was suitable and 
appropriate  
SD  D  U  A  SA  
8. I would have been more comfortable sharing my 
stories somewhere else  
SD  D  U  A  SA  
9. I am able and willing to contact the researcher with 
any questions I might have, even if these are at a later 
stage.  
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